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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis deals with topics in decision theory, game theory, and the inter-
face between these two disciplines. The subfield of decision theory under
consideration in the present text, decision under uncertainty, examines how
individualsmake decisions and choices in an uncertain world, and how these
choices are affected by the behavioral constitution of the decision maker.
This is best illustrated by a classic example of Bernoulli (1738), one of the
founding fathers of the field. Consider a lottery ticket that with equal prob-
ability yields either e 20,000, or e 01. The question Bernoulli asked is
at what price one should sell such a ticket. That is, what sure amount of
money would its owner consider an adequate remuneration for the chance
of gaining e 20,000, and the risk of ending up with nothing? Building fur-
ther on this example, one might wonder how the decision at what price to
sell changes if we are not considering a lottery ticket, but rather a bet of e
20,000 on a tennis match between two unknown players. And how would
things change if one is not the seller of such a ticket, but the buyer? That is,
at what price should one buy such a ticket?
While these questions may appear academic at first, their importance
reaches far beyond the realm of lotteries and tennis matches. Should I get
insurance against bicycle theft? Should I take the car to work, knowing that
the bus is slower but safer? Should I stop smoking today, knowing that this
may keep me from health problems thirty years from now? These are but
a few examples taken from the abundance of decision problems we face all
the time. By investigating problems like Bernoulli’s, decision theory aims
to unveil the systems underlying the choices we make when presented with
1The currency in Bernoulli’s example is ‘ducates’.
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these predicaments. Not surprisingly, the study of decision making is at the
heart of many social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and economics.
Decision under uncertainty is limited to the study of choice problems for
isolated individuals. This is only part of a bigger story. Especially in the
context of economics, we do not simply operate as isolated elements in an
empty space. We trade, we bargain, we compete and we collude – in short,
we interact. The outcome of a decision made by an economic agent is not
only contingent on what state of the world materializes – winning the lot-
tery/not winning the lottery, tennis player A wins/tennis player B wins – but
also on the actions taken by one or more other agents who are faced with
the same problem: making the decision that is in their best interest, with
the understanding that the outcome depends on the combination of all stra-
tegies played, the others’ as well as their own. Such strategic interactions
are the topic of study in the field of game theory. Ethymologically, this term
can be traced back to the works of John von Neumann (1928) and Ernst
Zermelo (1913) – pure mathematicians who independently applied quanti-
tative analysis to the play of parlor games. By today’s standards, however,
the name ‘game theory’ may be too restrictive. Firms competing for market
share, species fighting for survival, bidders trying to secure the object of an
auction with the lowest possible bid, haggling down a price: all these are in-
stances of games. One should not let the frivolous connotation of that term
obfuscate the true extent of its present definition.
While game theory has a meaningful use in several scientific disciplines,
it is hard to think of any in which it has taken as prominent a place as
in economics. Aside from a couple of stray exceptions, its application to
economic theory began with the publication of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s (1944) landmark book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, in
which they achieved a highly elegant integration of the principles of deci-
sion making put forth by Bernoulli (1738), with the game theoretic concepts
prevalent at the time. The importance of game theory for economics would
become even greater a few years later, when John Nash (1950b) proved the
famous result that each game has at least one equilibrium 2.
In spite of its impressive elegance, the expected utility framework used by
von Neumann andMorgenstern did not remain without criticism. Already in
2What Nash called an equilibrium is known today as a Nash equilibrium. Roughly speak-
ing, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile with the property that each player maximizes
his expected payoff by following his own equilibrium strategy, given that all others do the
same.
12
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the early fifties, Allais (1953) conducted an experiment that revealed that in-
dividuals make choices which are not consistent with that framework. Over
the years, more paradoxes and puzzles appeared that question the expected
utility paradigm, making the call for an alternative decision model louder
and louder. A serious contender – named prospect theory – was developed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They retained the basic structure of the
expected utility model, but enriched it with a number of behavioral aspects
to individual decision making, abundantly documented in psychology liter-
ature of the time. An important feature captured by prospect theory is ref-
erence dependence, leading to loss aversion. Loss aversion is based on the
premise that losses are considered to be more important than gains. How-
ever obvious this claim may seem, until the groundbreaking work of Kahne-
man and Tversky, the idea that the upset of receiving a utility of four when
one of five was expected, tends to exceed the joy of receiving one of six under
that same expectation, managed to elude economists for ages.
Given that Kahneman and Tversky’s decision model specifically takes
into account a number of obvious behavioral quirks, it comes as little sur-
prise that it significantly outperforms its expected utility counterpart. This
success for the case of individual decision making suggests that the integra-
tion of prospect theory with game theory will likewise lead to better models
for the analysis of strategic interactions. However, much of the beautiful fit
of expected utility with the analysis of games, seems to evaporate once we
impose Kahneman and Tversky’s extenstions to the expected utility model.
Indeed, in spite of the obvious appeal of an integrated theory, attempts to
enrich game theoric concepts with elements of prospect theory raise a mul-
titude of nontrivial questions and problems. These are the waters we sail
in the next three chapters. In particular, we investigate the implications of
loss aversion for a selection of well known game theoretic results.
1.1 Loss Aversion in Strategic Interactions
To model loss aversion we adopt the simple approach of Shalev (2000). He
assumed that each player has in mind some utility level r – an expectation or
an aspiration – which separates his spectrum of utility payoffs into gains and
losses. Troughout this thesis, this utility level is referred to as the player’s
reference point. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) pointed out that any utility
outcome x can be expressed as a deviation from that reference point: x =
r+ (x− r). Shalev captured Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) hypothesis that
13
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negative deviations (x− r <0) are more important than positive ones (x− r ≥
0) with the simple, but elegant transformation
U(x)=


r+ (x− r) if x− r ≥ 0,
r+ (1+λ) · (x− r) if x− r < 0,
where the positive parameter λ is a measure of the agent’s loss aversion.
At first glance, introducing this single effect to games hardly seems like a
challenging task. After all, one can simply apply von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s framework to the game, after correcting for players’ loss aversion
with Shalev’s transformation. In spite of the apparent simplicity of the prob-
lem, one quickly stumbles on a highly nontrivial issue: what should be the
players’ reference points? What do they consider gains and what losses? The
road usually taken in the literature is to exogenously specify some utility
level that somehow seems suitable to the situation. We learn from Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) p. 453, that such an approach may not be entirely
acceptable.
A decision problem is defined by the acts or options among which
one must choose, the possible outcomes or consequences of these
acts, and the contingencies or conditional probabilities that re-
late outcomes to acts. We use the term “decision frame” to re-
fer to the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and
contingencies associated with a particular choice.
Whether a player considers a payoff to be a gain or a loss, can be assumed to
depend on his decision frame. In a game theoretic context, this implies that
a player’s reference point depends on the strategies he has at his disposal
[the acts], the utility payoffs associated with these strategies [the outcomes],
and – crucially – the strategies played by his opponents [the contingencies].
It follows that, in order to correctly integrate loss aversion with the theory of
games, determining players’ reference points should be taken as an inherent
part of the solution concept they choose to adopt.
1.1.1 The Rubinstein Bargaining Game
Chapter 2 reconsiders Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers bargaining game
under the assumption that bargainers are loss averse. In the classical con-
ception of this game, two bargainers have to divide a perfectly divisible unit
14
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good. They do so by alternatingly proposing to one another some division
of that good, a procedure that continues until one makes an offer which
is accepted by the other. In this case bargaining ends, and players obtain
the utility payoffs implied by the accepted proposal. Rejecting a proposal
is costly in the sense that it is assumed to lead with a small, but strictly
positive probability, to a breakdown of the negotiations, leaving both players
with a zero payoff3. Without going into the specifics, Rubinstein constructed
a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) in this game, and proved that it was
the only such equilibrium.
In the current setup, each bargainer is assumed to be loss averse, and
the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer in
the past. This implies a nontrivial extension of Rubinstein’s original model
in the sense that payoffs, and therefore also the potential equilibrium stra-
tegies, become dependent on the history of play. As a first major result,
we construct an SPE, in which the strategies depend on the history of play
through the current reference points. The second major result of this chap-
ter is a characterization of this equilibrium. In particular, it is shown that it
is the unique one under three assumptions shared with the classical Rubin-
stein model:
• immediate acceptance of equilibrium offers;
• indifference between acceptance and rejection of such offers;
• strategies only depend on the current set of reference points, and not
on the past play of the game.
While this characterization does not exclude the possibility that other equi-
libria exist, it does show that our SPE is the only one similar to Rubinstein’s.
It is furthermore shown that in this specific equilibrium, being loss averse
is a disadvantage.
Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) showed that the unique SPE
of the classical alternating offers bargaining model results in the Nash bar-
gaining solution (Nash 1950a) outcomes if the probability of breakdown ap-
proaches zero. We establish a similar relation between our equilibrium and
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions (Harsanyi and Selten 1972; Kalai
1977), where each player’s bargaining power is negatively related to own
loss aversion and positively to the opponent’s.
3Rubinstein (1982) adopted the equivalent setup of time discounting, where after each
rejection, the good becomes slightly less valuable.
15
Thesis_Driesen_v04.pdf
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1.2 The Bargaining Problem
In Chapter 3, we turn to Nash’ (1950a) static, ‘one-shot’ bargaining prob-
lem. There, players have to cooperatively agree on an outcome, knowing
that failure to reach agreement leads to an unfavorable outcome for all. To
introduce loss aversion into this setting, we impose Shalev’s (2002) condition
of self-support. Each bargainer who has full information about the bargain-
ing game, the bargaining solution to be used, and the opponents’ attitudes
towards incurring losses, will form some expectation or aspiration about the
payoff he can realize. The fact that payoffs below this reference point are
considered losses and are thus transformed accordingly, implies that the
bargaining problem depends on the a priori expectations of the players. The
condition of self-support then imposes that the payoffs players realize ex
post – using the agreed upon bargaining solution in the transformed game
– are consistent with those ex ante expectations. If an outcome satisfies this
condition for a certain bargaining solution, it is said to be self-supporting
under that bargaining solution.
The idea just described is applied to the n-player Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution (KS) (Kalai, 1977; Peters and Tijs, 1984). The main result of the chap-
ter is that each game has exactly one outcome that is self-supporting under
KS. Since this is necessarily an untransformed element of the bargaining
set, there must exist a bargaining solution that yields exactly this outcome.
We explicitly define this bargaining solution. More specifically, we define a
new class of bargaining solutions, such that each loss aversion profile of the
players is associated with a single solution in this class; this solution then
yields the unique outcome that is self-supporting under KS for the prevalent
loss aversion profile. These bargaining solutions can be interpreted as asym-
metric versions of KS, where the introduced asymmetry in a sense ‘corrects’
for the varying loss attitudes of the players.
The chapter concludes with an axiomatic characterization of this newly
defined solution class. A bargaining solution is in our class if and only if it
satisfies the axioms of Scale Invariance [SI], Individual Monotonicity [IM],
and Strong Individual Rationality [SIR], and a new axiom called Propor-
tional Concession Invariance [PCI]. Roughly speaking, a bargaining solu-
tion satisfies PCI if moving the utopia point in the direction of the solution
outcome does not change this outcome. The traditional axiom of Pareto Op-
timality [PO] is not included in the axiomatization, as it is implied by these
four properties.
16
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1.1.3 Loss Aversion Equilibria
In this chapter we turn to bimatrix games. In this setting, we study three
different types of loss aversion equilibrium. A loss aversion equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium of a game in which the players are assumed to be loss
averse, and where – consistent with the framing concept put forth by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1981) – reference points are made endogenous to the
equilibrium calculation.
The first type under consideration is the fixed point loss aversion equilib-
rium (Shalev 2000). In this equilibrium concept, players’ reference points
depend on the beliefs they have about the strategies of their opponents.
A second type of loss aversion equilibrium, named maximin loss aversion
equilibrium, differs from fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in that each
player’s reference point is based on the support of his opponent’s equilib-
rium strategy, but no longer on the exact probabilities. In the third type,
called safety level loss aversion equilibrium, the reference points depend on
the values of the own payoff matrices.
The introduction of new equilibrium concepts raises an important ques-
tion. Can we always find such an equilibrium? For a fixed point loss aver-
sion equilibrium, Shalev (2002) already answered this question in the affir-
mative, even for games with more than two players. A first result of this
chapter is that for maximin loss aversion equilibria, existence cannot be
guaranteed. By means of an example, we uncover the underlying reason
for this negative result: the best-reply correspondence, associated with this
equilibrium concept, violates upper semi-continuity. Nonetheless, general
existence of maximin loss aversion equilibrium is established for the sub-
class of m×2 and 2×n bimatrix games. The general existence of safety level
loss aversion equilibria is obtained by means of a straightforward fixed point
argument.
The chapter concludes with a comparative statics analysis of all three
equilibrium concepts in the case of 2×2 bimatrix games. In the bargaining
games considered earlier, it is unambiguously true that loss aversion is a
disadvantage. The comparative statics analysis of this chapter reveals that
for bimatrix games, this is not the case. Nonetheless, a condition is obtained
under which a player benefits from his opponent erroneously believing that
he (the player) is more averse to losses than he actually is.
17
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1.2 A Comparative Tool for Risk and Ambiguity
Chapter 5 of this dissertation deals with aversion to risk and ambiguity.
It is well known that the Expected Utility model equates the concavity of
an agent’s utility function with that agent’s degree of risk aversion. We
present a general technique that allows for comparing the concavity of util-
ity functions – and thus risk attitudes – that requires no explicit knowledge
of events or probabilities. This technique, named the preference midpoint
technique, makes use of the close link between consumer theory and deci-
sion under uncertainty that follows from Arrow’s (1964) and Debreu’s (1959)
observation that amounts of a certain good can be reinterpreted as the utility
payoffs associated with a certain contingency. In particular, the preference
midpoint technique makes use of rates of substitution, well known from con-
sumer theory, to analyze preferences under uncertainty. While elementary
in a mathematical sense, this technique is new and implies several general-
izations of classical results:
(a) Yaari’s between-person comparisons of risk aversion without requiring
identical beliefs;
(b) Kreps & Porteus’ information-timing preference without requiring known
probabilities, commitment to backward induction, or violation of reduc-
tion of compound lotteries;
(c) Klibanoff, Marinacci, & Mukerji’s smooth ambiguity aversion without
using subjective probabilities (which are not directly observable) as in-
puts in preference conditions and, again, without requiring backward
induction or violation of reduction of compound lotteries;
(d) Comparative smooth ambiguity aversion without the requirement that
second-order subjective probabilities be identical.
Because our technique completely isolates the empirical meaning of utility,
it sheds new light on the descriptive appropriateness of utility to model risk
and ambiguity attitudes.
1.3 Fictitious Play: A Convergence Result
The thesis concludes with a purely game theoretic result, unrelated to loss
or risk aversion. In particular, it provides an alternative proof for the well
18
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known fact that two-person zero-sum games have the Fictitious Play Prop-
erty [FPP]. Fictitious Play [FP] is a learning process that belongs to the lit-
erature aiming to justify the Nash equilibrium concept using the argument
that boundedly rational players can learn to play equilibrium. In the spe-
cific case of FP, each player myopically plays the strategy that yields him
the highest expected utility payoff, given the empirical past play of his op-
ponent. While updating is frequently taken to occur at discrete points in
time, FP can also be modeled as a continuous process. Games for which the
FP procedure eventually leads to players playing equilibrium strategies are
said to have the FPP.
Robinson (1951) showed that the discrete – and best known – version
of this learning process, converges to a Nash equilibrium4. The result that
zero-sum games have the FPP when FP is assumed to be a continuous pro-
cess, is a folk theorem, but is most frequently attributed to Brown (1949).
While he never seems to have published a rigorous proof, he makes this
claim on several occasions in his work. The result was only formally estab-
lished by Harris (1998). In this chapter, we obtain an alternative proof, both
shorter and easier than the proof of Harris. In particular, it is shown that
Brown’s claim follows from a result of Monderer, Samet, and Sela (1997).
4Existence of Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games was established before by von Neu-
mann (1928).
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Chapter 2
Alternating Offers
Bargaining with Loss
Aversion
2.1 Introduction
One of the characteristics of the Ståhl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982) nonco-
operative approach to the classical problem of dividing a pie between two
players is that preferences are time dependent but do not otherwise depend
on the history of play of the game. In real life bargaining situations it is
very likely that this assumption is violated and that the share of the pie
that an agent finally obtains is evaluated in terms of the history of offers
and counter-offers made so far. In particular, it is likely that a share of
x% is evaluated less if a share of y% with y > x has been within reach at
an earlier stage of the game. This is the phenomenon of loss aversion, and
the objective in this chapter is to study the effect of loss aversion in the
Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game.
Loss aversion was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). We
adopt the simple and elegant version of Shalev (2002). In this version, an
agent’s preference is characterized by a basic utility function, a reference
point, and a loss aversion coefficient: outcomes below the reference point are
regarded as losses and their basic utility values are scaled down by the loss
aversion factor. It is essential that this reference point be endogenous (see
Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In particular, in a game-theoretic context,
what is regarded as a loss is likely to depend on the (history of play of the)
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game.
In this chapter we make the natural assumption that the reference point
of a player is equal to the highest turned down offer of the opponent, since
that represents the share of the pie that could have been obtained with cer-
tainty so far. It turns out that this results in a non-trivial modification of the
Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game: through changed reference
points the game with loss aversion depends on the history of play. Indeed,
while all subgames in the classical Rubinstein model starting with either a
proposal by a player or an acceptance/rejection decision are essentially iden-
tical, in our case these subgames depend on the effect the history of play has
on preferences. This makes the analysis of the game and, in particular, the
characterization of subgame perfect equilibria, much more complicated.
Thus, we consider the Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game
with loss averse players, where the discount factor is interpreted as the
probability of continuation of the game after rejection of a proposal. For
this game, we construct a subgame perfect equilibrium that shares some
features with the subgame perfect equilibrium of the classical game without
loss aversion: immediate acceptance of equilibrium offers – implying that
agreement is reached immediately as well; indifference between acceptance
and rejection of such offers; and strategies depending only on the current
reference points. It turns out that the equilibrium strategies depend on nine
different regions describing the location of the players’ reference points. For
instance, if the reference points are high then we are essentially back in the
classical case since higher offers are not going to be made in equilibrium
and, thus, the reference points will no longer change. But if reference points
are low – we assume them to be zero initially – then the equilibrium pro-
posals are influenced by the possibility of future higher reference points. We
also show that the constructed equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium with the three mentioned properties, but have to leave it as an
open problem whether these properties are necessary for uniqueness.
We include an extensive comparative statics analysis of the constructed
subgame perfect equilibrium. We establish the intuitive result that higher
loss aversion leads to a lower equilibrium share of the pie. We also extend
our results to the case of different discount factors (probabilities of continua-
tion of the game), and to more general (increasing and concave) basic utility
functions. Finally, we establish an asymptotic relation with non-symmetric
Nash bargaining solutions, in the spirit of Binmore et al. (1986). In partic-
ular, we show that a player’s bargaining power is negatively related to own
22
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loss aversion and positively to the opponent’s loss aversion.
Further related literature
Loss aversion with a fixed reference point can be regarded as a special case of
risk aversion. The effect of risk aversion in the Nash (1950a) and Rubinstein
(1982) bargaining models has been studied before, initially in Kihlstrom
et al. (1981) and Roth (1985) in the context of expected utility. For the
more general context of rank dependent utility, see Safra and Zilcha (1993)
and Köbberling and Peters (2003). In all this work the utility functions are
fixed and do not change as a result of (play of) the game.
Closer to the present context is Shalev (2002), who applies a loss aver-
sion transformation to the discount factor, and obtains the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein with the transformed discount factors. Li
(2007) assumes that bargainers prefer disagreement over any share that is
below the highest they have been offered in the past, and finds a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in this setting. Thus, Li’s way of updating ref-
erence points during play of the game bears some resemblance with our ap-
proach. However, Li assumes that reference points grow over time. More-
over, the utility functions in Li’s model have a discontinuous jump that ex-
plicitly ensures that, in equilibrium, each offer made to a player exceeds the
previous offer made to that player.
Compte and Jehiel (2003) assume that after breakdown of the negoti-
ations, the game starts anew at a fixed cost. The first mover is randomly
chosen from the two bargainers, and in each such new bargaining phase,
they have a constant reference point which is based on the proposals made
in the previous phases. The subgame perfect equilibrium they find in this
setting has in common with Li’s that bargainers do not achieve agreement
instantaneously.
Organization of the chapter
Section 2.2 describes the model and in Section 2.3 we construct a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Section 2.4 concerns uniqueness of this equilibrium,
and Section 2.5 collects our comparative statics results. Section 2.6 con-
cludes. Because of their length, all proofs are collected in three Appendices
2.A.1, 2.A.2, and 2.A.3.
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2.2 The Alternating Offers Bargaining Model with
Loss Aversion
In this section we describe the alternating offers bargaining model of Ru-
binstein (1982) and introduce the concept of loss aversion in this model. We
will try to be as nontechnical as is possible without becoming imprecise. A
completely formal treatment is presented in Appendix 2.A.1.
One unit of a perfectly divisible good, the pie, has to be divided among
two bargainers, 1 and 2. The set of all possible partitions of the pie is denoted
as
Z := {(z1, z2)∈R2 | z1+ z2 = 1, z1, z2 ≥ 0} .
Bargaining takes place at time t = 1,2, . . . At odd moments, player 1 makes
a proposal z = (z1, z2) ∈ Z and player 2 decides to accept (Y ) or to reject (N)
this proposal. At even moments, the roles of the players are reversed. If
a proposal (z1, z2) ∈ Z is accepted, then the game ends and each player i
obtains zi. If a proposal is rejected then the game continues to the next
moment with probability 0 < δ < 1, and stops with probability 1−δ. In the
latter case, the game ends in disagreement and no player receives anything,
i.e., the shares (0,0) result. If the game continues forever – which happens
with probability 0 – then again the shares (0,0) result.
A strategy f for player 1 in this game specifies for each odd moment
a proposal in Z, where this proposal may depend on the complete history
of play of the game so far; and for each even moment an answer Y or N,
where this answer may depend on the current proposal and on the rest of
the history of play of the game. A strategy g of player 2 is defined similarly,
with the roles of odd and even moments reversed.
So far, this is the Rubinstein alternating offers mechanism. From here,
however, we deviate by assuming that the players are loss averse. We as-
sume that the basic utility for a player i of obtaining a share zi of the pie
is just equal to zi,1 but that shares zi below some reference point r i ∈ [0,1]
are regarded as losses and scaled down by a loss aversion coefficient λi ≥ 0.
More precisely, player i evaluates zi by the function
w(zi, r i,λi) :=
{
zi if zi ≥ r i ,
zi−λi(r i− zi) if zi < r i .
1This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.
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or, equivalently, by
w(zi, r i,λi)= (1+λi)zi−λimax{r i, zi} . (2.1)
Loss aversion was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). We
use the simplified version of Shalev (2002). We assume that the loss aversion
coefficients of the bargainers are given and fixed. The reference points of the
players, however, are determined endogenously, in the following way.2 At
some moment t, consider all the offers made to player i by the other player
j so far, possibly including the offer that is on the table at moment t. These
represent all the shares of the pie that player i could have obtained up to this
moment with certainty. Then, it is natural to assume that the maximum of
those shares is player i’s reference point, since this is what he could have
obtained: lower shares represent losses with respect to this reference point,
and are evaluated according to (2.1).
Thus, we assume that the initial reference points are 0 and write r01 =
r02 = 0; and that at any moment t ≥ 1, player 1’s and 2’s reference points are
equal to
rt1 =max{0, zs1 | s=2,4, . . .≤ t}, rt2 =max{zs2 | s=1,3, . . .≤ t} ,
if z1, z2, . . . , zt ∈ Z are the proposals made up to time t. Observe that incor-
porating loss aversion in this natural way causes a crucial difference with
the classical Rubinstein bargaining game: the game is no longer history in-
dependent. For instance, subgames starting at odd moments are no longer
identical copies of the whole game, since reference points and therefore pay-
off functions may have changed during the play of the game.
Recall that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in the clas-
sical Rubinstein bargaining game (without loss aversion) has the following
characteristics: (i) it is time and history independent, that is, players always
make and accept the same proposals; (ii) in equilibrium every proposal is
immediately accepted; and (iii) in equilibrium a player is always indifferent
between acceptance and rejection. Also in our model with loss aversion we
look for an SPE but, clearly, we cannot expect to find a history independent
equilibrium. In the next section, we will construct an SPE in which, instead,
the strategies of the players are stationaryMarkov strategies: proposals and
2Endogeneity of the reference point is an essential assumption in prospect theory, see
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). If we would assume exogenous, fixed reference points then
our model would reduce to a special case of the standard Rubinstein bargaining model.
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acceptance/rejection decisions depend only on the current reference points,
and not on time or on the history of play of the game otherwise than through
the effect on reference points. This equilibrium will still satisfy (ii) and (iii)
and, in fact, we will show that it is the unique SPE with stationary Markov
strategies and satisfying (ii) and (iii). Whether dropping one or more of these
three conditions allows for different SPE is an open question.
2.3 A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Heuristically, the SPE in the Rubinstein model is based on the idea that the
proposal of a player i should make his opponent j indifferent between that
proposal and the proposal of j himself in the next round. We will employ the
same idea to construct an SPE in our model with loss averse players.
Consider an odd time moment t, where player 1 makes a proposal x ∈ Z.
Suppose that after rejection player 2 makes the proposal y ∈ Z at time t+1.
Let r2 be player 2’s reference point at time t−1 (so r2 = x2 at t= 1). To make
player 2 accept the proposal x we would need
(1+λ2)x2−λ2max{r2, x2}≥ (2.2)
δ [(1+λ2)y2−λ2max{y2,max{r2, x2}}]− (1−δ)λ2max{r2, x2} .
That is, player 2 should value the offer x at time t at least as highly as
his own offer y in the next period after having rejected x. The analogous
inequality at even moments is
(1+λ1)y1−λ1max{r1, y1}≥ (2.3)
δ [(1+λ1)x1−λ1max{x1,max{r1, y1}}]− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, y1} .
To construct the equilibrium, we assume that the inequalities (2.2) and (2.3)
are equalities. Let µi := 1+λi(1−δ) for i = 1,2. Then elaborating (2.3) with
equality yields the following three cases:
1. r1 > x1 > y1: δx1 = y1 .
2. x1 ≥ r1 > y1: δx1 = (1+λ1)y1−δλ1r1 .
3. x1 > y1 ≥ r1: δx1 =µ1y1 .
These three cases are exhaustive – it is easy to check that the case y1 ≥ x1
cannot occur. From (2.2) we obtain three similar cases:
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I. r2 > y2 > x2: δy2 = x2 .
II. y2 ≥ r2 > x2: δy2 = (1+λ2)x2−δλ2r2 .
III. y2 > x2 ≥ r2: δy2 =µ2x2 .
By combining these equations we obtain a partition of the unit square [0,1]2
of all possible pairs of reference points (r1, r2) into nine sets. These sets are
accurately depicted in Figure 2.1, and denoted by X1,I, . . . ,X3,III. Within one
and the same set X ·,· the equilibrium proposals of the players take the same
form, which may or may not depend on the specific values of the reference
points within the set.
r1
r2
0
b
b
b
b
X3,III X2,III X1,III
X3,II
X2,II
X1,II
X3,I X2,I X1,I
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
δ
1+λ2+δ
1
1+δ
1+λ1
1+λ1+δ
1
δ
(µ
2 −
δ
)
µ
1 µ
2 −
δ
2
δ
1+
λ
1 +
δ
1
1+
δ
1+
λ
2
1+
λ
2 +
δ
1
Figure 2.1: The partition X1,I, . . . ,X3,III.
A formal description of these nine sets and of all associated equilibrium pro-
posals is given in Appendix 2.A.1. Here we limit ourselves to the main as-
pects.
In the set X1,I the reference points are relatively high and the classical
Rubinstein proposals
x1,I =
(
1
1+δ ,
δ
1+δ
)
, y1,I =
(
δ
1+δ ,
1
1+δ
)
.
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obtain. These are independent of the values of the reference points.
Also in the sets X1,III and X3,I the equilibriumproposals are constant and
do not depend on the reference points. In X3,III, which is the relevant set for
the equilibrium outcome in Theorem 2.3.1 below, the equilibrium proposals
are
x3,III =
(
µ1(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
, y3,III =
(
δ(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
µ2(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
.
Again, these proposals do not depend directly on the reference points.
In X1,II and X3,II the equilibrium proposals depend explicitly on player
2’s reference point but not on player 1’s reference point; and in X2,I and X2,III
the equilibrium proposals depend explicitly on player 1’s reference point but
not on player 2’s reference point. In X2,II the proposals depend on both play-
ers’ reference points. Thus, only intermediate valued reference points turn
up in the equilibrium proposals explicitly. An equilibrium share is above the
reference point if this is low, and below the reference point if this is high.
We now define strategies fˆ for player 1 and gˆ for player 2 based on the
sets Xω and associated proposals xω, yω, where ω ∈ {1,I , . . . , 3,III}. Consider
player 1. At any odd moment t and for any reference point (r1, r2), take
the (unique) Xω containing (r1, r2): then player 1 makes the corresponding
proposal xω. At any even moment t and for any reference point (r1, r2), take
again the relevant set Xω: then player 1 accepts a proposal z if and only if
z1 ≥ yω1 . This defines the strategy fˆ . The strategy gˆ for player 2 is defined
similarly.
We now have the following result.
Theorem 2.3.1. The strategy profile ( fˆ , gˆ) is an SPE. The outcome is
x3,III =
(
µ1(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
.
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 is in Appendix 2.A.1.
2.4 A Uniqueness Result
Let ( f , g) be a pair of strategies and consider the following possible condi-
tions on ( f , g).
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(U1) f and g are stationary Markov strategies. Specifically, the proposal
prescribed by f at each odd moment is time independent and depends
only on the reference points at that moment, and the Y /N decision pre-
scribed by f at each even moment depends only on player 2’s proposal
and the reference points at that moment. Similarly for g.
(U2) Immediate acceptance. Any proposal made by player 1 according to f
is accepted by player 2 according to g, and conversely.
(U3) Accept-reject indifference. According to ( f , g), player 2 is indifferent
between accepting (Y) or rejecting (N) a proposal made by player 1,
and conversely.
Note that these conditions are satisfied by the subgame perfect equilibrium
in the classical model (without loss aversion). The equilibrium ( fˆ , gˆ) in The-
orem 2.3.1 was in fact constructed using these assumptions, which makes
the following result intuitive.
Theorem 2.4.1. ( fˆ , gˆ) is the unique SPE strategy profile satisfying (U1),
(U2), and (U3).
The formal (lengthy) proof is presented in Appendix 2.A.2. We now proceed
with a discussion of these conditions.
The condition that the equilibrium strategies are stationaryMarkov stra-
tegies implies that they depend on the history of play of the game only
through the effect this play has on the players’ reference points. Note that
this does not imply that the players are restricted to stationary Markov stra-
tegies: the SPE ( fˆ , gˆ) is resistent to deviations also with other strategies.
The second condition means that any proposal is immediately accepted.
We can in fact show that any SPE must satisfy this condition in some sub-
games, namely those where the reference points are higher than the (equi-
librium) shares of the pie. This is intuitive, cf. the extreme case where the
reference points are equal to 1 and, thus, are fixed throughout the rest of
the game, so that such a subgame is equivalent to the classical game with-
out loss aversion.
The third condition, finally, requires that each player is indifferent be-
tween accepting and rejecting the proposal made by the other player. Note
that it follows from the basic equilibrium condition that accepting a proposal
must make a player at least as well off as rejecting it. In the classical model
with loss neutral players a player j cannot be strictly better off since other-
wise the proposing player i could lower the share of j in the proposal and,
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thus, increase his own share and be better off. This argument, however is
based on the fact that in the classical model the payoffs of the players do
not change as a result of playing the game. In our model we cannot exclude
the possibility that such a deviation by the proposing player i may lead to
rejection by j since j’s new reference point resulting from the rejection may
be lower as it would have been from rejecting the equilibrium proposal. This
may effect not only player j’s future payoff but also the play of the game
after rejection.
Based on many failed attempts to construct different equilibria we are
inclined to think that the conditions (U1)–(U3) are implied by SPE, but, as
mentioned, the question is still open.
2.5 Analysis of the Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the SPE ( fˆ , gˆ) with respect to the loss aversion
coefficients λ1 and λ2 and the probability of continuation δ. We consider
what happens if δ goes to 1 and if the players have different δ’s. We also
consider what happens if the time lapse between proposals tends to zero,
and establish a relation with asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
2.5.1 Comparative Statics of the Loss Aversion Coefficients
The result of playing the equilibrium ( fˆ , gˆ) is the proposal and immediate ac-
ceptance of some distribution of the pie. Here we investigate the dependence
of this distribution on the players’ loss aversion coefficients. We restrict our-
selves to the set of reference point pairs X3,III, since this is the relevant set
at the beginning of the game. Moreover, the comparative statics results in
subgames where the reference points are in different sets Xω, are similar.
Recall that
x3,III =
(
µ1(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
where µi = 1+λi(1−δ). It is sufficient to restrict the analysis to one player,
because what one player gains is exactly what the other player loses. Differ-
entiating with respect to λ1 and λ2 yields
dx
3,III
1
dλ1
=−δ
2(1−δ)2(1+λ2)
(µ1µ2−δ2)2
< 0 ,
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and
dx
3,III
1
dλ2
= δµ1(1−δ)
2(1+λ1)
(µ1µ2−δ2)2
> 0 .
Thus, players are hurt by their own loss aversion and benefit from their
opponent’s. This result also holds for the other subgames. However, if a
player’s reference point is very high, i.e., r1 ≥ xω1 where ω ∈ {1,I, 1,II, 1,III} or
r2 ≥ yω2 where ω ∈ {3,I, 2,I, 1,I}, then the equilibrium is independent of this
player’s degree of loss aversion. For instance, if (r1, r2)∈ X1,II, then λ1 has no
influence on the equilibrium partition, but λ2 has a positive effect on player
1’s payoff and a negative effect on player 2’s.
2.5.2 Convergence Results with respect to the Probability of
Continuation
Convergence of the SPE for a common δ
The question we consider here is what happens to the equilibrium if δ tends
to one. Using l’Hôpital’s rule we derive
lim
δ→1
x
3,III
1 =
1+λ2
2+λ1+λ2
,
and hence
lim
δ→1
x
3,III
2 =
1+λ1
2+λ1+λ2
.
Observe that player i’s payoff is conversely proportional to 1+λ j, where
i, j ∈ {1,2} and i 6= j.
We can repeat this for all subgames. Figure 2.2 shows the nine sets of
Figure 2.1 in the limit for δ going to 1 and the limit equilibrium proposals,
for the case where λ2 >λ1. The limit outcome in X1,I is an equal split of the
pie, (1/2,1/2). In X3,II and X1,II the limit equilibrium partition is (1− r2, r2),
while in X2,III and X2,I it is (r1,1−r1). In X3,I the limit equilibrium partition
is (1/(2+λ1), (1+λ1)/(2+λ1)), and in X1,III it is ((1+λ2)/(2+λ2), 1/(2+λ2)).
Set X2,II collapses to the line piece r1+ r2 = 1 where r1 is in the interval
(1/(2+λ1), (1+λ2)/(2+λ2)). The limit equilibrium partition associated with
this set is (r1, r2).
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Figure 2.2: The equilibrium partitions for δ→ 1, with λ2 >λ1.
Convergence of the SPE for δ1 6= δ2
We generalize the model to the situation where the players have individual
continuation probabilities δ1 and δ2. In our setting, δi is interpreted as
the probability that the game continues after player i rejected j’s proposal.
Inequalities (2.2) and (2.3) generalize to
(1+λ2)x2−λ2max{r2, x2}≥
δ2((1+λ2)y2−λ2max{y2,max{r2, x2}})− (1−δ2)λ2max{r2, x2}
and
(1+λ1)y1−λ1max{r1, y1}≥
δ1((1+λ2)y2−λ2max{y2,max{r2, x2}})− (1−δ1)λ2max{r2, x2} .
All prior results also apply to this more general model. In particular, we
obtain a solution to the above inequalities, considered as equalities, from
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which we construct a strategy profile. This strategy profile is the unique
SPE satisfying (U1)–(U3).
A further generalization that leaves the previous results intact, is when
there is a time lapse ∆ between proposals, and the waiting time for break-
down of the game after player i, i = 1,2, rejected the last proposal, is ex-
ponentially distributed with survival rate βi. Then the probability that
the game continues after player i rejected a proposal is δ∆
i
, where δi =
exp(−1/βi). Since the game starts with the reference points in X3,III , we
limit the analysis to this case. The SPE outcome is
x3,III =
(
µ1(µ2−δ∆2 )
µ1µ2−δ∆1 δ∆2
,
δ∆2 (µ1−δ∆1 )
µ1µ2−δ∆1 δ∆2
)
y3,III =
(
δ∆1 (µ2−δ∆2 )
µ1µ2−δ∆1 δ∆2
,
µ2(µ1−δ∆1 )
µ1µ2−δ∆1 δ∆2
)
where now µi := 1+λi(1−δ∆i ) for i= 1,2. We can derive
lim
∆→0
x3,III =
(
(1+λ2) logδ2
(1+λ1) logδ1+ (1+λ2) logδ2
,
(1+λ1) logδ1
(1+λ1) logδ1+ (1+λ2) logδ2
)
.
In a similar way we obtain
lim
∆→0
y3,III = lim
∆→0
x3,III.
Note that this is an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as described by
Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Kalai (1977). That is, it is the solution to
the optimization problem
argmax
z∈Z
zα1 z
1−α
2 ,
where
α= (1+λ2) logδ2
(1+λ1) logδ1+ (1+λ2) logδ2
. (2.4)
In Appendix 2.A.3, we extend this result to the situation where players have
concave utility functions vi : [0,1]→ [0,1], and the feasible set associated
with the partitions of the pie is
Z˜ := {(v1(γ),v2(1−γ)) | 0≤ γ≤ 1} .
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We construct an SPE, resulting in an x ∈ Z˜, which is a function of δ∆1 and
δ∆2 . Using an argument from Binmore et al. (1986) we show that if ∆ goes to
zero, then the SPE outcome x converges to z˜N where
z˜N := argmax
z∈Z˜
zα1 z
1−α
2 ,
with α as defined by (2.4). Thus, increased loss aversion of a player results
in increased ‘bargaining power’ of the opponent.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the effect of loss aversion in the strate-
gic bargaining game of alternating offers introduced by Rubinstein (1982),
by constructing a subgame perfect equilibrium in the extended model, and
performing a comparative statics analysis on the outcome with respect to
the bargainers’ loss aversion coefficients. We find that being loss averse has
a negative effect on a player’s equilibrium share. We further find that the
outcome of the bargaining procedure converges to an asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution if the exogenous probability of breakdown goes to zero, such
that higher loss aversion leads to higher bargaining power of the opponent.
This subgame perfect equilibrium is the unique SPE that shares three
distinguishing features – stationary Markov strategies, immediate accep-
tance, and accept-reject indifference – with the unique SPE of Rubinstein.
It is an open question whether uniqueness also holds without all or some of
these conditions.
2.A Appendix: Proofs
2.A.1 The Formal Model and the SPE
In this section we formally complete the description of the model and show
that the constructed strategy profile ( fˆ , gˆ) is an SPE (i.e., we prove Theorem
2.3.1).
Formal Model
We divide T =N into Todd := {1,3, . . .} and Teven := {2,4, . . .}. We assume that
players have full information about the history of play: at any time t ∈ T,
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they know all previous proposals, their own as well as those of the other
player.
Define ht, the history of the game at time t ∈ T, as a vector of players’
proposals which have taken place before and at time t. Specifically, ht :=
(z1, . . . , zt), where zs ∈ Z for all s ≤ t. Furthermore, define H t as the set of
all possible histories ht of the bargaining procedure at time t ∈ T. That is,
H t := ∏ts=1 Z. Furthermore, let H0 := {h0}, where h0 is the empty history.
Henceforth, the term ‘history’ is used to indicate non-empty histories.
The players’ strategies are elements in F or G where F is the set of infi-
nite sequences of functions ( f t)t∈T where
for t= 1 : f t ∈ Z,
for t> 1 and t ∈Todd : f t :H t−1→ Z,
for t ∈Teven : f t :H t→ {Y, N},
and G the set of infinite sequences of functions (gt)t∈T where
for t ∈Todd : gt :H t→ {Y, N},
for t ∈Teven : gt :H t−1→ Z.
An agreement path (ht,a) is a history ht ∈H t ending in acceptance of the
time t proposal. The set
A t := {(ht,a) | ht ∈H t}
contains all time t agreement paths. The set
A :=
⋃
t∈T
A t
contains all histories ending in agreement. Similarly, we define a disagree-
ment path (ht,d) as a history ht ∈ H t ending in breakdown of the negotia-
tions upon rejection of the time t proposal. We define D t := {(ht,d) | ht ∈H t}
and D :=⋃t∈TD t. The set C t contains all objects of the form (ht, c), i.e. his-
tories that do not end at time t. Finally, we define
H∞ := {(z1, z2, . . .) | zt ∈ Z for all t ∈T},
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and refer to elements of H∞ as infinite paths. Then
H¯ :=H∞∪A∪D
is the set containing all paths of the game. Observe that a strategy profile
( f , g) ∈ F×G determines a specific play of the game or, equivalently, a set of
paths in H¯. In particular, if ( f , g) leads to agreement on a partition at time
t, then the set of paths associated with that strategy profile contains t−1
paths in D and one in A. If ( f , g) never induces an agreement, then this set
contains a single path in H∞, and countably many in D.
We introduce the function ξi : H¯\H∞→ [0,1] that specifies for each finite
path in H¯ the (physical) share of the pie bargainer i obtains. Specifically, for
all ht ∈H, ht = (z1, . . . , zt), we have
ξi(h
t,a) := zti, and
ξi(h
t,d) := 0.
We define player i’s utility function for (dis)agreement paths as
ui(h
t,a) :=w(ξi(ht,a), r i(ht),λi), ui(ht,d) :=w(ξi(ht,d), r i(ht),λi) .
Furthermore, player i’s utility evaluation of paths in H∞, i.e., perpetual
disagreement, is defined as −λi. That is,
ui(h) :=−λi for all h ∈H∞.
Finally, we define the expected utility function Ui : F ×G→ R. Let t ∈ T
be the point in time up until which the history is known, and let players
play the strategy profile ( f , g) ∈ F×G from then on. Then we say they play
( f |ht, g|ht) at time t+ 1, and we denote by Ui( f |ht, g|ht) player i’s time t
expected utility from the strategy profile ( f , g) ∈ F ×G. This can be exactly
calculated, and is known to both players.
The strategy profile ( f , g) is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if for
every t ∈T and every ht ∈H t, we have
U1( f |ht, g|ht)≥U1( f˜ |ht, g|ht) for all f˜ , and
U2( f |ht, g|ht)≥U2( f |ht, g˜|ht) for all g˜.
The Strategy Pair (fˆ, gˆ)
We first formally describe the nine sets, also referred to as regions, and as-
sociated proposals on which the definition of ( fˆ , gˆ) is based.
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Definition of Xω and x
ω, yω
• Region 1,I
X1,I =
{
(r1, r2)∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 > 1
1+δ , r2 >
1
1+δ
}
.
The equilibrium proposals in X1,I are
x1,I =
(
1
1+δ ,
δ
1+δ
)
, y1,I =
(
δ
1+δ ,
1
1+δ
)
.
[Thus, if both players’ reference points lie above 1/(1+δ), then the regular
Rubinstein outcomes are obtained. In Figure 2.1, the Rubinstein outcome is
the South-West corner point of this set.]
• Region 1,III
X1,III =
{
(r1, r2) ∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 > 1+λ2
1+λ2+δ
, r2 ≤
δ
1+λ2+δ
}
.
The equilibrium proposals in X1,III are
x1,III =
(
1+λ2
1+λ2+δ
,
δ
1+λ2+δ
)
y1,III =
(
δ(1+λ2)
1+λ2+δ
,
1+λ2(1−δ)
1+λ2+δ
)
.
[Observe that this set is a square, and that its North-West corner point lies
on the line r1+ r2 = 1.]
• Region 3,I
X3,I =
{
(r1, r2)∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 ≤ δ
1+λ1+δ
, r2 >
1+λ1
1+λ1+δ
}
.
This set is similar to X1,III, but with the roles of the players reversed. The
equilibrium proposals are
x3,I =
(
1+λ1(1−δ)
1+λ1+δ
,
δ(1+λ1)
1+λ1+δ
)
y3,I =
(
δ
1+λ1+δ
,
1+λ1
1+λ1+δ
)
.
[This set is again a square , and its South-East corner point lies on the line
r1+ r2 = 1.]
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• Region 3,III
X3,III =
{
(r1, r2) ∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 ≤ δ(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
, r2 ≤
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
}
.
The equilibrium proposals are
x3,III =
(
µ1(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
, y3,III =
(
δ(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
,
µ2(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
)
.
• Region 1,II
X1,II =
{
(r1, r2) ∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 > (µ2−δ)+δλ2(1− r2)
(1+λ2)−δ2
,
δ
1+λ2+δ
< r2 ≤
1
1+δ
}
.
The equilibrium proposals are
x1,II =
(
(µ2−δ)+δλ2(1− r2)
(1+λ2)−δ2
,
δ(1−δ)+δλ2r2)
(1+λ2)−δ2
)
y1,II =
(
δ(µ2−δ)+δ2λ2(1− r2)
(1+λ2)−δ2
,
(µ2−δ)+δ2λ2r2
(1+λ2)−δ2
)
.
[Observe that these proposals now depend on player 2’s reference point.]
• Region 3,II
X3,II =
{
(r1, r2)∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ r1 ≤ δ(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r2))
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
< r2 ≤
1+λ1
1+λ1+δ
}
.
The equilibrium proposals are
x3,II =
(
µ1(µ2−δ+λ2δ(1− r2))
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ+λ2r2µ1)
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
)
y3,II =
(
δ(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r2))
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
,
(µ1−δ)(1+λ2)+δ2λ2r2
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
)
.
[In this set player 1’s reference point is low, which explains that the equilib-
rium proposals do not depend on it.]
• Region 2,I
X2,I =
{
(r1, r2)∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ δ
1+λ1+δ
< r1 ≤
1
1+δ , r2>
(µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1)
(1+λ1)−δ2
}
.
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The equilibrium proposals are
x2.I =
(
(µ1−δ)+δ2λ1r1
(1+λ1)−δ2
,
δ(µ1−δ)+δ2λ1(1− r1)
(1+λ1)−δ2
)
y2,I =
(
δ(1−δ)+δλ1r1)
(1+λ1)−δ2
,
(µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1)
(1+λ1)−δ2
)
.
[This set is similar to X1,II.]
• Region 2,III
X2,III =
{
(r1, r2) ∈ [0,1]2
∣∣ δ(µ2−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
≤ r1 ≤
1+λ2
1+λ2+δ
,
r2 ≤
δ((µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1))
(1+λ1)µ2−δ2
}
.
The equilibrium proposals are
x2,III =
(
(1+λ1)(µ2−δ)+δ2λ1r1
(1+λ1)µ2−δ2
,
δ((µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1))
(1+λ1)µ2−δ2
)
y2,III =
(
δ((µ2−δ)+µ2λ1r1)
(1+λ1)µ2−δ2
,
µ2((µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1))
(1+λ1)µ2−δ2
)
.
[In this set player 2’s reference point is low, which explains that the equilib-
rium proposals do not depend on it.]
• Region 2,II
The boundaries of X2,II are described by the boundaries of the neighboring
sets, see Figure 2.1. The equilibrium proposals x2,II and y2,II are given by
x
2,II
1 =
(1+λ1)((µ2−δ)+δλ2(1− r2))+δ2λ1r1
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
,
x
2,II
2 =
δ(µ1−δ+δλ1(1− r1)+λ2(1+λ1)r2)
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
,
y
2,II
1 =
δ(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r2)+λ1(1+λ2)r1)
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
,
y
2,II
2 =
(1+λ2)((µ1−δ)+δλ1(1− r1))+δ2λ2r2
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
.
39
Thesis_Driesen_v04.pdf
Chapter 2. Alternating Offers Bargaining with Loss Aversion
The Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
To prove Theorem 2.3.1, we make use of the one-deviation property. The
one-deviation property says that for a strategy profile ( f , g) ∈ F ×G to be a
subgame perfect equilibrium it is sufficient that no player can improve by
deviating only once, i.e., at one point in time.
Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996) showed that the one-deviation prop-
erty holds in infinite-horizon extensive-form games which are continuous at
infinity3. Continuity at infinity is defined as follows. For any ε> 0 there is a
number t ∈T such that if two strategy profiles ( f , g), ( f ′, g′) ∈ F×G are such
that ( f s, gs)= ( f ′s, g′s) for all s≤ t, then |Ui( f , g)−Ui( f ′, g′)| < ε.
Lemma 2.A.1. The bargaining game with loss averse players is continuous
at infinity.
Proof. Let ε > 0, and let ( f , g) and ( f ′, g′) be strategy profiles in F ×G
satisfying ( f s, gs) = ( f ′s, g′s) for all s ≤ t, where t > maxi=1,2 logδε/(1+λi).
Observe that the largest payoff difference between two such strategy profiles
would emerge when the one yields player i the whole pie at time t+1, while
the other leads to perpetual disagreement. In the former case, player i would
obtain
U i = δt+ (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d),
while in the latter he would obtain
U i = (1−δ)
∞∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d).
From the fact that ui(ht,d)≥−λi for all t ∈T, it follows that
U i = (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d)+ (1−δ)
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−1ui(hs,d)
≥ (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d)+δt(1−δ)(−λi )
1
1−δ
=−δtλi + (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d).
3Another requirement concerns Bayesian updating, but this is automatically fulfilled
since our game is one of perfect information.
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From this and the fact thatU i−U i ≥ 0, we obtain
|Ui( f , g)−Ui( f ′, g′)| ≤U i−U i ≤ δt+ (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d)
+ δtλi− (1−δ)
t∑
s=1
δs−1ui(hs,d)= δt(1+λi)< ε .
Hence, the game is continuous at infinity.
It follows from Lemma 2.A.1 that we can use the one-deviation property.
Denote Ω= {1.I., . . . ,3.III.}.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. To show that ( fˆ , gˆ) is SPE, it is sufficient to show
that there is no subgame in which player 1 (2) can profitably deviate from fˆ
( gˆ) at a single time t ∈T, given that player 2 (1) plays strategy gˆ ( fˆ ). Assume
player 2 plays strategy gˆ. We denote the utility player 1 obtains by following
strategy fˆ by u∗1.
Let ht−1 ∈ C t−1, i.e. ht−1 is a history continuing to the next period. As-
sume ht−1 is such that (r1(ht−1), r2(ht−1)) ∈ Xω with ω ∈ Ω, and that ht =
(ht−1, z) with z ∈ Z. If t is odd (even), then z is proposed by player 1 (2). If
the proposal z is rejected, then the game continues with probability δ to the
next period or ends with probability 1−δ. If the game continues to time t+1,
then it ends in immediate acceptance of the proposal at t+1, since ( fˆ , gˆ) is
the prevalent strategy profile.
To show that fˆ is a best reply to gˆ we distinguish two cases, namely t is
odd and t is even. For each case, we consider three subcases. The reference
point pair (r1, r2) is in Xω where
Case 1. ω ∈ {1,I, 1,II, 1,III}. Then r1 > xω1 > yω1 , and yω1 = δxω1 .
Case 2. ω ∈ {2,I, 2,II, 2,III}. Then xω1 ≥ r1 > yω1 , and yω1 =
δ(xω1+λ1r1)
1+λ1 .
Case 3. ω ∈ {3,I, 3,II, 3,III}. Then xω1 > yω1 ≥ r1, and yω1 = δµ1 x
ω
1 .
t odd, case 1. We distinguish between the following cases:
• z1 = xω1 : In this case player 1 follows strategy fˆ . Player 2 accepts, so
u∗1 = u1(ht,a)= (1+λ1)xω1 −λ1max{r1, xω1 }= (1+λ1)xω1 −λ1r1.
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• z1 < xω1 : Then z2 > xω2 , so player 2 accepts. Player 1’s payoff is u1(ht,a)=
(1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}. Observe that r1 ≥ xω1 > z1 implies that
u1(h
t,a) = (1+λ1)z1−λ1r1.
Then z1 < xω1 implies u1(ht,a)< u∗1 . Hence, the proposal z is not optimal.
• z1 > xω1 : Then z2 < xω2 , so player 2 rejects and proposes yω if the game
continues. Hence, player 1 obtains
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= δ((1+λ1)yω1 −λ1max{yω1 , r1})− (1−δ)λ1r1
= (1+λ1)δyω1 −δλ1r1− (1−δ)λ1r1
= (1+λ1)δyω1 −λ1r1.
Since xω1 > δ2xω1 = δyω1 , we have δu1(ht+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)< u∗1 . Thus, the
proposal z is not optimal.
t odd, case 2. We distinguish between three cases:
• z1 = xω1 : In this case player 1 follows strategy fˆ . Player 2 accepts, so
u∗1 = u1(ht,a)= (1+λ1)xω1 −λ1max{xω1 , r1}= xω1 .
• z1 < xω1 : Since then z2 > xω2 , player 2 accepts. Player 1’s payoff is u1(ht,a)=
(1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}. From
(1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}≤ z1 < xω1 = u∗1 ,
it follows that the proposal z is not optimal.
• z1 > xω1 : Since then z2 < xω2 , player 2 rejects, and proposes yω if the game
continues. Hence, player 1 obtains
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δyω1 −δλ1max{yω1 , r1}− (1−δ)λ1r1
= (1+λ1)δyω1 −λ1r1.
From yω1 =
δ(xω1+λ1r1)
1+λ1 it follows that δx
ω
1 = (1+λ1)yω1 −δλ1r1. Therefore,
u∗1 = xω1 = (1+λ1)
1
δ
yω1 −λ1r1 > (1+λ1)δyω1 −λ1r1.
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Thus, the proposal z is not optimal.
t odd, case 3. We distinguish between three cases:
• z1 = xω1 : In this case player 1 follows strategy fˆ . Player 2 accepts, so
u∗1 = u1(ht,a)= (1+λ1)xω1 −λ1max{xω1 , r1}= xω1 .
• z1 < xω1 : Since then z2 > xω2 , player 2 accepts. Player 1’s payoff is u1(ht,a)=
(1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}. From
(1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}≤ z1 < xω1 ,
it follows that u∗1 > u1(ht,a). Thus, the proposal z is not optimal.
• z1 > xω1 : Since z2 < xω2 , player 2 rejects, and proposes yω if the game contin-
ues. Hence, player 1 obtains
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δyω1 −δλ1max{yω1 , r1}− (1−δ)λ1r1
= δyω1 − (1−δ)λ1r1.
Observe that
u∗1 = xω1 > yω1 > δyω1 ≥ δyω1 − (1−δ)λ1r1.
Hence, the proposal z is not optimal.
t even, case 1. Assume player 2 proposes some z ∈ Z. Accepting gives
player 1
u1(h
t,a)= (1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}.
Rejecting makes his reference point switch to max{r1, z1}; if the game con-
tinues, he proposes xω, and player 2 accepts. Since r1 > xω1 and yω1 = δxω1 , we
have
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω1 −δλ1max{xω1 ,max{r1, z1}}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)δxω1 −δλ1max{r1, z1}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)yω1 −λ1max{r1, z1}.
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Hence, it is optimal to accept the proposal z if z1 ≥ yω1 , and to reject it other-
wise. That is, to play strategy fˆ .
t even, case 2. Assume player 2 proposes some z ∈ Z with z1 ≤ xω
′
1 where
ω′ ∈ {1,I, 1,II, 1,III}. Accepting gives player 1
u1(h
t,a)= (1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}.
If he rejects and the game continues, then the reference point r1(ht) is
max{r1, z1}. Thus, at t+1 we enter a new game in which (max{r1, z1}, r2)
is the prevalent reference point pair. Since (max{r1, z1}, r2) ∈ ω where ω ∈
{2,I, 2,II, 2,III}, we have xω1 ≥max{r1, z1} ≥ yω1 , where yω1 is equal to δ(xω1 +
λ1max{r1, z1})/(1+λ1). At t+1 player 1 proposes xω1 and player 2 accepts, so
rejecting z yields
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω1 −δλ1max{xω1 ,max{r1, z1}}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= δxω1 − (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)yω1 −λ1max{r1, z1}.
If player 2 proposes z ∈ Z with z1 > xω
′
1 , then accepting yields u1(h
t,a)= z1
and rejecting
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω
′
1 −δλ1max{xω
′
1 ,max{r1, z1}}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)yω
′
1 −λ1z1.
Since z1 > xω
′
1 > yω
′
1 , we have u1(h
t,a) > δu1(ht+1,a)+ (1− δ)u1(ht,d). In
general, it is optimal to accept the proposal z if z1 ≥ yω1 , and to reject it
otherwise. That is, it is optimal to follow strategy fˆ .
t even, case 3. Assume player 2 proposes some z ∈ Z with z1 < yω1 . Note
that r1 < xω1 . Hence, rejecting yields
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω1 −δλ1max{xω1 ,max{r1, z1}}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1} (2.5)
= δxω1 − (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}.
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Accepting yields u1(ht,a) = (1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}. Since yω1 = δµ1 x
ω
1 , we
have
u1(h
t,a)= (1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)z1−δλ1max{r1, z1}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
< (1+λ1)yω1 −δλ1max{r1, yω1 }− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1} (2.6)
= (1+λ1)yω1 −δλ1 yω1 − (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
=µ1yω1 − (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= δxω1 − (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}.
Thus, it is optimal to reject z. If player 2 proposes z ∈ Z with z1 ≥ yω1 , then
accepting yields
u1(h
t,a)= (1+λ1)z1−λ1max{r1, z1}= z1.
Let z1 ≤ yω
′
1 where ω
′ ∈ {1,I, 1,II, 1,III}. If player 1 rejects and the game
continues, then r1(ht)= z1, and (z1, r2) ∈ω′′ where ω′′ ∈ {2,I, 2,II, 2,III}. Note
that then yω
′′
1 ≤ z1 ≤ xω
′′
1 . Thus, rejecting yields
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω
′′
1 −δλ1max{xω
′′
1 , z1}− (1−δ)λ1z1
= δxω′′1 − (1−δ)λ1z1 (2.7)
= (1+λ1)yω
′′
1 −λ1z1 .
Since z1 ≥ yω
′′
1 , also z1 ≥ (1+λ1)yω
′′
1 −λ1z1. If player 2 proposes z ∈ Z with
z1 > xω
′
1 , then rejecting yields
δu1(h
t+1,a)+ (1−δ)u1(ht,d)
= (1+λ1)δxω
′
1 −δλ1max{xω
′
1 ,max{r1, z1}}− (1−δ)λ1max{r1, z1}
= (1+λ1)δxω
′
1 −δλ1z1− (1−δ)λ1z1 (2.8)
= (1+λ1)δxω
′
1 −λ1z1.
Observe that z1 > xω
′
1 implies z1 > δxω
′
1 . It follows that z1 > (1+λ1)δxω
′
1 −λ1z1,
i.e. accepting z is optimal.
Thus, we have shown that player 1 can not profitably deviate from fˆ at any
single time t, given that player 2 plays strategy gˆ. The proof that player 2
can not profitably deviate from gˆ at any single time t, given that player 1
plays fˆ , is analogous. Lemma 2.A.1 implies that ( fˆ , gˆ) is an SPE.
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2.A.2 The Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
Throughout this section, we assume that conditions (U1)–(U3) are satisfied.
Preliminary lemmas
Define a bargaining round as an offer made by player 1 and a counter offer
made by player 2. Bargaining rounds are indexed with i ∈ {0,1,2, . . .}. Then
(r i1, r
i
2) is the reference point pair prevalent at the beginning of bargaining
round i. In view of (U1) it makes sense to define
r i+11 :=max{r i1, y1(r i1, r i+12 )}, and r i+12 :=max{r i2, x2(r i1, r i2)}. (2.9)
This allows us to show the following.
Lemma 2.A.2. Given that x(r i1, r
i
2) is player 1’s SPE proposal and y(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )
player 2’s counterproposal, we have
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)=


δ−δy1(r i1, r i+12 ) if r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 )> x2(r i1, r i2)
δ(1+λ2ri+12 )
1+λ2 −
δy1(ri1 ,r
i+1
2 )
1+λ2 if y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2)
δ
µ2
− δ
µ2
y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) if y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2,
and
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=


δ−δx2(r i+11 , r i+12 ) if r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )
δ(1+λ1ri+11 )
1+λ1 −
δx2(ri+11 ,r
i+1
2 )
1+λ1 if x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 )
δ
µ1
− δµ1 x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 ) if x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1.
Proof. This follows from (U2) and (U3), and the definition of the players’
utility functions.
For each ω ∈Ω we introduce the following sets Pω and Qω of pairs of refer-
ence points:
P1,I := {(r i1, r i2) | r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 ), r i1> x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )}
P2,I := {(r i1, r i2) | r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 ), x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 )}
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P3,I := {(r i1, r i2) | r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 ), y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1}
P1,II := {(r i1, r i2) | y2(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2), r i1> x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )}
P2,II := {(r i1, r i2) | y2(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2), x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 )}
P3,II := {(r i1, r i2) | y2(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2), y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1}
P1,III := {(r i1, r i2) | x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2, r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )}
P2,III := {(r i1, r i2) | x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2, x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 )}
P3,III := {(r i1, r i2) | x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2, y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1}
Q1,I := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 ), r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )}
Q1,II := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 ), y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )≥ r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )}
Q1,III := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 ), x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i+12 }
Q2,I := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 ), r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )}
Q2,II := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 ), y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )≥ r i+12 >
x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )}
Q2,III := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 ), x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i+12 }
Q3,I := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )}
Q3,II := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )≥ r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )}
Q3,III := {(r i1, r i+12 ) | y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ r i+12 } .
We derive a series of lemmas for reference point pairs in these sets.
Lemma 2.A.3. For all (r i1, r
i
2)∈ Pω, we have
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)≥ x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )⇔ x2(r i1, r i2)≤ xω2 .
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Similarly, for all (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Qω, we have
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y1(r i+11 , r i+22 )⇔ y1(r i1, r i+12 )≤ yω1 .
Proof. Let ω= 1,I and (r i1, r i2) ∈ Pω. By definition of P1,I we have
r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 ) and r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
From Lemma 2.A.2 we obtain
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2) = δ−δy1(r i1, r i+12 )
= δ−δ(δ−δx2(r i+11 , r i+12 ))
= δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ). (2.10)
Suppose x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )≥ x2(r i1, r i2). Then by (2.10)
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)= δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )≥ δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i1, r i2).
It follows that
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)≥
δ−δ2
1−δ2 =
δ
1+δ = x
1,I
2 .
Suppose x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )< x2(r i1, r i2). Then by (2.10)
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)= δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )< δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i1, r i2),
implying x2(r i1, r
i
2)< x
1,I
2 . Therefore,
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)≥ x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )⇔ x2(r i1, r i2)≤ x
1,I
2 .
Similarly, let ω= 1,I and (r i1, r i+12 ) ∈Qω. By definition of Q1,I
r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 ) and r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ).
Then by Lemma 2.A.2
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )= δ−δx2(r i+11 , r i+12 )
= δ−δ(δ−δy1(r i+11 , r i+22 ))
= δ−δ2+δ2y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ),
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which implies
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y1(r i+11 , r i+22 )⇔ y1(r i1, r i+12 )≤ y1,I1 .
The proof for ω ∈Ω, ω 6= 1,I, is analogous.
The following lemma says that if the reference point pair is in Pω now and at
all future odd time points, then player 1 must propose xω. A similar result
holds for Qω.
Lemma 2.A.4. If (rk1, r
k
2) ∈ Pω for all k ≥ i, then x2(r i1, r i2)= xω2 . Similarly, if
(rk1, r
k+1
2 ) ∈Qω for all k≥ i, then y1(r i1, r i+12 )= yω1 .
Proof. Observe that if (rk1, r
k
2) ∈ Pω for all k ≥ i, then by Lemma 2.A.2 it
follows that x2(r i1, r
i
2) is either independent from the reference point pair
(r i1, r
i
2), or no offer is ever made that changes that reference point pair.
Hence, x2(r i1, r
i
2) can be obtained as the sum of a geometric series. For in-
stance, let (rk1, r
k
2) ∈ P1,I for all k≥ i. Then by Lemma 2.A.2,
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2) = δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )
= δ(1−δ)+δ2(δ−δ2+δ2x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ))
= δ(1−δ)(1+δ2)+δ4x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ))
= δ(1−δ)(1+δ2 +δ4+ . . .)
= δ(1−δ) · 1
1−δ2
= x1,I2 .
The proof for Pω where ω 6= 1,I and for Qω where ω ∈Ω is analogous to the
proof for P1,I.
The following lemma establishes some restrictions on how reference points
can move through the sets P and Q.
Lemma 2.A.5. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P1,III, then (r i1, r i+12 ) ∉Q1,I.
If (r i1, r
i
2)∈ P2,III, then (r i1, r i+12 ) ∉Q2,I.
If (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,I, then (r i+11 , r i+12 ) ∉ P1,I.
If (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II, then (r i+11 , r i+12 ) ∉ P1,II.
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Proof. Let (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P1,III and assume (r i1, r i+12 ) ∈ Q1,I. Then from the
definitions of P1,III and Q1,I we have
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2,
r i1 > x1(r i+11 , r i+12 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 ), and
r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )> x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Since r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 ) and r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ) we have r i+11 = r i1 and r i+22 =
r i+12 by (2.9). From (U1) it follows that
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )= y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ).
Furthermore, since x2(r i1, r
i
2)≥ r i2, (2.9) implies r i+12 = x2(r i1, r i2). Thus,
r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )= y2(r i1, r i+12 )> x2(r i1, r i2)= r i+12 .
This is a contradiction.
The proofs of the other statements are analogous.
The Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
In this section we prove a series of lemmas which are used in the proof of
Theorem 2.4.1.
Lemma 2.A.6. Let ω ∈ {1,I, 1,II, 2,I, 2,II}. Then for all (r i1, r i2) ∈ Pω we have
x(r i1, r
i
2)= xω. Similarly, for all (r i1, r i+12 )∈Qω we have y(r i1, r i+12 )= yω.
Proof. Let (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ Pω where ω ∈ {1,I,1,II,2,I,2,II}. Then r i1 > y1(r i1, r i+12 )
and r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2). By (2.9) this implies r i+11 = r i1 and r i+12 = r i2. By (U1),
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)= x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
By Lemma 2.A.3 x2(r i1, r
i
2)= xω2 . The case for Qω is similar.
Lemma 2.A.7. If (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,I, then
i. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y
3,I
1 .
ii. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≤ y
3,I
1 .
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Thus, y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= y
3,I
1 .
Proof of Lemma 2.A.7, part i. Let (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Q3,I. From the definition of
Q3,I we have
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, and
r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )> x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Assume y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )< y
3,I
1 . By Lemma 2.A.3, y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ). Since
y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ≥ r i1 we have from (2.9) that r i+11 = y1(r i1, r i+12 ). Hence, r i+11 >
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ). We have two possibilities:
a. r i+11 > x1(r i+21 , r i+22 )> y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+12 )∈ P1,I.
b. x1(r i+21 , r
i+2
2 )≥ r i+11 > y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+12 )∈ P2,I.
By Lemma 2.A.5, case a. can be ruled out. Hence, (r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ) ∈ P2,I. By
Lemma 2.A.6, x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ) = x
2,I
2 . Since (r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,I, Lemma 2.A.2 im-
plies
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )
= δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x
2,I
2
= δ
µ1
x
2,I
1 .
By (2.9), we have r i+11 = y1(r i1, r i+12 ). Note that x
2,I
1 is a function of r
i+1
1 , and
therefore of y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ). That is,
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
·
(µ1−δ)+δ2λ1r i+11
(1+λ1)−δ2
= δ
µ1
·
(µ1−δ)+δ2λ1y1(r i1, r i+12 )
(1+λ1)−δ2
.
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Solving for y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) yields
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
· µ1−δ
1+λ1−δ2−δ2λ1 δµ1
= δ(µ1−δ)
(1+λ1)µ1−δ2µ1−δ3λ1
= δ(µ1−δ)
(1+λ1)µ1−δ2−δ2λ1+δ3λ1−δ3λ1
= δ(µ1−δ)
(1+λ1)(µ1−δ2)
= δ
1+λ1+δ
= y3,I1 ,
where we used the fact that
(1+λ1)(µ1−δ2)= (1+λ1)(1+λ1(1−δ)−δ2)
= (1+λ1)((1+δ)(1−δ)+λ1(1−δ))
= (1+λ1)(1−δ)(1+λ1+δ)
= (1−δ+λ1(1−δ))(1+λ1+δ)
= (µ1−δ)(1+λ1+δ).
Observe that y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) = y
3,I
1 is contradicting y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) < y
3,I
1 , our initial
assumption.
Before we can prove Part ii. we must make a similar argument for Q3,II.
Lemma 2.A.8. If (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II, then
i. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y
3,II
1 .
ii. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≤ y
3,II
1 .
Thus, y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= y
3,II
1 .
Proof of Lemma 2.A.8, Part i. Let (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II. From the definition
of Q3,II it follows that
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, and
y2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )≥ r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
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Assume y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )< y
3,II
1 . Thus, y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ) by Lemma 2.A.3.
Since y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ≥ r i1, we have r i+11 = y1(r i1, r i+12 ) by (2.9). Hence, r i+11 >
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ), leaving two possibilities:
a. r i+11 ≥ x1(r i+21 , r i+22 )> y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+12 )∈ P1,II.
b. x1(r i+21 , r
i+2
2 )> r i+11 > y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+12 )∈ P2,II.
Case a. is ruled out by Lemma 2.A.5. Hence, (r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ) ∈ P2,II, and thus
by Lemma 2.A.6, x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ) = x
2,II
2 . Since (r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II, we have from
Lemma 2.A.2 that
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )
= δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x
2,II
2
= δ
µ1
x
2,II
1 .
Note that y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= r i+11 and that x
2,II
1 is a function of r
i+1
1 . That is,
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
(1+λ1)((µ2−δ)+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))+δ2λ1r i+11
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
=
(1+λ1)((µ2−δ)+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))+δ2λ1y1(r i1, r i+12 )
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2
.
Solving for y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) yields
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
·
(1+λ1)(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)−δ2−δ2λ1 δµ1
=
δ(1+λ1)(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)µ1−δ2µ1−δ3λ1
=
δ(1+λ1)(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))
(1+λ1)(1+λ2)µ1−δ2−δ2λ1+δ3λ1−δ3λ1
=
δ(1+λ1)(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))
(1+λ1)((1+λ2)µ1−δ2)
=
δ(µ2−δ+δλ2(1− r i+12 ))
(1+λ2)µ1−δ2
= y3,II1 .
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This contradicts y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )< y
3,II
1 .
This result allows us to prove the second part of Lemma 2.A.7.
Proof of Lemma 2.A.7, Part ii. Let (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,I. By the definition of
Q3,I we have
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1, and
r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )> x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Assume y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) > y
3,I
1 . Then by Lemma 2.A.3 we have y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 ) >
y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ). Observe that y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) ≥ r i1, and thus by (2.9) y1(r i1, r i+12 ) =
r i+11 . Hence, y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 ) > r i+11 , implying (r i+11 , r i+12 ) ∈ P3,I. Then from
Lemma 2.A.2, y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )> y
3,I
1 and y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 ), we have
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )= δ−δy1(r i+11 , r i+22 )< δ−δy1(r i1, r i+12 )< δ−δy3,I1 = x
3,I
2 .
By Lemma 2.A.3 this implies x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ). Observe that, by
(2.9), r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ) implies r i+22 = r i+12 , and thus
r i+22 = r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )> x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ).
This leaves two possibilities.
a. r i+22 > y2(r i+21 , r i+32 )> x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+22 )∈Q3,I.
b. y2(r i+21 , r
i+3
2 )≥ r i+22 > x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+22 )∈Q3,II.
Take case b., i.e. (r i+11 , r
i+2
2 )∈Q3,II. Then
y2(r
i+2
1 , r
i+3
2 )≥ r i+22 = r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ),
which implies y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 )> y1(r i+21 , r i+32 ). By Lemma 2.A.3 we have y1(r i+11 ,
r i+22 )< y
3,II
1 . This contradicts part i. of Lemma 2.A.8.
Hence, case a. must hold, i.e. (r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) ∈Q3,I. Note that x2(r i+21 , r i+22 )<
x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )< x
3,I
2 . Then
y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )=
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x2(r
i+2
1 , r
i+2
2 )>
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x
3,I
2 = y
3,I
1 .
Thus, if (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,I and y1(r i1, r i+12 ) > y
3,I
1 , then (r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 ) ∈ Q3,I and
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) > y
3,I
1 . Thus, for all k ≥ i we have (rk1, rk+12 ) ∈ Q3,I. Then by
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Lemma 2.A.4 we have that y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) = y
3,I
1 . This contradicts y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) >
y
3,I
1 .
We can now also complete the proof of Lemma 2.A.8.
Proof of Lemma 2.A.8, Part ii. Let (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II. By definition of Q3,II
we have
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1
y2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )≥ r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Assume y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) > y
3,II
1 . Then by Lemma 2.A.3 we have y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) <
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ). Since y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ r i1, (2.9) says that r i+11 = y1(r i1, r i+12 ). Hence,
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) > r i+11 , which implies (r i+11 , r i+12 ) ∈ P3,II. From Lemma 2.A.2,
y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )< y1(r i+11 , r i+22 ), y
3,II
1 < y1(r i1, r i+12 ), and the observation that r i+22 =
max{r i+12 , x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )}= r i+12 , it follows that
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )=
δ(1+λ2r i+22 )
1+λ2
− δ
1+λ2
y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )
<
δ(1+λ2r i+22 )
1+λ2
− δ
1+λ2
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )
<
δ(1+λ2r i+22 )
1+λ2
− δ
1+λ2
y
3,II
1
=
δ(1+λ2r i+12 )
1+λ2
− δ
1+λ2
y
3,II
1
= x3,II2 .
By Lemma 2.A.3 this implies x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ). Since r i+22 = r i+12 >
x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ), this implies r
i+2
2 > x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ). Then there are two possibili-
ties:
a. r i+22 > y2(r i+21 , r i+32 )> x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+22 )∈Q3,I.
b. y2(r i+21 , r
i+3
2 )≥ r i+22 > x2(r i+21 , r i+22 ), i.e. (r i+11 , r i+22 )∈Q3,II.
Take case a., i.e. (r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) ∈Q3,I. Observe that
y2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )≥ r i+12 = r i+22 > y2(r i+21 , r i+32 ),
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and thus y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) < y1(r i+21 , r i+32 ). By Lemma 2.A.3 we then obtain the
inequality y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 )> y
3,I
1 . This contradicts part i. of Lemma 2.A.7.
Hence, case b. must hold, i.e. (r i+11 , r
i+2
2 )∈Q3,II. Since x2(r i+11 , r i+12 )> x
3,II
2
and x2(r i+21 , r
i+2
2 )> x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ), we have from Lemma 2.A.2
y1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )=
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x2(r
i+2
1 , r
i+2
2 )>
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x
3,II
2 = y
3,II
1 .
Thus, (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,II and y1(r i1, r i+12 ) > y
3,II
1 implies (r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 ) ∈ Q3,II and
y1(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 ) > y
3,II
1 . Then, for all k ≥ i we have (rk1, rk+12 ) ∈ Q3,II, which
by Lemma 2.A.4 implies y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) = y
3,II
1 . This contradicts y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) >
y
3,II
1 .
Similar results hold in P2,III and P1,III.
Lemma 2.A.9. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P1,III, then x2(r i1, r i2)= x
1,III
2 .
Lemma 2.A.10. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P2,III, then x2(r i1, r i2)= x
2,III
2 .
The proofs of these lemmas are analogous to the proofs of Lemmas 2.A.7 and
2.A.8 respectively.
Lemma 2.A.11. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P3,III, then
i. x2(r i1, r
i
2)≥ x
3,III
2 .
ii. x2(r i1, r
i
2)≤ x
3,III
2 .
Thus, x2(r i1, r
i
2)= x
3,III
2 .
Proof of Lemma 2.A.11, Part i. Let (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P3,III. By the definition of
P3,III we have
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2,
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1.
Assume x2(r i1, r
i
2) < x
3,III
2 . Lemma 2.A.3 implies x2(r
i
1, r
i
2) > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Since x2(r i1, r
i
2)≥ r i2, we have from (2.9) that r i+12 = x2(r i1, r i2). Hence, r i+12 >
x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 ). Then there are two possibilities:
a. r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 )> x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ), i.e. (r i1, r i+12 ) ∈Q3,I.
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b. y2(r i+11 , r
i+2
2 )≥ r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ), i.e. (r i1, r i+12 ) ∈Q3,II.
Take case a., i.e. (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,I. From Lemma 2.A.7 we have y1(r i1, r i+12 ) =
y
3,I
1 . From Lemma 2.A.2 it follows that x2(r
i
1, r
i
2) = δµ2 −
δ
µ2
y
3,I
1 = δµ2 y
3,I
2 . Ob-
serve that µ2(µ1−δ2)<µ1µ2−δ2. Thus,
y
3,I
2 =
1+λ1
1+λ1+δ
= (1+λ1)(1−δ)
(1+λ1+δ)(1−δ)
= (1−δ+λ1(1−δ))
1−δ+λ1(1−δ)+δ−δ2
= µ2
µ2
· (µ1−δ)
µ1−δ2
> µ2(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
= y3,III2 . (2.11)
Then x2(r i1, r
i
2) > δµ2 y
3,III
2 = x
3,III
2 , contradicting the initial assumption x2(r
i
1,
r i2)< x
3,III
2 .
Take case b., i.e., (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,II. By Lemma 2.A.2, x2(r i1, r i2) = δµ2 y
3,II
2 .
Note that r i+12 = x2(r i1, r i2) by (2.9), and that y
3,II
2 is a function of r
i+1
2 . That
is,
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)=
δ
µ2
·
(µ1−δ)(1+λ2)+δ2λ2r i+12
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
= δ
µ2
·
(µ1−δ)(1+λ2)+δ2λ2x2(r i1, r i2)
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
.
Solving for x2(r i1, r
i
2) yields
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)=
δ
µ2
· (µ1−δ)(1+λ2)
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2−δ2λ2 δµ2
= δ(µ1−δ)(1+λ2)
µ1µ2(1+λ2)−δ2µ2−δ3λ2
= δ(µ1−δ)(1+λ2)
µ1µ2(1+λ2)−δ2−δ2λ2+δ3λ2−δ3λ2
= δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2
= x3,III2 .
This contradicts x2(r i1, r
i
2)< x
3,III
2 .
Before we can complete the proof of Lemma 2.A.11, we need a similar result
for Q3,III.
Lemma 2.A.12. If (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Q3,III, then
i. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y
3,III
1 ,
ii. y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≤ y
3,III
1 .
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Thus, y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= y
3,III
1 .
Proof of Lemma 2.A.12, Part i. This is analogous to the proof of Lemma
2.A.11 Part i.
We continue with the second part of Lemma 2.A.11.
Proof of Lemma 2.A.11, Part ii. Let (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P3,III. By definition of P3,III
we have
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )> x2(r i1, r i2)≥ r i2,and
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1.
Assume x2(r i1, r
i
2) > x
3,III
2 . Then by Lemma 2.A.3 x2(r
i
1, r
i
2) < x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
Since x2(r i1, r
i
2) ≥ r i2, we have r i+12 = x2(r i1, r i2) by (2.9). Thus, r i+12 < x2(r i+11 ,
r i+12 ), implying (r
i
1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,III. By the first part of Lemma 2.A.12 this im-
plies that y1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )≥ y
3,III
1 . Then from Lemma 2.A.2 and the construction
of x3,III we obtain
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)=
δ
µ2
− δ
µ2
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≤
δ
µ2
− δ
µ2
y
3,III
1 = x
3,III
2 .
This contradicts x2(r i1, r
i
2)> x
3,III
2 .
In a similar way we can complete the proof of Lemma 2.A.12.
Proof of Lemma 2.A.12, Part ii. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.A.11,
Part ii.
We can now obtain the offers made in the sets P3,I and P3,II.
Lemma 2.A.13. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P3,I then x2(r i1, r i2)= x
3,I
2 .
Proof. Let (r i1, r
i
2)∈ P3,I. By definition of P3,I we have
r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 )> x2(r i1, r i2), and
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1.
Assume x2(r i1, r
i
2) 6= x
3,I
2 . We have three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
cases.
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• (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,I: Observe that by Lemma 2.A.2, (r i1, r i2) ∈ P3,I implies
x2(r i1, r
i
2) = δ−δy1(r i1, r i+12 ) = δy2(r i1, r i+12 ). Then by Lemma 2.A.7 and
the construction of x3,I this implies x2(r i1, r
i
2) = δy
3,I
2 = x
3,I
2 , contradict-
ing the assumption that x2(r i1, r
i
2) 6= x
3,I
2 .
• (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Q3,II: Since (r i1, r i2) ∈ P3,I and (r i1, r i+12 )∈Q3,II we have
y2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+2
2 )≥ r i+12 =max{r i2, x2(r i1, r i2)}= r i2 > y2(r i1, r i+12 ).
However, by Lemma 2.A.8 we have y2(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) = y
3,II
2 , which implies
y2(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) = y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ) by Lemma 2.A.3. This contradicts the above.
• (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈ Q3,III: By Lemma 2.A.2, Lemma 2.A.12, inequality (2.11),
and the construction of x3,I, we have
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)= δ−δy1(r i1, r i+12 )= δy
3,III
2 < δy
3,I
2 = x
3,I
2 .
By Lemma 2.A.3 this implies x2(r i1, r
i
2) > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ). Since r i2 >
x2(r i1, r
i
2) we have by (2.9) that r
i+1
2 = r i2, implying r i+12 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ).
This implies (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∉Q3,III, a contradiction.
It follows that x2(r i1, r
i
2)= x
3,I
2 .
Lemma 2.A.14. If (r i1, r
i
2) ∈ P3,II then x2(r i1, r i2)= x
3,II
2 .
Proof. Let (r i1, r
i
2)∈ P3,II. By definition of P3,II we have
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2)
x1(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )> y1(r i1, r i+12 )≥ r i1.
Assume x2(r i1, r
i
2) 6= x
3,II
2 . Then we distinguish three mutually exclusive and
exhaustive cases.
• (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,I: Since r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2) we have from (2.9) that r i2 = r i+12 .
Hence,
y2(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )≥ r i2 = r i+12 > y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ).
However, by Lemma 2.A.7 we have y2(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= y
3,I
2 , which by Lemma
2.A.3 implies y2(r i1, r
i+1
2 )= y2(r i+11 , r i+22 ). This contradicts the above.
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• (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,II: From Lemma 2.A.8 we obtain y1(r i1, r i+12 ) = y
3,II
1 . By
Lemma 2.A.2 and the construction of x3,II, we then have
x2(r
i
1, r
i
2)=
δ(1+λ2r i+12 )
1+λ2
−
δy1(r i1, r
i+1
2 )
1+λ2
=
δ(1+λ2r i+12 )
1+λ2
−
δy
3,II
1
1+λ2
=
δ(y3,II2 +λ2r i+12 )
1+λ2
= x3,II2 ,
contradicting x2(r i1, r
i
2) 6= x
3,II
2 .
• (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∈Q3,III: By Lemma 2.A.12 and the definition of y
3,III
1 this im-
plies
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )= y
3,III
1 =
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x
3,III
2 .
By Lemma 2.A.2 we have
y1(r
i
1, r
i+1
2 )=
δ
µ1
− δ
µ1
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 ).
Hence, x2(r i+11 , r
i+1
2 )= x
3,III
2 .
Since r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2), we have from (2.9) that r i+12 = r i2. Then
x2(r
i+1
1 , r
i+1
2 )≥ r i+12 = r i2 > x2(r i1, r i2).
By Lemma 2.A.3 this implies x2(r i1, r
i
2)> x
3,II
2 . Since r
i
2 > x2(r i1, r i2) and
r i2 = r i+12 this implies r i+12 > x
3,II
2 . That is,
r i+12 >
δ(µ1−δ+λ2r i+12 µ1)
µ1(1+λ2)−δ2
.
This is equivalent to r i+12 >
δ(µ1−δ)
µ1µ2−δ2 = x
3,III
2 . Hence, r
i+1
2 > x2(r i+11 , r i+12 ),
which implies (r i1, r
i+1
2 ) ∉Q3,III. This is a contradiction.
It follows that x2(r i1, r
i
2)= x
3,II
2 .
Similar results hold for Q2,III and Q1,III.
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Lemma 2.A.15. If (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Q1,III then y1(r i1, r i+12 )= y
1,III
1 .
Lemma 2.A.16. If (r i1, r
i+1
2 )∈Q2,III then y1(r i1, r i+12 )= y
2,III
1 .
Proofs are analogous to Lemma 2.A.13 resp. 2.A.14. We now prove the main
result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. Let (r i1, r
i
2) = P1,I. By definition we have r i2 >
y2(r i1, r
i+1
2 ) and r
i
1 > x1(r i1, r i2). By Lemma 2.A.6 this implies r i2 > y
1,I
2 and
r i1 > x
1,I
1 . Hence, (r
i
1, r
i
2) ∈ X1,I, from which it follows that P1,I ⊆ X1,I.
Similarly, by Lemmas 2.A.6, 2.A.9, 2.A.10, 2.A.11, 2.A.13, and 2.A.14,
(r i1, r
i
2) ∈ Pω implies (r i1, r i2) ∈ Xω for each ω ∈ Ω. Hence, Pω ⊆ Xω for each
ω ∈Ω. Since the sets Pω are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, this implies
Pω = Xω for each ω ∈Ω.
Hence, at times t ∈ Todd player 1’s unique SPE strategy is to propose xω if
(r1, r2)∈ Xω. That is, to play strategy fˆ . Analogously, we have
Qω = Xω for each ω ∈Ω,
such that player 2’s unique SPE strategy at times t ∈ Teven is to propose yω
if (r1, r2) ∈ Xω, i.e. to follow strategy gˆ.
It follows from part B. of the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 that player 1’s unique
optimal strategy at times t ∈ Teven is to accept proposals which are at or
above 2’s SPE proposal, and to reject those which are not. (Rejecting player
2’s proposal violates immediate acceptance.) That is, player 1’s unique SPE
strategy at times t ∈Teven is fˆ . Similarly, player 2’s unique optimal strategy
at times t ∈ Todd is to accept and reject proposals according to the strategy
gˆ.
Thus, the strategy profile ( fˆ , gˆ) is the unique SPE satisfying (U1)–(U3).
2.A.3 Concave Utility Functions
Let player i’s preference for pie, i= 1,2, be represented by a strictly increas-
ing, concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function vi : [0,1]→R. Since
such a utility function is unique up to an affine transformation, we may
assume that vi(0)= 0 and vi(1)= 1. Furthermore, define
Z˜ := {(v1(z1),v2(z2)) | z ∈ Z}.
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In this more general setting, each finite path in H¯ is associated with a utility
outcome. That is, for all h ∈ H¯ \H∞, we say that player i, i = 1,2, obtains
vi(ξi(h)), rather than ξi(h). Note that due to rescaling, both players still
attach a zero utility payoff to a disagreement path, and a utility payoff of
one to agreement on a partition that gives them the whole pie. The loss
aversion transformation w is then applied to the utility outcome vi(ξi(h)).
The reference point r i used in this transformation, is defined as the utility
associated with the highest share player i has rejected in the past. Like
before, we have
a. r1 > x1 > y1: δ1x1 = y1.
b. x1 ≥ r1 > y1: δ1x1 = (1+λ1)y1−δ1λ1r1.
c. x1 > y1 ≥ r1: δ1x1 =µ1y1.
and
i. r2 > y2 > x2: δ2y2 = x2.
ii. y2 ≥ r2 > x2: δ2y2 = (1+λ2)x2−δ2λ2r2.
iii. y2 > x2 ≥ r2: δ2y2 =µ2x2.
where x, y ∈ Z˜. These equations again define a ninefold partition of the set
of all possible reference point pairs, similar to the one depicted in Figure
2.1. Define Ω˜ := {a.i., . . . , c.iii.}, and denote the associated sets again by Xω,
ω ∈ Ω˜. It can be shown that the system of equations yields a unique solution
(xω, yω) in Z˜× Z˜ for each ω ∈ Ω˜. Let ht = (ht−1, z) with z ∈ Z˜. Then for all
ω ∈ Ω˜, define the strategy pair ( f˘ , g˘) for t ∈Todd by
f˘ t(ht−1)= xω, g˘t(ht)=
{
Y if z2 ≥ xω2
N otherwise.
, if (r1(h
t−1), r2(ht−1)) ∈ Xω,
and for t ∈Teven by
f˘ t(ht)=
{
Y if z1 ≥ yω1
N otherwise
, g˘t(ht−1)= yω, if (r1(ht−1), r2(ht−1)) ∈ Xω.
We obtain the following result.
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Theorem 2.A.17. The strategy profile ( f˘ , g˘) is an SPE.
Proof. Observe that Lemma 2.A.1 continues to hold if players’ utility
functions are concave. Hence, the game is still continuous at infinity. The
proof of Theorem 2.A.17 is then analogous to that of Theorem 2.3.1.
It follows that the partition obtained at the beginning of the game, where
reference points are zero, is given by xc.iii.. Henceforth, we drop the super-
script c.iii., and write the solution as x. Note that we may again generalize
the above results to the case where the time lapse between proposals is ∆.
Thus, we have
ψ(x1)= x2 =
δ∆2
µ2
yc.iii.2 =
δ∆2
µ2
ψ(yc.iii.1 )=
δ∆2
µ2
ψ
(
δ∆1
µ1
x1
)
where µi = 1+λi(1−δ∆i ). Then by extending Proposition 4 from Binmore et al.
(1986), we generalize the result that the equilibrium partition converges to
an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution partition as ∆ goes to zero, to the
case where players have concave utility functions.
Let zN be the asymmetric Nash solution
zN = argmax
z∈Z˜
zα1 z
1−α
2 ,
where α= (1+λ2) logδ2(1+λ1) logδ1+(1+λ2) logδ2 . Observe that z
N is uniquely defined by
• zN2 =ψ(zN1 ), and
• |ψ′−(zN1 )| ≤ α1−α
zN2
zN1
≤ |ψ′+(zN1 )|,
where ψ′− and ψ
′
+ are the left- resp. righthand side derivatives of ψ. Let
x→ x¯ as ∆→ 0. Since ψ is continuous on [0,1], we have that x¯2 = ψ(x¯1).
Furthermore, since ψ is decreasing and concave, we have
|ψ′−(x¯1)| ≤ lim
∆→0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ψ(x1)−ψ
(
δ∆1
µ1
x1
)
x1− δ
∆
1
µ1
x1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣≤ |ψ
′
+(x¯1)|,
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and, using l’Hôpital’s rule,
lim
∆→0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ψ(x1)−ψ
(
δ∆1
µ1
x1
)
x1− δ
∆
1
µ1
x1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣= lim∆→0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
δ∆2
µ2
−1
)
ψ
(
δ∆1
µ1
x1
)
(
1− δ
∆
1
µ1
)
x1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= lim
∆→0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1+λ2)δ∆2 logδ2
µ22
ψ
(
δδ1
µ1
x1
)
+
(
δ∆2
µ2
−1
) dψ( δ∆1
µ1
x1
)
d∆
− (1+λ1)δ
δ
1 logδ1
µ21
x1+
(
1− δ
∆
1
µ1
)
dx1
d∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (1+λ2) logδ2
(1+λ1) logδ1
· ψ(x¯1)
x¯1
= α
1−α ·
x¯2
x¯1
.
It follows that x¯= zN .
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Chapter 3
The Kalai-Smorodinsky
Bargaining Solution with
Loss Aversion
3.1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Nash (1950a) defined the ‘bargaining problem’ as a
proxy for real life bargaining situations. His model is described by two play-
ers attempting to find agreement on a certain feasible outcome. They are
motivated by the fact that failure to cooperate results in an unfavorable
outcome for all. Nash himself defined and characterized a solution for this
problem, the well known Nash bargaining solution. A wide range of other so-
lutions have been formulated since. One of the most prominent alternatives
to the Nash bargaining solution is the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tion, defined by Raiffa (1953) and characterized by Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975).
In economics – and bargaining is no exception – risk attitudes tend to
play a pervasive role on how agents behave. In the bargaining literature,
much attention has been paid to the influence of risk attitudes, and in par-
ticular risk aversion, on the outcomes players finally agree on according to
certain bargaining solutions. Several studies, among which Kannai (1977),
Kihlstrom et al. (1981), and Roth (1985), find that the Nash bargaining solu-
tion favors the less risk averse bargainer. Kihlstrom et al. (1981) find similar
results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Köbberling and Pe-
ters (2003) also study the effect of risk aversion on the Kalai-Smorodinsky
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solution, but distinguish between probabilistic risk aversion and utility risk
aversion. They find it is an advantage to have a more utility risk averse
opponent, or a less probabilistically risk averse opponent.
In this chapter we investigate the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tion under a related behavioral phenomenon, named loss aversion. Loss
aversion was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984). It is based
on the premise that economic agents derive utility from changes in wealth
in comparison with some reference point, and that changes for the worse –
i.e. losses – carry more weight than equivalent changes for the better.
To introduce this concept in the bargaining problem, we follow the ap-
proach of Shalev (2002). Each bargainer’s preference is represented by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, a nonnegative loss aversion co-
efficient, and a reference point; if a player’s utility level is below his refer-
ence point, then he experiences a disutility equal to the size of his incurred
loss, inflated by the loss aversion coefficient. Thus, in a bargaining context,
incorporating loss aversion of the players is equivalent to applying a partic-
ular transformation to the bargaining problem. Reference points are subse-
quently endogenized by imposing the self-supporting condition. An outcome
z is said to be self-supporting under a given solution, whenever transform-
ing the bargaining game using outcome z as reference point, yields a game
of which the solution is z. We may interpret a bargainer’s reference point as
the expectation or the aspiration of what utility payoff he may realize given
a certain bargaining solution. The self-supporting condition then imposes
that the bargaining solution assigns to each player exactly the (initially) as-
pired utility level, and as a consequence, that no losses are incurred.
We first set out to show that n-player bargaining games, n ≥ 2, have ex-
actly one outcome that is self-supporting under the Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution1. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) defined their solution on two-player
bargaining games. In view of the result by Roth (1979) that it is not gen-
erally defined on all n-player bargaining games, we consider the subclass
of all n-player bargaining games, defined by Peters and Tijs (1984), which
excludes the problematic cases. On these games we define a class of asym-
metric n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Consider an outcome in the
Pareto set and the line segments respectively connecting that outcome to
the disagreement point and to the utopia point. For any two players we
may then project these line segments into the plane. Our solution is defined
1This was already remarked – without proof – by Shalev (2002) for the case of two-player
bargaining games.
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by the unique outcome in the Pareto set such that for any two players, the
slopes of these projected line segments satisfy a given proportion. We estab-
lish that for each loss aversion profile, there is a single bargaining solution
in our class that yields the associated self-supporting outcome. This implies
uniqueness of a self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion for n-player bargaining games. Moreover, the bargaining solution we
define provides an easy method of finding this outcome.
We next provide an axiomatic characterization of this class of bargaining
solutions. In particular, we show that it is fully defined by the standard
properties Strong Individual Rationality, Scale Invariance, and Individual
Monotonicity, and a new axiom named Proportional Concession Invariance
[PCI]. The axiom of PCI says that if players make concessions with respect
to their utopia values in such a way that the new utopia point is on the line
segment connecting the solution outcome and the original utopia point, then
the solution outcome is left unchanged.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the notation,
and in Section 3.3 we show how loss aversion is incorporated in the bar-
gaining problem. Section 3.4 describes the concept of monotonic curves,
their associated bargaining solutions, and defines the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution as a special case. In Section 3.5 we define a new class
of bargaining solutions, and we show that every solution in this class is the
self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
for some loss aversion profile. Section 3.6 contains the axiomatic character-
ization of this class of bargaining solutions. We conclude in Section 3.7.
Proofs of all claims made in the text are in Appendix 3.A.
3.2 Preliminaries
The set of players or bargainers is denoted N := {1, . . .,n}, with n ≥ 2. For
x, y ∈ RN we say x≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N, and x> y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N.
The relations ‘≤’ and ‘<’ are defined similarly. We define RN+ := {z ∈ RN |
z ≥ 0} and RN++ := {z ∈ RN | z > 0}. For x, y ∈ RN we denote by xy the vector
(x1y1, . . . , xn yn), and for S ⊆ RN we define xS := {xy ∈ RN | y ∈ S}. Similarly,
we denote (x1+ y1, . . . , xn+ yn) as x+ y, and the set {x+ z | z ∈ S} as x+S. The
vector in RN that has i-th coordinate equal to 1 and all other coordinates
equal to 0 is denoted ei. The vector eM, M ⊆ N and M 6= ;, has all coordi-
nates i ∈M equal to 1, and all coordinates i ∉M equal to 0. For x ∈ RN++, we
denote
(
1
x1
, . . . , 1
xn
)
as x−1.
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A bargaining problem for N is defined as a pair (S,d) where
• S ⊂RN is non-empty, closed, convex, and comprehensive,
• d ∈ S,
• there exists a z ∈ S such that z> d, and
• Sd := {z ∈ S | z≥ d} is bounded.
A set S is comprehensive if x ∈ S and x≥ y together imply y ∈ S. In a bargain-
ing context, this assumption can be interpreted as free disposal of utility in
the sense that any player can choose a lower utility payoff without it leading
to an infeasible outcome. Bargainers seek agreement on an outcome z in S
where each player i ∈ N obtains utility zi. In case no agreement is reached
the disagreement outcome d results.
The set of all bargaining problems is denoted BN . For (S,d) ∈ BN and
each i ∈N, we define
ui(S,d) :=max{zi | z ∈ Sd}.
This represents the highest possible utility payoff bargainer i can attain in
the bargaining problem (S,d), given that no bargainer j ∈ N, j 6= i, obtains
a utility payoff lower than d j. The vector u(S,d) := (u1(S,d), . . .,un(S,d)) is
termed the utopia point of (S,d). For all (S,d)∈BN we define the Pareto set
of (S,d) as
P(S) := {z ∈ S | for all x ∈RN if x≥ z and x 6= z, then x ∉ S}.
A bargaining solution or in short, a solution, is a map ϕ : BN → RN that
assigns to any bargaining problem (S,d)∈BN a single point ϕ(S,d)∈ S.
3.3 Bargaining with Loss Aversion
Shalev (2002) introduced a transformation that models loss aversion. Each
bargainer i ∈ N has a non-negative loss aversion coefficient λi and a ref-
erence point r i. We denote the vector (λ1, . . . ,λn) ∈ RN+ by λ. Similarly,
r := (r1, . . ., rn) ∈ RN . Each bargainer i evaluates a utility payoff zi ∈ R by
the transformation wi, defined as
wi(zi,λi, r i) :=
{
zi if zi ≥ r i
zi−λi(r i− zi) if zi < r i.
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Thus, a bargainer i who incurs a loss – i.e. obtains a utility payoff zi below
his reference point r i, experiences a disutility that is equal to his loss r i− zi,
inflated by the loss aversion coefficient λi. Payoffs above the reference point
are left unchanged. Note that we may also write
wi(zi,λi, r i)= (1+λi)zi−λimax{r i, zi}.
For utility outcomes z ∈RN we define
w(z,λ, r) := (w1(z1,λ1, r1), . . . ,wn(zn,λn, rn)).
For sets T ⊂ RN we write w(T,λ, r) := {w(z,λ, r) | z ∈ T}. Henceforth, the
transformation w :RN ×RN+ ×RN → RN is referred to as the Shalev transfor-
mation.
For bargaining problems (S,d)∈BN we define
w((S,d),λ, r) := (w(S,λ, r),w(d,λ, r)).
We then have the following.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let (S,d)∈BN , λ ∈RN+ , and r ∈RN . Then w((S,d),λ, r)∈BN .
Let ϕ : BN → RN be some bargaining solution, and let (S,d) be some
problem in BN . Then by Lemma 3.3.1, ϕ(w((S,d),λ, r)) is well-defined for all
λ ∈RN+ and r ∈RN .
A point z ∈ S is called a self-supporting outcome under ϕ if
z=ϕ(w((S,d),λ, z)).
Each bargainer i is assumed to have some aspiration or expectation zi about
the utility payoff he can realize given the bargaining problem (S,d) and the
bargaining solution ϕ. Since bargainers are in varying degrees loss averse,
and have complete knowledge about their opponents’ loss aversion, they do
not actually bargain over the given problem (S,d), but rather over the trans-
formed problem w((S,d),λ, z), where z ∈ RN is the vector of players’ expec-
tation levels. Imposing the condition of self-support is then equivalent to
imposing that the utility payoffs players realize ex post are consistent with
their ex ante expectations. The set of all such points is defined as
Sel f ϕ((S,d),λ) := {z ∈ S | z=ϕ(w((S,d),λ, z))}.
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Then Sel f ϕ : BN ×RN+ → RN is a correspondence that assigns to each bar-
gaining problem (S,d)∈BN and loss aversion profile λ≥ 0 a possibly empty
subset of S.
For two-player bargaining games (S,d), Shalev (2002) characterized the
set of self-supporting outcomes under the Nash bargaining solution. Specif-
ically, he showed that it is a closed, connected subset of the Pareto set P(S).
3.4 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
Raiffa (1953), and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) defined and characterized
a solution – the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS) – for bargaining problems
in B{1,2}. It was shown by Roth (1979) that the n-player extension of the KS
solution, n > 2, is not defined on all bargaining problems in BN . Therefore,
Peters and Tijs (1984) introduced the rather large subclass IN of bargaining
problems in BN for which this non-existence result does not hold. Consider
the following condition.
For all x ∈ S, x≥ d, and i ∈N we have: (3.1)
x ∉ P(S) and xi < ui(S,d)⇒ there is an ε> 0 such that x+εei ∈ S
Then
IN := {(S,d)∈BN | (S,d) satifies condition (3.1)}.
Condition (3.1) says that if a feasible outcome x is not Pareto optimal, then
for any bargainer who does not obtain his utopia payoff there is a feasible
outcome that this bargainer strictly prefers over x. The class of bargain-
ing problems (S,0) ∈ IN is denoted IN0 ; for bargaining problems in IN0 we
henceforth omit the disagreement point, i.e. we denote (S,0)∈ IN0 as S.
Peters and Tijs (1984) defined the n-player extension of the KS solution
by making use of monotonic curves. Specifically, a monotonic curve for N is
a map
ϑ : [1,n]→
{
x ∈RN+ | xi ≤ 1 for all i ∈N, and 1≤
∑
i∈N
xi
}
,
such that for all 1≤ s ≤ t≤ n we have ϑ(s)≤ ϑ(t) and ∑i∈N ϑi(s)= s. The set
of all monotonic curves for N is denoted ΘN .
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Lemma 3.4.1 (Peters and Tijs 1984). For each ϑ ∈ ΘN and S ∈ IN0 with
u(S)= eN, the set
P(S)∩ {ϑ(t) | t ∈ [1,n]}
contains exactly one point.
Let ϑ be some monotonic curve in ΘN . In view of Lemma 3.4.1 we can
define ρϑ : IN → RN , the bargaining solution associated with ϑ. Let S ∈ IN0 ;
if u(S)= eN, then{
ρϑ(S)
}
:=P(S)∩ {ϑ(t) | t ∈ [1,n]},
and if u(S)=β, then ρϑ(S) :=βρϑ(β−1S). For (S,d)∈ IN , we define ρϑ(S,d) :=
d+ρϑ(S− d). The class of all solutions associated with a monotonic curve
in ΘN is referred to as the class of individually monotonic bargaining solu-
tions. The KS solution is an element of this class. Specifically, it is defined
as
ρϑˆ where ϑˆ(t) := te
N
n
for t ∈ [1,n].
Observe that ϑˆ defines a straight line in RN , which for bargaining games S ∈
IN0 where u(S)= eN , is concurrent with the line connecting the disagreement
point 0 and the utopia point eN. For general bargaining problems (S,d)∈ IN ,
the KS solution is the intersection of the Pareto set P(S) and the straight line
that connects the disagreement point d and the utopia point u(S,d). To ease
notation, we also refer to ρϑˆ as KS, i.e. KS≡ ρϑˆ.
3.5 The Solution Class DN
We now show that self-supporting outcomes under the KS solution are well-
defined, and that each game in IN has exactly one such outcome. Peters and
Tijs (1984) show that I{1,2} =B{1,2}, which implies that our result generalizes
the remark of Shalev (2002) about the uniqueness of a self-supporting out-
come under the KS solution for two-player bargaining games. Furthermore,
we introduce a class DN of bargaining solutions on IN , where for any λ ∈RN+
there is a single ϕ ∈DN such that ϕ(S,d) is the unique self-supporting out-
come of the game (S,d) under the KS solution.
Observe that from Lemma 3.3.1 and the fact that the Shalev transfor-
mation preserves the ordering of payoffs, we obtain that (S,d) ∈ IN implies
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w((S,d),λ, r)∈ IN for all λ ∈RN+ and r ∈RN . Therefore, Sel f KS((S,d),λ), the
set of self-supporting outcomes under the KS solution, is well-defined.
We now introduce the class DN of bargaining solutions. Denote by N¯ the
player set without player n – i.e. N¯ :=N\{n}, and define the correspondence
Dk : IN →RN for all k ∈RN¯++ as
Dk(S,d) := {z ∈ P(S) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have:
(un(S,d)− zn)(zi−di)= ki(ui(S,d)− zi)(zn−dn)}. (3.2)
It is not hard to verify that Dk 6= Dk′ whenever k,k′ ∈ RN¯++ with k 6= k′. The
set DN :=
{
Dk | k ∈RN¯++
}
is defined as the set that contains all such corre-
spondences. For any k ∈RN¯++, define
ϑk(t) :=
{
z ∈Gk |
n∑
i=1
zi = t
}
, (3.3)
where t ∈ [1,n], and Gk := {z ∈ RN+ | (1− zn)zi = ki(1− zi)zn for all i ∈ N¯}. In
Lemma 3.A.1, which can be found in the Appendix, we show that any corre-
spondence ϑk is a monotonic curve in ΘN .
Theorem 3.5.1. For all k ∈RN¯++ and (S,d)∈ IN , we have
Dk(S,d)=
{
ρϑ
k
(S,d)
}
.
It follows from Theorem 3.5.1 that the set DN :=
{
Dk | k ∈RN¯++
}
is a sub-
set of the class of individuallymonotonic bargaining solutions. The following
theorem establishes the equivalence between
{
Sel f KS( . ,λ) |λ ∈RN+
}
and
D
N .
Theorem 3.5.2. For all (S,d)∈ IN we have
Sel f KS((S,d),λ)=Dk(S,d)
where k := (k1, . . . ,kn−1), and ki := 1+λn1+λi for all i ∈ N¯. That is,
Sel f KS((S,d),λ) := {z ∈ P(S) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have:
(1+λi)(un(S,d)− zn)(zi−di)= (1+λn)(ui(S,d)− zi)(zn−dn)}.
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With a slight abuse of notation, we henceforth consider Dk(S,d) to be an
outcome. That is, if Dk(S,d)= {z}, then we write Dk(S,d)= z. Then also
Dk(S,d)=
(
Dk1(S,d), . . .,D
k
n(S,d)
)
.
From Theorem 3.5.2 it follows that for each loss aversion profile λ ∈ RN+ , we
may look at Sel f KS( . ,λ) as an asymmetric n-player Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution where the asymmetry is fully defined by the bargainers’ degrees of
loss aversion. In the following section we provide an axiomatic characteri-
zation of these solutions.
3.6 An Axiomatic Characterization of DN
From Theorem 3.5.1 it follows that DN is a subclass of the individual mono-
tonic bargaining solutions, defined and characterized by Peters and Tijs
(1984). Of their axioms we retain Scale Invariance [SI] and Individual
Monotonicity [IM].
(SI) ϕ :BN →RN satisfies Scale Invariance if t(ϕ(S,d))=ϕ(t(S), t(d)), where
t : RN → RN is a linear transformation t(x) := α+βx, with α ∈ RN ,
β ∈RN++, and t(S) :=α+βS for S ⊂RN .
(IM) ϕ :BN →RN satisfies Individual Monotonicity if ϕi(S,d)≤ϕi(T,d) for
all (S,d), (T,d) ∈ BN and i ∈ N with S ⊆ T and u j(S) = u j(T) for all
j ∈N \{i}.
The axiom of SI is consistent with the premise that bargainers’ pref-
erences are representable by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) introduced IM as a possible alternative to
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, defined by Nash (1950a), after this
axiom had been criticized. A third well-known property we require is Strong
Individual Rationality [SIR].
(SIR) ϕ : BN → RN satisfies Strong Individual Rationality if ϕ(S,d)> d for
all (S,d)∈BN .
We introduce a novel axiom called Proportional Concession Invariance
[PCI]. One can consider a solution outcome ϕ(S,d) as a representation of
concessions that bargainers make with respect to their utopia point values
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u(S,d). The PCI axiom then says that if we replace u(S,d) by a point uˆ on
the line segment connecting ϕ(S,d) and u(S,d), and shrink the bargaining
set accordingly, then the solution outcome should not change. Put differ-
ently, if the players’ utopia values are reduced in such a way that their con-
cessions with respect to the original solution outcome change proportionally,
then this solution outcome should not change.
(PCI) ϕ : BN → RN satisfies Proportional Concession Invariance if for a bar-
gaining problem (S,d) ∈ BN with solution ϕ(S,d), and a bargaining
problem (Sˆ,d) with
Sˆ := {z ∈ S | z≤ uˆ},
where uˆ=αϕ(S,d)+(1−α)u(S,d) for some α ∈ [0,1], we have ϕ(Sˆ,d)=
ϕ(S,d).
S
b
u(S, d)
d
b ϕ(S, d)
∆1
∆2
Sˆ
b
u(S, d)
d
b ϕ(Sˆ, d) = ϕ(S, d)
b uˆ = u(Sˆ, d)
(1− α)∆1
(1− α)∆2
Figure 3.1: A visual representation of PCI in two-player bargaining games.
The property PCI can also be thought of as a very weak form of IIA, and
is therefore satisfied by the Nash bargaining solution and its asymmetric
variants. Furthermore, observe that PCI is the counterpart to Disagreement
Point Convexity [DPC], one of the axioms used by Peters and van Damme
(1991) to characterize the class of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
This property requires that the solution outcome ϕ(S,d) remain unchanged
if we replace d by a point dˆ on the line segment connecting the disagreement
point d and the solution outcome ϕ(S,d).
It is worth noting that the characterization of DN makes no use of Pareto
Optimality [PO]. In fact, in the Appendix, we use an argument similar as in
Roth (1977) to show that PO is implied by our axioms. The following theorem
states our characterization result.
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Theorem 3.6.1. Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution. Then ϕ ∈DN if
and only if ϕ satisfies SIR, SI, IM, and PCI.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
It was established in this chapter that bargaining games with n possibly
loss averse players, n ≥ 2, have exactly one self-supporting outcome under
the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Moreover, an asymmetric n-
player version of the KS solution was defined which directly captures the
asymmetry resulting from the bargainers’ degrees of loss aversion. To be
more precise, we consider the symmetric n-player version of the KS solution,
and – following the method of Shalev – we correct for the players’ differences
in bargaining power that stem from the varying extents to which they are
loss averse. It was shown that for any loss aversion profile, the outcome
thus obtained is given by exactly one bargaining solution in the class DN
of asymmetric n-player KS solutions. These results are summarized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.7.1. Let λ ∈RN+ be the profile of loss aversion. For every (S,d)∈
IN , an outcome z ∈ S is self-supporting under the KS solution if and only if
z=Dk(S,d), where ki := 1+λn1+λi for all i ∈ N¯.
We have characterized the class DN of all bargaining solutions Dk by
the axioms of Strong Individual Rationality, Scale Invariance, Individual
Monotonicity, and Proportional Concession Invariance. While the first three
properties are standard in the axiomatic bargining literature, the last one is
newly defined in this article.
A careful comparison between the axiomatic characterizations of KS and
D
N reveals that the correction needed to account for bargainers’ loss aver-
sion is equivalent to relaxing the axiom of Symmetry, and imposing that the
solution remain unchanged when players make concessions with respect to
their utopia values in a proportion that is determined, uniquely, by the loss
aversion coefficients.
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3.A Appendix: Proofs
3.A.1 The proof of Lemma 3.3.1
Let (S,d) ∈ BN , λ ∈ RN+ , and r ∈ RN . Since the Shalev transformation is
continuous, one-to-one, and preserves the ordering of payoffs, we have that
• w(S,λ, r) is non-empty, closed, and comprehensive,
• w(d,λ, r)∈w(S,λ, r),
• there are z ∈w(S,λ, r) with z>w(d,λ, r), and
• w(Sd,λ, r) is bounded.
Left to show is that w(S,λ, r) is convex. Let x, y ∈ S and t ∈ [0,1]. By convex-
ity of S, we have tx+ (1− t)y ∈ S. By the fact that w is concave in the first
coordinate, we have
w(tx+ (1− t)y,λ, r)≥ tw(x,λ, r)+ (1− t)w(y,λ, r).
By comprehensiveness of w(S,λ, r) this implies
tw(x,λ, r)+ (1− t)w(y,λ, r)∈w(S,λ, r).
This implies convexity of w(S,λ, r).
3.A.2 The proof of Theorem 3.5.1
First, we show the following.
Lemma 3.A.1. Let k ∈ RN¯++. Then the correspondence ϑk(t), t ∈ [1,n], is a
monotonic curve.
Proof. Let s¯ ∈ [1,n]. We show that there is a unique point z∗ ∈ RN+ such
that ϑk(s¯)= z∗. That is, we show that the system of equations
(1− zn)zi = ki(1− zi)zn for all i ∈ N¯ (3.4)
n∑
j=1
z j = s¯, (3.5)
has exactly one solution z∗ in RN+ . Suppose the system has a solution z ∈RN+ ,
and suppose zn > 1. Then for each i ∈ N¯ we either have zi > 1 or zi < 0,
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which by z ∈ RN+ implies zi > 1 for all i ∈N. Since this is a violation of (3.5),
we must have zn ≤ 1. Since (1−ki)−1 ∉ [0,1] for all i ∈ N¯, we can write
zi =
kizn
1− zn(1−ki)
for all i ∈ N¯.
Then for all i ∈ N¯, zi is strictly increasing in zn on the domain [0,1]. The
observations that
n∑
j=1
z j = 0≤ s¯ for zn = 0, and
n∑
j=1
z j = n≥ s¯ for zn = 1,
together with continuity of
∑n
j=1 z j in zn then imply that there is exactly
one z∗ ∈ RN+ that solves the system of equations (3.4) and (3.5). It follows
that the correspondence ϑk is a map. Moreover, for all 1≤ s ≤ t ≤ n we have
0 < ϑk(s) ≤ ϑk(t) ≤ eN and ∑i∈N ϑki (s) = s. It follows that ϑk is a monotonic
curve.
To prove Theorem 3.5.1, we show that each map Dk ∈DN is the bargain-
ing solution associated with the monotonic curve ϑk as defined in (3.3).
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1. Consider a normalized bargaining problem T ∈
IN0 , i.e. u(T)= eN. Let k ∈RN¯++ and observe that by (3.2) we have
Dk(T)= P(T)∩Gk.
By convexity of T we have P(T)⊂ {z ∈RN+ |
∑
j∈N z j ≥ 1}, implying
Dk(T)= P(T)∩ {ϑk(t) | t ∈ [1,n]},
where ϑk is defined by (3.3). It follows that Dk(T)=
{
ρϑ
k
(T)
}
. From this it is
easily established that
Dk(S,d)=
{
ρϑ
k
(S,d)
}
for all (S,d)∈ IN .
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3.A.3 The Proof of Theorem 3.5.2
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.A.2. Let (S,d) ∈ IN . Then Dk(S,d)= KS(S,d) if and only if k =
eN¯ .
Proof. It is easy to show that for any t ∈ [1,n), we have ϑk(t)= ϑˆ(t) if and
only if k= eN¯ . The result then follows from Theorem 3.5.1 and the definition
of KS.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2. Let (S,d) ∈ IN and λ ∈ RN+ , and let u ≡ u(S,d).
By Lemma 3.A.2 and the fact that KS(S,d)≥ d, we have
KS(w((S,d),λ, z))= {x ∈ P(w(S,λ, z)) | for all i ∈ N¯ we have
(un− xn)(xi − (1+λi)di+λizi)= (ui− xi)(xn− (1+λn)dn+λnzn)}.
Observe that z ∈ Sel f KS((S,d),λ) if and only if z = KS(w((S,d),λ, z)). That
is, z ∈ Sel f KS((S,d),λ) iff
(i) z ∈ P(w(S,λ, z)), and
(ii) (un− zn)(zi − (1+λi)di +λizi) = (ui − zi)(zn− (1+λn)dn+λnzn) for all
i ∈ N¯.
From z = w(z,λ, z), P(w(S,λ, z))= w(P(S),λ, z), and the fact that the Shalev
transformation is one-to-one, it follows that z ∈ P(w(S,λ, z)) is equivalent to
z ∈ P(S).
Define k := (k1, . . . ,kn−1) where ki := 1+λn1+λi for all i ∈ N¯. Observe that the
statement in (ii) is equivalent to
(un− zn)(zi−di)= ki(ui− zi)(zn−dn) for all i ∈ N¯.
It follows that z ∈ Sel f KS((S,d),λ) is equivalent to
z ∈
{
x ∈ P(S) | (un− xn)(xi −di)= ki(ui− xi)(xn−dn) for all i ∈ N¯
}
.
Hence, Sel f KS((S,d),λ)=Dk(S,d).
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3.A.4 The proof of Theorem 3.6.1
The standard axiom of Pareto Optimality is useful for the proof.
(PO) ϕ :BN →RN satisfies PO if ϕ(S,d)∈ P(S) for all (S,d)∈BN .
From Peters and Tijs (1984) we obtain the following.
Lemma 3.A.3 (Peters and Tijs 1984). Let ϕ : IN →RN be a bargaining solu-
tion. Then ϕ satisfies PO, SI, and IM, if and only if ϕ= ρϑ for some ϑ ∈ΘN .
This we use to establish the following result.
Proposition 3.A.4. Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution in DN . Then
ϕ satisfies SIR, SI, IM, and PCI.
Proof. Since ϕ ∈DN we have ϕ=Dk for some k ∈RN¯++. By Theorem 3.5.1,
we have ϕ= ρϑ where ϑ ∈ΘN , which by Lemma 3.A.3 implies that ϕ satisfies
SI and IM.
Consider a bargaining problem (S,d) ∈ IN , and the solution ϕ(S,d)=: z.
To see that ϕ satisfies SIR, suppose there is an i ∈ N such that zi = di.
Observe that z ∈ P(S) and
(un(S,d)− zn)(z j−d j)= k j(u j(S,d)− z j)(zn−dn) for all j ∈ N¯.
If i = n, then z j = d j for all j ∈ N¯, implying z = d. Let i ∈ N¯, and observe
that zi = di implies zn = dn, and thus z = d. Since d ∉ P(S), we arrive at a
contradiction. It follows that z> d.
To see that ϕ satisfies PCI, consider the problem (Sˆ,d)∈ IN where
Sˆ := {x ∈ S | x≤ uˆ},
with uˆ=αz+(1−α)u(S,d) for some α ∈ (0,1). Then uˆ− z= (1−α)(u(S,d)− z),
implying that
(uˆn− zn)(zi−di)= ki(uˆi− zi)(zn−dn) for all i ∈ N¯. (3.6)
Since z ∈ Sˆ and z ∈ P(S), we have z ∈ P(Sˆ). This and (3.6) together imply
Dk(Sˆ,d)= z. Hence, ϕ satisfies PCI.
For the reverse implication we require two additional lemmas.
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Lemma 3.A.5. Let (S,d) ∈ IN , and z ∈ S \P(S). Then for the function f :
[0,1]→RN defined as
f (α) := (1−α)z+αu(S,d),
there is exactly one α∗ ∈ [0,1] such that f (α∗)∈ P(S).
Proof. By compactness of S we have that
α∗ :=max{α | f (α)∈ S}
is well-defined. We now show that f (α∗) ∈ P(S). Suppose f (α∗) ∉ P(S). By
condition (3.1), it follows that for each i ∈ N with zi < ui(S,d), there is an
εi > 0 such that f (α∗)+ εi ei ∈ S. Then by convexity of S there is an ε > 0,
such that
f (α∗)+ε(u(S,d)− z)∈ S.
But then there is a β>α∗ with f (β)∈ S. This is a contradiction.
To show uniqueness, let α1,α2 ∈ [0,1] with α1 6=α2, and suppose f (α1), f (α2)∈
P(S). Without loss of generality, assume α2 >α1. Then since u(S,d)≥ z and
u(S,d) 6= z, we have f (α2)≥ f (α1) and f (α2) 6= f (α1). Since f (α1) ∈ P(S), this
implies f (α2) ∉ S, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.A.6. Let ϕ : IN → RN be a solution satisfying SIR, SI, and PCI.
Then ϕ satisfies PO.
Proof. Let ϕ : IN → RN be a bargaining solution satisfying SIR, SI, and
PCI. By SI it is sufficient to restrict attention to bargaining problems in IN0 .
Let S ∈ IN0 . By SIR we have ϕ(S)> 0. Now assume ϕ(S) ∉ P(S). By Lemma
3.A.5, there is a single z∗ ∈ P(S), such that
z∗ = (1−α)ϕ(S)+αu(S) for some α ∈ (0,1].
Define Sˆ := {x ∈ S | x≤ z∗}, and observe that by PCI we have
ϕ(Sˆ)=ϕ(S).
Similarly, for the set T := {x ∈ S | x≤ϕ(S)} we have ϕ(T)=ϕ(S). Now observe
that Sˆ = [z∗(ϕ(S))−1]T. Then by SI we have
ϕ(Sˆ)= z∗(ϕ(S))−1ϕ(T)= z∗(ϕ(S))−1ϕ(S)= z∗.
This contradicts ϕ(Sˆ)=ϕ(S).
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Proposition 3.A.7. Let ϕ : IN →RN be a bargaining solution satisfying SIR,
SI, IM, and PCI. Then ϕ ∈DN .
Proof. Since ϕ satisfies SIR, SI, and PCI, it follows from Lemma 3.A.6
that ϕ satisfies PO. Then by Lemma 3.A.3 it follows that ϕ ≡ ρϑ∗ for some
monotonic curve ϑ∗ ∈ΘN .
Consider the problem
H :=Conv
(
{ei | i ∈N}∪ {0}
)
,
and observe that H ∈ IN0 . If there is an i ∈N with ϕi(H)= 1, then ϕ j(H)= 0
for all j 6= i, which is a violation of SIR. Hence, 0<ϕ(H)< eN. It follows that
k := (k1, . . .,kn−1), where
ki :=
1−ϕn(H)
1−ϕi(H)
· ϕi(H)
ϕn(H)
, (3.7)
is well-defined and k ∈RN¯++.
In what follows, we show that
ϑ∗(t)= ϑk(t) (3.8)
for all 1≤ t≤ n. We do this in three steps. Let t¯ ∈ [1,n]. Then
1. we construct a specific problem S ∈ IN0 ,
2. we show that ϕ(S)= ϑk(t¯), and
3. we show that ϕ(S)= ϑ∗(t¯).
By (3.8) we have ρϑ
k = ρϑ∗ , which together with ϕ= ρϑ∗ and Dk = ρϑk estab-
lishes ϕ=Dk.
Step 1: Define the function g : [0,1]→ [1,n] as
g(α) :=
∑
i∈N
ϕi(H)
αϕi(H)+ (1−α)
. (3.9)
From the fact that g is strictly increasing2 and continuous, and the fact that
g(0) = 1 and g(1) = n, it follows that for each t ∈ [1,n] there is a unique
α ∈ [0,1] such that g(α)= t.
2This follows from ϕ(H) 6= 0 and ϕ(H) 6= eN .
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Let β := α¯ϕ(H)+(1−α¯)eN , where α¯ is such that g(α¯)= t¯. Then define the
problem S ∈ IN0 as
S := {β−1z | z ∈H and z≤β}.
Since ϕ satisfies SI and PCI, we have
ϕ(S)=β−1ϕ(H). (3.10)
It follows from (3.10) and (3.9), and the fact that g(α¯)= t¯ that ∑i∈N ϕi(S)= t¯.
Step 2: Rewriting (3.7) yields
(1−ϕn(H))ϕi(H)= ki(1−ϕi(H))ϕn(H) for all i ∈ N¯.
From the definition of β we have β−ϕ(H)= (1− α¯)(eN −ϕ(H)). Thus,
(βn−ϕn(H))ϕi(H)= ki(βi−ϕi(H))ϕn(H) for all i ∈ N¯.
For each i ∈ N¯, we can multiply both sides of the equation by 1βnβi . By (3.10)
this yields
(1−ϕn(S))ϕi(S)= ki(1−ϕi(S))ϕn(S) for all i ∈ N¯.
It follows that ϕ(S)∈Gk. Since ∑i∈N ϕi(S)= t¯, we have
ϕ(S)=ϑk(t¯). (3.11)
Step 3: Since ϕ≡ ρϑ∗ , and S ∈ IN0 with u(S)= eN, we have
{ϕ(S)}= P(S)∩ {ϑ∗(t) | t ∈ [1,n]},
which implies ϕ(S)= ϑ∗(t∗) for some t∗ ∈ [1,n]. From the definition of mono-
tonic curves we obtain
t∗ =
∑
i∈N
ϑ∗i (t
∗)=
∑
i∈N
ϕi(S)= t¯.
Hence,
ϕ(S)=ϑ∗(t¯). (3.12)
Combining (3.11) and (3.12) yields the desired result.
Theorem 3.6.1 is established by Propositions 3.A.4 and 3.A.7.
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Chapter 4
On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix
Games
4.1 Introduction
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed expected utility the-
ory, it has been the dominant approach in decision making under uncer-
tainty. The pervasive role of expected utility in the economics of uncertainty
has also been subject to criticism. One of the earliest examples is the Allais
paradox (Allais 1953)1.
Several alternative models for decision under uncertainty have been pro-
posed. One of the most prolific examples of these nonexpected utility theo-
ries is ‘prospect theory’, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In this
model it is assumed that economic agents make choices between lotteries
in two phases: an editing phase and an evaluation phase. In the editing
phase, agents observe and interpret the options between which they must
choose using several simple heuristics, one of which is the framing of pay-
offs as gains or as losses, using a reference point. In the evaluation phase, an
agent modifies his utility function to a reference-dependent utility function,
to account for the perception of the payoffs. That is, perceived losses are
weighted downwards, a phenomenon frequently referred to as loss aversion.
The agent then transforms the probabilities with which payoffs are realized
by using a probability weighting function, and uses these modified proba-
1For surveys of the literature on violations of expected utility theory, see Schoemaker
(1982) or Machina (1987).
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bilities to calculate the expected reference-dependent utility of the lottery.
Here, we ignore the latter aspect.
Although expected utility theory remains the most important model for
rational decision making in mainstream economic theory, the nonexpected
utility theories – and prospect theory in particular – have proved to be suc-
cessful challengers of the expected utility paradigm. Many of these theories
have an equally solid mathematical basis as expected utility theory, making
them acceptable alternatives for economists. More importantly, they tend
to incorporate a number of behavioral patterns, documented in the psychol-
ogy literature2 that better explain the decisions of economic agents, and as
a consequence, are better able to provide a theoretical basis for several em-
pirically observed phenomena that do not fit with the standard theory of
rational choice3.
Although a number of these behavioral aspects have been applied to the
specific field of noncooperative game theory4, the effects of loss aversion on
non-cooperative games have not been extensively studied. There is some
work in which the outcomes of certain well known examples of games are
showed to be consistent with experimental or empirical observations, if the
players are assumed to be loss averse5. However, this literature focuses on
specific examples, and furthermore, usually assumes that the players’ ref-
erence points are given by some exogenous status quo value. This does
not fully reflect the idea of reference-dependence as it was originally in-
tended: Tversky and Kahneman (1981) defined the framing of payoffs as
‘the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies as-
sociated with a particular choice’ (p. 453). This implies that the reference
points of players playing a noncooperative game should not be fixed ex ante,
but must be based on their own strategies (the acts), their payoffs (the out-
comes), and the strategies of their opponents (the contingencies). Thus, game
theory adds another dimension to the issue of framing payoffs, and to loss
aversion in general, that is often ignored.
One paper in which reference-dependence is treated consistently with
Tversky and Kahneman’s definition is (Shalev 2000). There, an equilibrium
concept is developed in which each player transforms his basic utility pay-
2See for instance Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Hershey et al. (1982), and others.
3An overview of puzzles and the solutions proposed by prospect theory is provided in
Camerer (2002).
4Examples are Crawford (1990), Dekel et al. (1991), and Eichberger and Kelsey (1999).
5For example, Fershtman (1996) studies an incumbency game, Berejikian (2002) a.o. the
game of chicken and the prisoners’ dilemma, and Butler (2007) an ultimatum game.
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offs with a reference point such that his expected reference-dependent equi-
librium payoff is exactly equal to that reference point. Thus, the players’
reference points can be interpreted as their expected payoffs in equilibrium.
In line with Tversky and Kahneman’s definition, the reference points thus
depend on the equilibrium strategies and on the players’ individual basic
utility payoff matrices.
We develop two other equilibrium concepts that take into account the
players’ loss aversion in a way that is consistent with Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s definition. Unlike Shalev, we only consider bimatrix games, i.e., two-
player games in which each player has a finite number of pure strategies.
The first new concept, called ‘maximin loss aversion equilibrium’, assumes
that each player’s reference point is equal to his pure maximin value, taking
into account only those pure strategies of the opponent that are played with
positive probability. This differs from Shalev’s equilibrium concept in two
significant ways: first, a player’s reference point depends on the support of
the opponent’s strategy. In addition, it assumes that players are cautious, in
the sense that they base their reference points on ‘worst-case’ values. Since a
player’s reference point depends on nothing but the support of his opponent’s
strategy, it can exhibit discontinuities when the opponent’s support changes.
Indeed, maximin loss aversion equilibrium may fail to exist. Nonetheless,
we show existence if at least one player has at most two pure strategies.
The loss aversion safety level of a player is the value of the matrix game,
derived from the basic payoff matrix with that value as reference point. A
safety level loss aversion equilibrium is an equilibrium in the bimatrix game
obtained by transforming the basic payoffs with these loss aversion safety
levels as reference points. This type of equilibrium shares the fixed point
idea with Shalev’s loss aversion equilibrium and the ‘cautious player’ prop-
erty with the maximin loss aversion equilibrium. However, it is based on
reference points that no longer depend on the opponent’s equilibrium strat-
egy, and that represent the payoff that a player can guarantee for himself.
We conclude the paper with a comparative statics analysis of the three
equilibrium concepts in 2×2 bimatrix games. Specifically, we assume that
both players are loss neutral, but that player 2 believes that player 1 is loss
averse. We study the effect this has on the equilibrium payoff of player 1,
and establish under which condition this is beneficial to player 1.
This chapter continues as follows. After preliminaries in Section 4.2,
we discuss Shalev’s (2000) ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium’ in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 discusses the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, and Section
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4.5 the safety level loss aversion equilibrium. In Section 4.6 we present
the comparative statics results mentioned above. Proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Bimatrix Games and Nash Equilibrium
Players 1 and 2 have sets of pure strategies I = {1, . . .,m} and J = {1, . . . ,n},
respectively. If player 1 plays i and player 2 plays j, then player 1 [2] re-
ceives a i j [bi j], the number in the payoff matrix A [B] in row i and column
j. The pair (A,B) is called a bimatrix game.
The (k−1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆k is defined as
∆
k :=
{
ω ∈Rk :
k∑
l=1
ωl = 1 and ωi ≥ 0 for all i= 1, . . . ,k
}
.
A mixed strategy for player 1 [2] is an element of ∆m [∆n]. A pure strategy l
is identified with the mixed strategy el, where el is the vector with a one in
position l and zeros otherwise. The support of a player’s strategy is the set
of pure strategies that a player plays with positive probability. That is,
S(p) := {i ∈ I : p i > 0} and S(q) := { j ∈ J : q j > 0}.
A Nash equilibrium in an m× n bimatrix game (A,B) is a pair (p∗, q∗) ∈
∆
m×∆n such that p∗Aq∗ ≥ pAq∗ for all p ∈ ∆m and p∗Bq∗ ≥ p∗Bq for all
q ∈∆n.6
4.2.2 Loss Aversion
Following Shalev (2000), we introduce loss aversion in two-player games
(A,B) by specifying nonnegative loss aversion coefficients λ1 and λ2, respec-
tively measuring player 1’s and player 2’s degrees of loss aversion. A loss
aversion bimatrix game is an object of the form ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)).
In addition to his loss aversion coefficient, player 1 [2] has a value r1 [r2]
below which he considers the basic utility payoff entries of A [B] as losses.
These points, r1 and r2, are the players’ respective reference points. The idea
6Note that we do not use the transposition notation for vectors and matrices if there is no
confusion what is meant.
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of loss aversion is captured by transforming the players’ basic utility payoffs
as follows:
a
λ1,r1
i j
= a i j−λ1max{r1−a i j,0},
b
λ2,r2
i j
= bi j−λ2max{r2−bi j,0}.
Observe that this transformation preserves the ordering over deterministic
payoffs. That is, a decision-maker prefers basic utility payoff x to y if and
only if he prefers xλ,r to yλ,r for all λ≥ 0 and r ∈R.
For each equilibrium concept to be considered below, we require that it
is a Nash equilibrium in the bimatrix game game (Aλ1,r1 ,Bλ2,r2 ), where the
reference points r1 and r2 are endogenous. The three equilibrium concepts
differ in the way the reference points are determined.
4.3 Fixed Point Loss Aversion Equilibrium
Shalev (2000) introduces a loss aversion equilibrium where the players’ ref-
erence points are found through a fixed point calculation. Define
r :=min
{
min
(i, j)∈ I×J
a i j, min
(i, j)∈ I×J
bi j
}
and
r :=max
{
max
(i, j)∈ I×J
a i j, max
(i, j)∈ I×J
bi j
}
.
Thus, r and r are the lowest resp. the highest payoffs in A or B. For a strat-
egy profile (p, q) and a reference point r1 ∈ [r, r], player 1 has an expected
payoff of pAλ1,r1 q. Observe that
pAλ1,r q= pAq≥ min
(i, j)∈ I×J
a i j ≥ r
and
r ≥ max
(i, j)∈I×J
a i j ≥ pAq≥ pAλ1,rq.
This and the fact that pAλ1,r1q is a continuous function of r1 implies that
there is an r∗1 ∈ [r, r] such that r∗1 = pAλ1,r
∗
1 q. Furthermore, r∗1 is unique
because r1 is strictly increasing on [r, r], while pAλ1,r1 q is nonincreasing on
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[r, r]. Similarly, there is a unique r∗2 ∈ [r, r] such that r∗2 = pBλ2,r
∗
2 q. Clearly,
these ‘fixed point’ reference points can be interpreted as the utilities players
expect to realize given the strategy profile (p, q). Hence, for each strategy
profile (p, q) there is a unique pair of reference points (r1, r2) that is ‘consis-
tent’ with this strategy profile.
Next, Shalev introduces a non-empty, compact- and convex-valued corre-
spondence β :∆m×∆n× [r, r]2→∆m×∆n× [r, r]2 where
β(pˆ, qˆ, (rˆ1, rˆ2)) := {(p, q, (r1, r2)) ∈∆m×∆n× [r, r]2 :
r1 = pAλ1,rˆ1 qˆ≥ p′Aλ1,rˆ1 qˆ for all p′ ∈∆m, and
r2 = pˆBλ2,rˆ2 q≥ pˆBλ2,rˆ2 q′ for all q′ ∈∆n}.
Since the (Nash) best reply-correspondence is upper semicontinuous and the
players’ payoff functions are continuous in their respective reference points,
it follows that the correspondence β is also upper semicontinuous. Hence, by
the Kakutani fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point (p∗, q∗, (r∗1, r
∗
2)).
Note that the strategy pair (p∗, q∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the bimatrix
game (Aλ1,r
∗
1 ,Bλ2,r
∗
2 ). Since the reference points are determined through a
fixed point calculation, we refer to this equilibrium concept as fixed point
loss aversion equilibrium.
Definition 4.3.1. A fixed point loss aversion equilibrium (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆m ×
∆
n in a bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), is a Nash equilibrium in the game
(Aλ1,r
∗
1 ,Bλ2,r
∗
2 ), where
r∗1 = p∗Aλ1,r
∗
1 q∗ and r∗2 = p∗Bλ2,r
∗
2 q∗.
One of the less attractive features of this equilibrium concept is that ref-
erence points are not unique: two loss aversion equilibria generally do not
yield the same expected payoffs to the players. Furthermore, a player’s refer-
ence point depends heavily on his own beliefs about the opponent’s strategy.
In what follows, we discuss two alternative equilibrium concepts which – to
a greater or lesser extent – respond to these issues.
4.4 Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibrium
In maximin loss aversion equilibrium, each player chooses his reference
point in such a way that his maximin payoff w.r.t. the strategies he believes
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his opponent plays with positive probability, is exactly equal to that refer-
ence point. The Nash equilibria in the game that results from using these
consistent reference points are maximin loss aversion equilibria.
Maximin loss aversion equilibria are similar to fixed point loss aversion
equilibria, in the sense that players base their reference points on the sup-
ports of their opponents’ strategies. In a fixed point loss aversion equilibrium
the reference points depend on the exact probabilities used in these strate-
gies. In a maximin loss aversion equilibrium, the reference points depend
only on the supports of the strategies of the opponents. Each player consid-
ers the pure strategies of the opponents that can be realized with positive
probability, and his reference point is the pure maximin value over those
strategies.
4.4.1 Definition of Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibrium
Formally, for a strategy combination (p, q) ∈∆m×∆n, the players’ reference
points are defined as follows. 7
r∗1 :=max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
a i j, and r
∗
2 :=max
j∈J
min
i∈Car(p)
bi j . (4.1)
Observe that this implies
r∗1 :=max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(q)
a
λ1,r∗1
i j
and r∗2 :=max
j∈J
min
i∈Car(p)
b
λ2,r∗2
i j
.
In other words, reference points do not change after the basic payoffs are
transformed according to loss aversion with these reference points.
Reference points are unique for each support played by the opponent.
Since a player’s reference point only depends on the support of the strategy
played by his opponent, rather than the strategy itself, reference points are
more robust against wrong beliefs a player may have about his opponent.
Definition 4.4.1. A maximin loss aversion equilibrium in a loss aversion
bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)) is a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆m ×∆n in
the bimatrix game (Aλ1,r
∗
1 ,Bλ2,r
∗
2 ), where r∗1 and r
∗
2 are the reference points
for (p∗, q∗) defined by (4.1).
7For simplicity of notation we do not use different symbols for the various reference point
concepts.
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This concept of maximin loss aversion equilibrium does not solve the
problem of multiple reference points. Because reference points no longer
depend continuously on the strategies played by the opponent, maximin loss
aversion equilibria may fail to exist.
4.4.2 Existence of Maximin Loss Aversion Equilibrium
An Example Showing Non-Existence
Consider the following 3×3 bimatrix game:
A =

8 1 01 8 0
4 4 −1

 B=

1 2 12 1 1
0 0 1

 .
Let player 2 be loss neutral, i.e. λ2 = 0, and assume λ1 = 1. Because of
player 2’s loss neutrality, r2 has no influence on the equilibrium. That is, B=
Bλ2,r2 for all values of r2. Observe that player 1’s best reply against player
2 playing e1 is e1, and player 2’s best reply against this is e2. Hence, e1
can never be an equilibrium strategy for player 2. Similarly, we can exclude
e2 as one of player 2’s equilibrium strategies. This implies that player 1’s
equilibrium reference point is never equal to 8. This leaves two possibilities:
r1 = 0 or r1 = 4.
• r1 = 0: In this case, we have
Aλ1,0 =

8 1 01 8 0
4 4 −2

 .
The unique Nash equilibrium in (Aλ1,0,B) is ((.5, .5,0), (.5, .5,0)), imply-
ing r1 = 4.
• r1 = 4: In this case, we have
Aλ1,4 =

 8 −2 −4−2 8 −4
4 4 −6

 .
The unique Nash equilibrium in (Aλ1,4,B) is
((1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
,
(1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
))
, imply-
ing r1 = 0.
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Each of player 1’s possible reference points implies a loss aversion game in
which the support of player 2’s equilibrium strategy is such that another
reference point should be chosen. Hence, there is no maximin loss aversion
equilibrium.
The Source of Non-Existence
Define the players’ respective maximin best reply correspondences β1 :∆n→
∆
m and β2 :∆m→∆n as
β1(qˆ) := {p ∈∆m : pAλ1,r1 qˆ≥ p′Aλ1,r1 qˆ for all p′ ∈∆m and
r1 =max
i∈I
min
j∈Car(qˆ)
a i j},
and
β2(pˆ) := {q ∈∆n : pˆBλ2,r2 q≥ pˆBλ2,r2 q′ for all q′ ∈∆n and
r2 =max
j∈J
min
i∈Car( pˆ)
bi j}.
Define the overall maximin best-reply correspondence β : ∆m ×∆n → ∆m ×
∆
n as β := β1×β2. For each (pˆ, qˆ) there is a single pair of payoff matrices
(Aλ1,r1 ,Bλ2,r2 ), and the set of best replies against (pˆ, qˆ) given these payoff
matrices is non-empty, compact and convex. It follows that β is non-empty,
and compact- and convex-valued. Since a maximin loss aversion equilibrium
need not exist, this implies that β need not be upper semicontinuous. More
specifically, there are sequences (pk, qk) and (pˆk, qˆk) in ∆m×∆n converging
to (p∗, q∗) resp. (pˆ∗, qˆ∗) and satisfying (pk, qk) ∈ β(pˆk, qˆk) for all k ∈N that
do not satisfy (p∗, q∗) ∈β(pˆ∗, qˆ∗).
In our example, suppose player 2 has a sequence of strategies given by
qˆk =


1
3 + 16
(
1− 1
k
)
1
3 + 16
(
1− 1
k
)
1
3 − 13
(
1− 1
k
)

 .
Note that this implies rk1 = 0 for all k ∈N. Then player 1 obtains 92 − 32k from
his first two strategies, and 4− 2
k
from his second. Thus, β1(qˆk) = {(α,1−
α,0) with α ∈ [0,1]} for all k ∈N. The sequence qˆk converges to qˆ∗ = (12 , 12 ,0).
Then r∗1 = 4 from which it follows that player 1 obtains a payoff of 3 for the
first two strategies and 4 for the third one. Hence, β1(qˆ∗)= {(0,0,1)}. Since
β1 does not satisfy upper semicontinuity, neither does β.
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Existence in m×2 and 2×n Games
Although maximin loss aversion equilibria do not exist in general, we do
have existence in the case where one of the players has no more than two
pure strategies.
Proposition 4.4.2. For all λ1,λ2 ≥ 0, and m×2 (or 2×n) matrices A and B,
there exists a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in the loss aversion bimatrix
game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)).
Proof. Let λ1,λ2 ≥ 0 and let A,B be m×2 matrices, and consider the game
((A,B), (λ1,λ2)). Define
r˜ :=max
i∈I
min
j∈J
a i j,
and let (p∗, q) be a Nash equilibrium in the game (Aλ1,r˜,B). We distinguish
three (exhaustive) cases:
i. q = et where t ∈ J. This implies there is an s ∈ S(p∗) such that bst =
max j∈J bs j, since otherwise et would not be a best reply of player 2
against p∗. Since loss aversion preserves the agent’s preference order-
ing over pure alternatives, this implies bλ2,bstst =max j∈J b
λ2,bst
s j
. From
the fact that s ∈ S(p∗), it follows that aλ1,r˜st = maxi∈I a
λ1,r˜
it
, and thus
also aλ1,astst =maxi∈I a
λ1,ast
it
. Hence, (es, et) is a pure loss aversion equi-
librium in ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), and the associated reference point pair is
(ast,bst).
ii. (p∗, q)= (es, (β,1−β)) where s ∈ I and β ∈ (0,1). This implies
βa
λ1,r1
s1 + (1−β)a
λ1,r1
s2 ≥βa
λ1,r1
i1 + (1−β)a
λ1,r1
i2
for all i ∈ I with r1 = r˜. Furthermore, it implies bs1 = bs2 =: b from
which it follows that bλ2,r2
s1 = b
λ2,r2
s2 with r2 = b. Hence, (es, (β,1−β)) is
a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), and the asso-
ciated reference point pair is (r˜,b).
iii. p∗ and q satisfy |S(p∗)| ≥ 2 and |S(q)| = 2. Then there exist pure
strategies s and s′ in S(p∗) such that [bs1 > bs2 and bs′1 < bs′2] or
[bs1 = bs2 and bs′1 = bs′2]. In both cases, there exists an α ∈ (0,1)
such that both player 2’s pure strategies are best replies against player
1’s strategy (αes+ (1−α)es′ ), with payoffs given by Bλ2,r2 where r2 =
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max j∈Jmini∈{s,s′} bi j. But then ((α,1−α), q) is a maximin loss aver-
sion equilibrium in the game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)). The associated reference
points are
r1 := max
i∈{s,s′}
min
j∈J
a i j, and r2 :=max
j∈J
min
i∈{s,s′}
bi j
respectively.
This completes the proof of the m×2 case. The 2×n case is analogous.
The above proposition includes 2×2 bimatrix games. It can be shown
that the maximin best-reply correspondence for 2×2 bimatrix games satis-
fies upper semicontinuity, implying that existence in such cases also follows
from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Since for each q ∈ ∆2 there exists a
p ∈β1(q) with |S(p)| = 2, it seems one could obtain an easier proof for Propo-
sition 4.4.2 by restricting the best-reply correspondence β1 to strategies with
carriers containing at most two pure strategies. However, while such a re-
stricted best-reply correspondence would not violate non-emptiness, it would
definitely not be convex-valued. Hence, existence in the more general case
of m×2 and 2×n games can not be obtained directly by means of Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem.
Note that the above proof provides a method to calculate maximin loss
aversion equilibria. One can modify player 1’s payoff matrix under the as-
sumption that player 2 plays both his strategies with positive probability,
and calculate the Nash equilibria in the resulting game. These Nash equi-
libria can then be transformed into maximin loss aversion equilibria.
4.5 Safety Level Loss Aversion Equilibria
In a safety level loss aversion equilibrium, a player’s reference point is the
value of the matrix game which is obtained by adapting his basic payoff
matrix to account for loss aversion. If this basic payoff matrix is C and the
loss aversion coefficient is λ, then this reference point is equal to the number
r if r is the value of the matrix game Cλ,r. Details are spelled out below.
This reference point does not depend on a player’s belief about the strat-
egy of the opponent in equilibrium. Instead, a player computes what he can
obtain for sure and considers payoffs below this number as losses. Moreover,
these reference points are unique, and safety level loss aversion equilibria
always exist.
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4.5.1 Definition and Existence of Safety Level Loss Aversion
Equilibria
The safety level is a concept that dates back to von Neumann’s (1928) anal-
ysis of zero-sum games. Formally, for a bimatrix game (A,B), the players’
safety levels are defined by
v1(A) :=max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAq, and v2(B) :=max
q∈∆n
min
p∈∆m
pBq.
Since a player can guarantee his safety level, it would make an intuitively
appealing reference point in a loss aversion bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)).
However, in the payoff matrices adapted by loss aversion the safety levels
may change. Therefore, we look for reference points which in the trans-
formed matrices are equal to the safety levels. That is, we wish to find r∗1
and r∗2 such that r
∗
1 = v1(Aλ1,r
∗
1 ) and r∗2 = v2(Bλ2,r
∗
2 ). Such reference points
are called loss aversion safety levels.
To prove that there is a unique r∗1 such that r
∗
1 = v1(Aλ1,r
∗
1 ), it is sufficient
to show that v1(Aλ1,r) is a continuous, nonincreasing function of r on the
interval [r, r], and that
v1(A
λ1,r)≥ r, and v1(Aλ1,r)≤ r.
Clearly, v1(Aλ1,r) is continuous in r. To show that it is nonincreasing in r on
the interval [r, r], let r1 and s1 be reference points in [r, r] with r1 > s1, and
let
p∗ ∈ argmax
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,r1 q, and
q∗ ∈ argmin
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,s1 q.
Then
v1(A
λ1,s1 )=max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,s1q
≥min
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,s1 q
= p∗Aλ1,s1q∗.
Note that pAλ1,rq is nonincreasing in r for any given strategy pair (p, q).
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Therefore, p∗Aλ1,s1 q∗ ≥ p∗Aλ1,r1q∗. Now observe that
p∗Aλ1,r1 q∗ ≥min
q∈∆n
p∗Aλ1,r1 q
=max
p∈∆m
min
q∈∆n
pAλ1,r1 q
= v1(Aλ1,r1 ).
It follows that v1(Aλ1,r) is nonincreasing in r. Furthermore,
v1(A
λ1,r)= v1(A)≥ min
(i, j)∈I×J
a i j ≥ r,
and since v1(Aλ1,r) is nonincreasing in r, we also have
v1(A
λ1,r)≤ v1(Aλ1,r)= v1(A)≤ max
(i, j)∈I×J
a i j ≤ r.
Thus, there must be a unique r∗1 ∈ [r, r] such that r∗1 = v1(Aλ1,r
∗
1 ). Similarly,
there exists a unique r∗2 ∈ [r, r] such that r∗2 = v2(Bλ2,r
∗
2 ).
The players transform their payoff matrices using their degrees of loss
aversion and their loss aversion safety levels. The safety level loss aversion
equilibria are the Nash equilibria in the transformed game, i.e. the bimatrix
game (Aλ1,r
∗
1 ,Bλ2,r
∗
2 ).
Definition 4.5.1. A safety level loss aversion equilibrium in a loss aversion
bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)) is a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆m ×∆n in
the bimatrix game (Aλ1,r
∗
1 ,Bλ2,r
∗
2 ), where
r∗1 = v1(Aλ1,r
∗
1 ) and r∗2 = v2(Bλ2,r
∗
2 ).
4.5.2 Strict Dominance when Players are Loss Averse
In a safety level loss aversion equilibrium the determination of the equilib-
rium strategies is not related to the determination of the reference points.
Hence, in contrast to the previous equilibrium concepts, reference points
may also depend on strategies that are not played in equilibrium. Suppose
for instance that player 2 has a strictly dominated column in his payoff ma-
trix B, say bi,n−1 > bi,n for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, whatever the reference
level and the adapted payoff matrix are going to be, player 2 will not put
any probability on column n in an equilibrium. One could argue that player
1, in determining his loss aversion safety level, should take into account that
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player 2 is not going to play column n. More generally, one could argue that,
before actually computing loss aversion safety levels, first strictly dominated
strategies should be iteratively eliminated. This raises the question which
strategies are strictly dominated in the loss aversion context. The remainder
of this section is devoted to studying this question.
We say that a pure strategy i ∈ I is strictly dominated in A if there is a
strategy p ∈ ∆m with p i = 0, such that pAe j > eiAe j for all j ∈ J. A pure
strategy i ∈ I is said to be strictly dominated in (A,λ1), if it is strictly domi-
nated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r]. Then, to eliminate a pure strategy i ∈ I from
the game, it is no longer sufficient that it is strictly dominated in A. To see
this, consider the following example:
A =

5 00 5
2 2

 .
Observe that player 1’s pure strategy e3 is strictly dominated by the mixed
strategy (0.5,0.5,0). Now let λ1 = 1 and r1 = 2. Then the transformed payoff
matrix is
A1,2 =

 5 −2−2 5
2 2

 .
Clearly, strategy e3 is no longer strictly dominated in A1,2, even though it
was in A.
Since A = Aλ1,r, ei being strictly dominated in A is still a necessary con-
dition for ei to be strictly dominated in (A,λ1). The following proposition
gives a necessary and sufficient condition.
Proposition 4.5.2. In the game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)) where λ1 > 0, a strategy p ∈
∆
m strictly dominates the pure strategy i ∈ I in (A,λ1) if and only if p strictly
dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all
ρ ∈
[
min
j∈J
a i j, max
(i′, j)∈Car(p)×J
a i′ j
]
.
Proof. Let a pure strategy i be strictly dominated by a strategy p in the
payoff matrix A. Then define ρ :=min j∈J a i j and ρ :=max(i′ , j)∈Car(p)×J a i′ j.
⇐: Let the pure strategy i be strictly dominated in (A,λ1). Then it is strictly
dominated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r]. Since [ρ,ρ]⊆ [r, r], strategy i is strictly
dominated in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ,ρ].
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⇒: Let the pure strategy i be strictly dominated by p in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ,ρ].
Then p strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ . That is,
pA
λ1,ρ e j > eiAλ1,ρ e j
for all j ∈ J. Let ρ ∈ [r,ρ]. Then eiAλ1,ρ e j = eiAλ1,ρ e j. Furthermore, ρ ≥ ρ
implies pAλ1,ρ e j ≤ pAλ1,ρ e j . Hence, pAλ1,ρ e j > eiAλ1,ρ e j as well. So p
strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r,ρ].
Similarly, p strictly dominating i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ,ρ] implies that p
strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ. That is, pAλ1,ρ e j > eiAλ1,ρ e j for all j ∈ J.
Observe that for all ρ ∈ [ρ, r], we have that
pAλ1,ρ e j = (1+λ1)pAe j−λ1ρ.
Note that for all j ∈ J there is an i′ ∈ S(p) such that eiAλ1,ρ e j ≤ ei′Aλ1,ρ e j.
Hence, for all j ∈ J we have that eiAλ1,ρ e j ≤ ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ, r], implying
eiAλ1,ρ e j = (1+λ1)eiAe j−λ1ρ
for all j ∈ J and ρ ∈ [ρ, r]. Hence, (1+λ1)pAe j −λ1ρ > (1+λ1)eiAe j −λ1ρ
for all j ∈ J, and the inequality is preserved if we replace ρ by any ρ ∈ [ρ, r].
But then pAλ1,ρ e j > eiAλ1,ρ e j for all j ∈ J and ρ ∈ [ρ, r]. That is, p strictly
dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρ, r].
Thus, p strictly dominates i in Aλ1,ρ for all ρ ∈ [r, r], which means that p
strictly dominates i in (A,λ1).
Remark 4.5.3. It could happen that none of the l strategies p1, . . . , pl ∈∆m
dominate a pure strategy i in (A,λ1), while taken together they do. Suppose
none of the strategies p1, . . . , pl dominate i in (A,λ1). Then for each pk there
is an interval Rk ⊆ [r, r] such that pk does not strictly dominate i in Aλ1,ρ
for any ρ ∈ Rk. Then, as long as ⋂l
k=1R
k = ;, there is always a strategy pk
strictly better than pure strategy i.
Thus, when considering safety level loss aversion equilibria in a loss
aversion bimatrix game ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), we could assume that the payoff
matrices A and B are the result of iterated elimination of strategies that
are either strictly dominated in (A,λ1) and (B,λ2) respectively, or strictly
dominated in the weaker sense, explained in the above remark.
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4.6 Comparative Statics
In this section we consider the effect of loss aversion on the equilibrium
payoff of a player. Specifically, suppose that both players are loss neutral but
player 2 believes that player 1 is loss averse. This makes player 2 change his
equilibrium strategy and we investigate when this is beneficial for player 1.
4.6.1 Preliminaries
For reasons of tractability we only consider 2×2 bimatrix games.8 The basic
utilities are represented by the following matrices:
A :=
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
and B :=
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
]
.
Since pure Nash equilibria are equivalent to the pure versions of all three
types of loss aversion equilibrium considered above, we can restrict our-
selves to mixed equilibria. Following Berden and Peters (2006), we exclude
the case where player 1 has a weakly dominant strategy, implying a11 6= a21
and a12 6= a22. W.l.o.g. assume a11 > a21, a12 < a22, and a11 ≥ a22. This
leaves three exhaustive cases:
i. a21 ≥ a22;
ii. a22 ≥ a21 ≥ a12;
iii. a12 ≥ a21.
In addition, we assume b11 < b12 and b21 > b22. Hence, also player 2 has no
weakly dominant strategy. These assumptions imply that the game has a
unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗), with
p∗ =
[
γ
1−γ
]
and q∗ =
[
δ
1−δ
]
,
where
γ= b21−b22
b12−b11+b21−b22
and δ= a22−a12
a11−a12−a21+a22
.
Assume that player 2 does not have any information about his opponent’s
attitude towards losses, allowing him to form a wrong belief about it. That is,
8As an additional advantage there is no existence problem for maximin equilibria.
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player 2 may falsely believe that player 1 is loss averse, which causes player
2 to play differently in order to make player 1 indifferent between his pure
strategies in equilibrium. Specifically, player 2 plays a strategy q˜= (δ˜,1− δ˜)
where δ˜ ∈ (0,1). Player 1 knows the utility function of his opponent, so he
keeps playing his previous strategy p∗. Thus, if player 2 misperceives λ1,
the mixed loss aversion equilibrium becomes (p∗, q˜). 9
The equilibriumunder player 2’s wrong perception of λ1 can be explained
in two ways. First, player 1 could be naive in the sense that he does not know
that player 2 does not perceive his degree of loss aversion correctly. Thus,
player 1 plays his equilibrium strategy and is surprised by player 2’s action.
A second explanation would be that player 1 – knowing that player 2 does
not have any information about λ1 – intentionally misrepresents his degree
of loss aversion, but is myopic in the sense that he is not able to determine
the strategy he has to play in order to optimally exploit player 2’s action.
Clearly, starting from a situation where both players are loss averse but
player 2 overestimates player 1’s loss aversion is not really different from
the present case.
4.6.2 Result
We say that player 2’s wrong perception of λ1 benefits player 1 if p∗Aq˜ ≥
p∗Aq∗, and hurts him if p∗Aq˜≤ p∗Aq∗.10 The following theorem presents
the comparative statics result.
Theorem 4.6.1. In case i. player 1 benefits from player 2 misperceiving λ1.
In cases ii. and iii. player 1 benefits from player 2 misperceiving λ1 if and
only if
b21−b22
b12−b11+b21−b22
≥ a22−a21
a11−a12+a22−a21
. (4.2)
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Note that the left-hand side in (4.2) is equal to γ, i.e., the probability that
player 1 puts on the first row in equilibrium. If nonnegative, the right-hand
side γ′ = a22−a21
a11−a12+a22−a21 in (4.2) is the probability that player 1 would have to
9In this 2×2 framework, players keep playing strategies with full supports for each type
of loss aversion equilibrium.
10Note that player 2’s wrong belief about his opponent’s loss attitude neither hurts nor
benefits him. That is, p∗Bq∗ = p∗Bq˜.
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put on the first row in order to be indifferent between the actions of player 2.
In that case, playing the mixed strategy p′ = (γ′,1−γ′) would yield player 1
the Nash equilibrium payoff p∗Aq∗. Thus, as long as player 2 plays his
Nash equilibrium strategy q∗, then player 1 is indifferent between playing
p∗ and p′. However, if player 2 plays q˜, i.e. erroneously believes player 1 is
loss averse, then player 1 obtains the Nash equilibrium payoff by playing p′,
but could receive more or less by playing p∗.
If condition (4.2) on the payoffs of the players is satisfied, we thus obtain
that pretending to be more loss averse makes a player better off. The com-
parative statics of the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium were also inves-
tigated in Shalev (2000), with different results however. Shalev investigated
how a player’s reference point moves with his own degree of loss aversion.
As this reference point equals a player’s equilibrium payoff by definition,
this yields associated comparative statics results. It is not clear what the
proper interpretation of these results is since payoffs for players with differ-
ent utility functions are compared. For our approach this difficulty does not
arise since we compare payoffs of one and the same player 1: only player 2’s
belief about player 1 changes, but not player 1 himself.
4.7 Summary
We have argued in this chapter that in order to correctly incorporate the
concept of loss aversion into noncooperative game theory, it is necessary to
let the reference points of the players depend on the strategies the players
play. Three different loss aversion equilibrium concepts were discussed, that
satisfy this requirement. It was established that in 2×2 bimatrix games, a
simple condition on the payoffs is sufficient for a player to benefit from his
opponent overestimating his (the player’s) degree of loss aversion.
4.A Appendix: Proofs
4.A.1 The Proof of Theorem 4.6.1
A player’s reference point is in between the lowest and the highest payoff in
his payoff matrix. In the 2×2 case, there are three intervals which could
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contain r1: the upper, the middle and the lower interval. Let π ∈R4 with
π=


(a12 , a22 , a21 , a11) in case i.
(a12 , a21 , a22 , a11) in case ii.
(a21 , a12 , a22 , a11) in case iii.
The following lemma says that the reference point in a fixed point loss aver-
sion equilibrium lies in the middle interval.
Lemma 4.A.1. If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in
((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), then r1 ∈ [π2,π3].
Proof. For any basic utility payoff x, let xˆ denote transformed payoff
as a consequence of loss aversion. The expected payoff r1 under the mixed
fixed point loss aversion equilibrium is a convex combination of aˆ21 and aˆ22.
Therefore, r1 ≤max{aˆ21, aˆ22}≤max{a21,a22} and thus, r1 ≤π3.
To see that the reference point can never be in the lower interval, we con-
sider each case separately.
Case i.: Here, a21 ≥ a22 and a22 > a12. Assume r1 ∈ [a12,a22). Note that
a22− a21 ≤ 0 and aˆ12− a22 < 0, and thus (a22− a21)(aˆ12− a22) ≥ 0. By
an elementary computation it follows that
a11a22−a21aˆ12
a11− aˆ12−a21+a22
≥ a22 .
In other words, player 1’s expected payoff under loss aversion is larger
or equal than a22, contradicting r1 < a22. Thus, r1 ≥π2.
Case ii.: Here, a11 > a21 and a22 ≥ a21. Assume r1 ∈ [a12,a21). Now (a11−
a21)(a22−a21)≥ 0, which implies
a11a22−a21aˆ12
a11− aˆ12−a21+a22
≥ a21 ,
contradicting r1 < a21. Hence, r1 ≥π2.
Case iii.: Repeating the argument from case ii., with a21 replaced by a12,
and aˆ12 by aˆ21, yields the desired contradiction for case iii.
It follows from the above that r1 ∈ [π2,π3].
For the other loss aversion equilibrium concepts we have similar results.
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Lemma 4.A.2. If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a maximin loss aversion equilibrium in
((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), then r1 =π2.
Proof. Since the equilibrium is completely mixed we have in Case i.:
maxi∈Imin j∈J a i j =max{a12,a22}= a22; and in Cases ii. and iii.:
maxi∈Imin j∈J a i j =max{a12,a21}= a21. Thus, r1 =π2.
Lemma 4.A.3. If (p∗, q∗, (r1, r2)) is a safety level loss aversion equilibrium
in ((A,B), (λ1,λ2)), then r1 ∈ [π2,π3].
Proof. Recall that for any 2×2 matrix A, we have
v1(A)=max
p∈∆2
min
q∈∆2
pAq≥max
i∈I
min
q∈∆2
eiAq=max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAe j. (4.3)
Assume r1 <π2. Then
π2 =max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAλ1,r1 e j.
In safety level loss aversion equilibrium we have r1 = v1(Aλ1,r1 ). Then
v1(A
λ1,r1 )<π2 =max
i∈I
min
j∈J
eiAλ1,r1 e j,
which contradicts (4.3). Hence, r1 ≥π2.
The safety level, v1(Aλ1,r1 ), can be interpreted as player 1’s Nash equi-
librium payoff in the zero-sum game (Aλ1,r1 ,−Aλ1,r1 ). By a similar reasoning
as above, we have that player 2’s payoff, −v1(Aλ1,r1 ), is above −π3, implying
v1(Aλ1,r1 )≤π3. Hence, r1 ∈ [π2,π3].
Recall that q˜= (δ˜,1− δ˜). We now compute δ˜ for the three different cases.
Case i.: Here, we have a11 > a21 ≥ a22 > a12, and by Lemmas 4.A.1–4.A.3,
r1 ∈ [a22,a21]. Thus,
δ˜= a22−a12−λ1(r1−a22)+λ1(r1−a12)
a11−a12−a21+a22+λ1(r1−a12)−λ1(r1−a22)
= (1+λ1)(a22−a12)
a11−a21+ (1+λ1)(a22−a12)
.
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Case ii.: Here a11 > a22 ≥ a21 > a12 with a11 > a22, a22 > a21, or both. By
Lemmas 4.A.1–4.A.3, we have r1 ∈ [a21,a22]. Hence,
δ˜= a22−a12+λ1(r1−a12)
a11−a12+λ1(r1−a12)−a21+λ1(r1−a21)+a22
= a22−a12+λ1(r1−a12)
a11−a12−a21+a22+λ1(2r1−a12−a21)
.
Case iii.: Here a11 > a22 ≥ a12 > a21. By Lemmas 4.A.1–4.A.3, we have
r1 ∈ [a12,a22], which implies that δ˜ has the same value as in case ii.
That is,
δ˜= a22−a12+λ1(r1−a12)
a11−a12−a21+a22+λ1(2r1−a12−a21)
.
Having specified q˜, player 2’s equilibrium strategy associated with a wrong
belief about λ1, for each case, we now investigate how it compares to q∗,
player 2’s equilibrium strategy associated with the correct belief about λ1.
Lemma 4.A.4. Let (p∗, (δ,1−δ)) be the Nash equilibrium in (A,B), and let
(p∗, (δ˜,1− δ˜)) be the Nash equilibrium in (Aλ1,r1 ,B), where r1 is the equilib-
rium reference point associated with either of the three loss aversion equilib-
rium types. Then
δ˜≥ δ
in all three cases.
Proof. Let x := a22−a12 and y := a11−a21−a12+a22. Note that x and y
are strictly positive, and that δ= x/y. Assume λ1 > 0. Again we consider the
different cases.
Case i.: Here we have
δ˜= (1+λ1)(a22−a12)
a11−a21+ (1+λ1)(a22−a12)
= (1+λ1)x
y+λ1x
.
Since y> x this implies δ˜> δ.
Case ii. and iii.: Here we have
δ˜= a22−a12+λ1(r1−a12)
a11−a12−a21+a22+λ1(2r1−a12−a21)
= x+λ1(r1−a12)
y+λ1(2r1−a12−a21)
.
Now δ˜≥ δ follows by straightforward computation, using r1 ∈ [a21,a22].
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Proof of Theorem 4.6.1: We have
p∗Aq∗ = [γa11+ (1−γ)a21 γa12+ (1−γ)a22]
[
δ
1−δ
]
,
and
p∗Aq˜= [γa11+ (1−γ)a21 γa12+ (1−γ)a22]
[
δ˜
1− δ˜
]
.
From Lemma 4.A.4, we have δ˜≥ δ. Then p∗Aq˜≥ p∗Aq∗ if and only if γa11+
(1−γ)a21 ≥ γa12+ (1−γ)a22, which is equivalent to (4.2). Observe that in
case i. this condition is trivially satisfied. This concludes the proof.
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Chapter 5
Relative Concave Utility for
Risk and Ambiguity
5.1 Introduction
Bernoulli (1954) introduced expected utility and diminishing marginal util-
ity to explain risk aversion. Since then, it has been common in the literature
to equate risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility. Frequently used
indexes of risk aversion, such as the absolute and relative Arrow–Pratt in-
dexes, refer exclusively to marginal utility, and comparisons of risk attitudes
are captured by concave utility transformations (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1964;
Yaari 1969). Similarly, Kreps and Porteus (1978) explained preference for or
against early resolution of uncertainty by letting marginal utility depend on
the time of resolution in a recursive expected utility model. Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, and Mukherji (2005; KMM), Nau (2006), and Neilson (1993) used a
similar recursive expected utility model to explain ambiguity attitudes such
as exhibited by the Ellsberg paradox in terms of marginal utility.
This chapter presents a discrete version of marginal rates of substitu-
tion for analyzing utility, and applies it to the models of the afore-mentioned
references. This is first related to a known tradeoff tool (Köbberling and
Wakker 2003), and more widely applicable preference axiomatizations for
all afore-mentioned models are obtained. Next it is used to obtain a general
method for comparing the concavity of different utility functions. Although
the method is elementary in a mathematical sense, it delivers many gener-
alizations of the classical results in the literature that have not been known
before. We, thus, extend Yaari’s (1969) comparability of risk attittudes to
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the case of different subjective beliefs. We similarly extend KMM’s smooth
ambiguity comparisons to the case of different subjective beliefs and differ-
ent risk attitudes. For KMM’s model, we further avoid the use of theoretical
constructs that are not directly observable – such as subjective probabilities
– in the preference axioms. For the recursive expected utility models, we
need not commit to violations of the reduction of compound lotteries, and we
do not need known probabilities.
Thus, a first contribution this chapter makes, concerns the utility analy-
sis in a number of popular models, which is expected to be uncontroversial to
all readers. For readers who do not doubt the appropriateness of marginal
utility for completely capturing attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, the
technique presented in this chapter is a contribution to the analysis of such
attitudes. For other readers, however, the interpretation of the results may
be different when it comes to the analysis of risk and ambiguity attitudes.
Discrete rates of substitution isolate the empirical meaning of utility very
clearly. As illustrated in Figure 5.2(a), uncovering this empirical meaning,
requires carefully inspecting many outcomes, with almost no regard of the
events or the risks. It does not seem plausible that detailed inspections of
outcomes could suffice to completely capture attitudes towards ambiguity
or risk. The same basic objection was raised against expected utility under
risk in the early 1980’s (Schoemaker 1982), and was a reason for develop-
ing nonexpected utility. This classical argument against expected utility is
sharpened and extended to the use of expected utility for ambiguity. Thus,
the results of this chapter support models for ambiguity, that use nonex-
pected utility. Such models may use nonadditive probabilities (Gilboa 1987;
Schmeidler 1989), or multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) as well
as robust control (Hansen and Sargent 2001; Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini 2006). The latter models put the processing of uncertain events
central in their analyses of risk and ambiguity, and thus avoid the aforemen-
tioned intuitive objection.
This chapter continues as follows. Section 5.2 informally presents a dis-
crete version of marginal rates of substitution. It shows how this version
can be used to analyze risk and uncertainty, and prepares for some intuitive
discussions. Section 5.3 presents basic definitions of decision under under
uncertainty, and Section 5.4 adds technical definitions. Section 5.5 defines a
tradeoff indifference that formalizes the discrete rates of substitution, and
states the main results, to be applied in the following sections. Section 5.6
generalizes the results of Yaari (1969) on comparative risk aversion. Section
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5.7 axiomatizes a recursive model of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and of KMM,
and derives some absolute concavity results. Relative results for the recur-
sive model are in Section 5.8, and Section 5.9 compares the results of the
chapter to related results in the literature. Section 5.10 contains a discus-
sion, and Section 5.11 concludes.
5.2 Risk Aversion through Marginal Rates of Sub-
stitution
In consumer theory, marginal rates of substitution (MRS) provide a useful
tool for analyzing utility. For example, if at the starting point (x,γ) in figure
5.1(a), an increase of β−γ infinitesimal units of one commodity, say tea (T),
exactly offsets an increase of one infinitesimal unit y− x of Hats (H), then
the MRS of H for T is β−γ. The common empirical finding is that MRS’s di-
minish, corresponding with concave utility. This implies that, at the higher
starting point (x,β) in Figure 5.1(b), the MRS of H for T, α−β, exceeds β−γ.
The more tea you have, the more extra tea you need to offset one unit of
hats. Under cardinal utility models, the utility midpoint between α and γ,
i.e. β, then is below the physical midpoint, i.e. β ≤ α+γ2 . Formally, the con-
dition then implies that the second derivative of utility with respect to T is
negative; that is, utility is concave in T. Figure 5.1(c) presents a comparative
result at v versus x (v > x and w− v = y− x). The utility midpoint at v, β∗,
is lower than β, the utility midpoint at x. This implies that the utility of
tea is more concave for v hats than for x hats. The lower the midpoint β is,
the more concave utility is. We can similarly compare MRS’s and concavity
of utility by comparing utility midpoints not for different levels of hats, but
for different persons, or within one person for different circumstances (for
different timepoints, and so on), as we will elaborate on later.
In decision theory, we usually observe discrete preferences rather than
first order optimality conditions. Then, we use discrete versions of Figures
5.1(a) and 5.1(b) where y−x, β−γ, α−β, and w−v are not infinitesimal, but
take real values. The quantities α−β
y−x and
β−γ
y−x of Figure 5.1(b) can now be
taken as two discrete rates of substitution (RS). For cardinal utility models,
utility of T is still concave for H fixed at x if and only if in all configurations
of Figure 5.1(b) – also discrete ones – we have β≤ α+γ2 . This condition, called
Diminishing Rate of Substitution (DRS) will be formalized later. Similarly,
noninfinitesimal distances are now considered in Figure 5.1(c), and β∗ ≤ β
still characterizes relative concave utility.
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(a) Rate of sub-
stitution
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RS: β∗ ≤ β
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utility for T
Figure 5.1: Rates of Substitution
As pointed out by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959), techniques used to
analyze preferences over commodity bundles can also be used to analyze
preferences under uncertainty. Suppose a coin is flipped, with either heads
(event H) or tails (event T) coming up. The point (x,γ) now designates an
event-contingent payment, yielding x if H, and γ if T. Such event-contingent
payments are called acts. Under expected utility, the act (x,γ) is evaluated
by pU(x)+ (1− p)U(γ), where p denotes the probability of H, andU denotes
utility. Concave utility now characterizes risk aversion, i.e. a preference for
expectations over acts. Using the Arrow-Debreu analogy, we see that DRS,
as illustrated in Figure 5.1(b), is equivalent to risk aversion. Further, one
decision maker is more risk averse than another if and only if the corre-
sponding utility midpoints are lower at the earlier time point. Hence, under
expected utility, we can analyze risk attitude, using RS’s – well known from
consumer theory – rather than risk premiums.
Some readers might raise an intuitive objection against the preceding
analysis of risk attitudes in terms of RS’s. After all, RS’s only concern tastes
for outcomes, as they do in consumer theory, and they do not refer to risk in
any direct manner. The only probability considered above was p, the proba-
bility of heads, and its role was minimal. In fact, the whole analysis works
irrespectively of what p is, and we need not know p. It is not plausible that
risk attitude can be captured completely without any consideration for the
role of probabilities. To endorse this intuitive objection, however, the ex-
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pected utility model has to be abandoned. Under expected utility, it follows
as a logical truh that RS or, equivalently, marginal utility, captures risk atti-
tude. The intuition that utility, reflecting the taste for outcomes, cannot cap-
ture risk attitudes was one of the reasons why generalizations of expected
utility were introduced in the 1980’s. It implies in particular that compar-
isons of marginal utility cannot capture comparisons of risk attitudes.
For readers who do not share the intuitive objection and who adhere to
expected utiltiy, RS’s simply provide a useful alternative to risk premiums
for analyzing risk attitudes. There is an additional advantage of RS’s over
risk premiums for decision under uncertainty, where probabilities are not
given beforehand but have to be subjective. Then – unlike with risk – the
probabilities are not directly observable. Instead, they are theoretical con-
structs that have to be derived from preferences. Preference conditions that
use subjective probabilities as inputs are not directly testable, much the
same as preference conditions that use utilities as inputs are not directly
testable. There is no easy way to calculate expected values or risk premi-
ums if we do not know the subjective probabilities of a person. RS’s, to the
contrary, are as readily observable under uncertainty as they are under risk;
and, as they are in consumer theory. They continue to serve as useful tools
for analyzing risk attitude also when probabilities are subjective. Indeed,
the whole analysis of Figure 5.1(c) remains valid and directly observable
even if p is subjective and unknown.
5.3 Elementary Definitions
This section gives the basic definitions for decision under uncertainty. S
denotes the state space, which can be finite or infinite. Exactly one state
s ∈ S is true, the other states are not true, and it is uncertain which state
is the true one. An algebra is a collection of subsets of S which contains ;
and S, and which is closed under complement taking and finite unions and
intersections. We assume that an algebra A is given on S, the elements of
which are called events. All sources considered later will be subalgebras of
A .
The outcome set C is a nondegenerate subinterval of R, with outcomes
being monetary. Outcomes are denoted by Greek letters α, β, etc. Prefer-
ences will be defined over a set X of acts. Acts, denoted x, y, . . ., are mea-
surable mappings from states to outcomes; x assigns outcome x(s) to each
state s ∈ S. Measurability means that the inverse of every subinterval of C
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is contained in A . Readers not interested in measure theory may assume
that A contains all subsets of S, in which case all functions from S to C are
measurable so that all measurability considerations are trivially satisfied
and can be ignored.
Each outcome α is identifiedwith the constant act xwith x(s)=α for all s.
We assume that all finite-valued measurable mappings from S to C (called
simple acts) are contained in X . (E1 : x1, . . . ,En : xn) denotes the simple act
assigning x j to each s in E j; the E j ’s partition S. Other than that, we allow
X to be almost any subset of the set of measurable mappings from S to C .
One more restriction on X , to ensure that all expected utilities considered
hereafter are well-defined and finite, will be added later.
A preference relation of a decision maker is a binary relation over X ,
denoted by <. The notation ≻, ∼, 4, and ≺ is as usual. Expected utility
(EU) holds if there exist a (finitely additive) probability measure P on A ,
and a strictly increasing utility function U : R→ R, such that: (a) EU(x) =∫
SU(x(s))dP(s) (the expected utility of act x) is well-defined and finite for
all x ∈ X ; and (b) x< y if and only if EU(x)≥ EU(y). EU implies that < is a
weak order, i.e. it is complete (for all x, y, either x< y or y< y) and transitive
(for all x, y, z, we have that x< y and y< z together imply x< z).
A certainty equivalent of an act x is an outcome α such that α∼ x. Under
EU with continuous strictly increasing utility, α=U−1(EU(x)) is unique. For
outcome α, event E, and act x, αEx denotes the act assigning outcome α to
each state in event E and the same outcome as x to each state off E. Thus,
given that β can denote a constant act, αEβ denotes the two-outcome act
(E :α,not-E :β).
5.4 Technical Definitions
This section defines technical conditions. It can be skipped by readers in-
terested primarily in empirical and conceptual results. An event E is null
if αEx ∼ βEx for all acts x and outcomes α and β, and nonnull otherwise.
Under EU, an event E is null if and only if P(E) = 0. We assume nonde-
generacy throughout, implying that there exists a nonnull event E for which
the complement is also nonnull. Under EU, nondegeneracy is equivalent to
0 < P(E)< 1. We also assume monotonicity, i.e. x < y if x(s)≥ y(s) for each
state s, with x ≻ y if x(s) > y(s) for each state s. Monotonicity implies that
α<β if and only if α≥β for all outcomes α,β. EU implies monotonicity.
We avoid infinite-dimensional topological complications by restricting
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continuity to finite-dimensional subspaces: < is continuous if, for every
partition (E1, . . . ,En) of S, the preference relation restricted to acts (E1 :
x1, . . .,En : xn) satisfies the usual Euclidean continuity. Under EU, continu-
ity of preference can be seen to be equivalent to continuity of utility.
To avoid undefined or infinite EU values, and to express this require-
ment in directly observable preference conditions, we define truncations of
acts, following (Wakker 1993). All truncation conditions defined hereafter
are trivially satisfied if all acts x ∈ X are bounded in the sense that there ex-
ists an outcome preferred to all x(s) and one less preferred than all x(s). This
includes the case where X contains only the simple acts. Readers only inter-
ested in bounded acts may skip the following definitions concerning trunca-
tions. For act x and outcome µ, x∧µ, the above truncation of x at µ, assigns
x(s) to s whenever x(s)4µ and it assigns µ to s whenever x(s)≻µ. For act x
and outcome η, x∨η, the below truncation of x at η, assigns x(s) to s when-
ever x(s)< η and it assigns η to s whenever x(s)≺ η. X is truncation-closed if
all (above and below) truncations of all of its acts are contained in X . Trun-
cation continuity holds if, whenever x ≻ y for a simple act y, then x∧µ ≻ y
for some outcome µ and, whenever x≺ y for a simple act y, then x∨η≺ y for
some outcome η.
It is sometimes convenient if probability measures are countably addi-
tive. A probability measure is countably additive if A j ↓ ; (A j ⊃ A j+1 and
the intersection of these sets is empty) implies that P(A j) converges to 0. It
is equivalent to the probability of a countable disjoint union being the sum
of the individual probabilities whenever that countable union is contained in
the algebra. The condition is most useful if the algebra A is a sigma-algebra
(i.e. an algebra closed under countable unions). A preference condition nec-
essary and sufficient for countable additivity is set-continuity:
If β < γ, A j ↓ ;, and x ≻ β then, for some natural number J,
x≻ γA jβ for all j > J.
We summarize the assumptions made.
Structural Assumption 5.4.1 (Decision under Uncertainty). S is a state
space endowed with an algebra A of subsets called events, and C , a subinter-
val of R, is the outcome set. X , the set of acts, contains all simple measurable
mappings from S to C , and possibly some other measurable mappings from
S to C . < is a binary relation on X. Truncation closedness holds, and for
every act there exists a certainty equivalent. Nondegeneracy holds.
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We will sometimes assume that objective probabilities of the events are
available, in which case by common assumptions of decision under risk the
act can be identified with the probability distribution generated over the
outcomes. Then αpβ denotes the lottery yielding α with probability p and β
with probability 1− p.
Structural Assumption 5.4.2 (Decision under Risk). Structural Assump-
tion 5.4.1 holds. An (objective) probability measure is given on A . The prefer-
ence value of an act depends on the lottery generated over the outcomes, and
every simple lottery over outcomes is generated by some act.
5.5 Formalizing Rates of Substitution
5.5.1 Rates of Substitution Defined Formally
We formalize some claims of Section 5.2 about rates of substitution, and
relate those rates to a tradeoff indifference tool of Köbberling and Wakker
(2003). We next present some generalizations of existing results that will be
used at a later point in the chapter. We write
[α;β]∼∗ [µ;ν] or αβ∼∗ µν (5.1)
if
αEx∼βE y and
µEx∼ νE y. (5.2)
for some nonnull event E and simple acts x and y. ∼∗ is called a tradeoff
indifference. In Figure 5.1(b) we have αβ ∼∗ βγ (take E = T, µ = β, and ν =
γ). Here, each side of a tradeoff indifference concerns the numerator (α−β
and β−γ respectively) of the RS of money-contingent-on-not-E for money-
contingent-on-E
(
α−β
y−x and
β−γ
y−x , respectively
)
with the denominator of each
RS being the same. Therefore, testing if the RS is increasing or decreasing
is easy, simply by comparing α−β with β−γ.
Definition 5.5.1. Diminishing rate of substitution (DRS) holds if
αβ∼∗ βγ ⇒ β≤ α+γ
2
.
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Because of symmetry, no ordering between α and γ has to be imposed in
Definition 5.5.1.
In the following definition, as throughout the rest of the chapter, su-
perscripts indicate indexes and not powers. The definition considers two
preference relations and formalizes Figure 5.1(c).
Definition 5.5.2. <1 exhibits a stronger DRS than <2 if
αβ∼∗2 βγ and αβ′ ∼∗1 β′γ ⇒ β′ ≤β.
A tradeoff relation was used in axiomatizations of several models of deci-
sion under uncertainty by Köbberling and Wakker (2003). We similarly use
it to discretize MRS’s so that we can analyze properties of utility and relate
those to risk (and ambiguity) attitudes. From substitution, we get:
Lemma 5.5.3. Under EU, αβ∼∗ µν if and only if U(α)−U(β)=U(µ)−U(ν).
5.5.2 Measuring Utility using Rates of Substitution
In an experiment, Wakker and Deneffe (1996) measured for a nonnull event
E, a sequence of indifferences
α
j
E
x∼α j−1
E
y, where j = 1, . . . ,n; (5.3)
see Figure 5.2(a). In our notation, this implies
α j+1α j ∼∗ α1α0 for all j = 1, . . . ,n−1. (5.4)
By Lemma 5.5.3, the α j ’s are equally-spaced in utility units. Normaliz-
ingU(α0)= 0 andU(αn)= 1, we obtainU(α j)= j/n for all j, and the graph of
U in Figure 5.2(b) results (depicted for n= 4).
Thus, RS’s underly Wakker and Deneffe’s tradeoff method, which pro-
vides an easy tool for empirically measuring utility, even if we do not know
the subjective probability of event E. We can measure U on as a large an
interval as we want by taking α0 as small as needed and αn as large as
needed. We can have the measurement as refined as we want by taking x
and y outside of E sufficiently close to each other so that the differences
between the α’s become as small as desired. In this manner, we can get to
know everything aboutU that we want to.
One key aspect of the utility measurement technique just described is
central to this chapter. It is that the procedure inspects outcomes α0, . . . ,αn
in great detail, but hardly pays attention to the events or probabilities, be
they objective or subjective (Eq. (5.3) and Figure 5.2(b)).
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(a) Eq. (5.3).
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(b) Utility graph derived from preference midpoint obser-
vations.
Figure 5.2: Measuring utility requires a detailed analysis of outcomes, not of
events.
Conclusion 5.5.4. Under EU, utility can be analyzed without inspecting the
probabilities or ambiguous events.
5.5.3 Preference Foundations
We now turn to a preference foundation for EU using DRS. The following
consistency condition for utility measurement is obviously necessary for EU
to hold, given that utility is strictly increasing.
Definition 5.5.5. Tradeoff consistency holds if improving an outcome in
any αβ∼∗ γδ relationship breaks that relationship.
That is, if αβ∼∗ γδ and α′β ∼∗ γδ, then we must have α= α′. Although
the definition uses the derived concept of ∼∗, it is easily reformulated di-
rectly in terms of preferences so that it is directly testable and can be used in
preference foundations. Tradeoff consistency provides a preference founda-
tion for expected utility. The following result generalizes results of Wakker
(2009) to nonsimple acts, and results of Wakker (1993) to the less restrictive
tradeoff condition used here.
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Theorem 5.5.6. Under the Structural Assumption 5.4.1 (decision under un-
certainty), the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) Expected utility holds with continuous strictly increasing utility.
(ii) < satisfies:
(a) weak ordering;
(b) monotonicity;
(c) continuity;
(d) truncation continuity;
(e) tradeoff consistency.
In Statement (i), the probabilities are unique and the utility function is unique
up to level and unit. The probability in Statement (i) is countably additive if
and only if set-continuity holds.
Utility need not be bounded in Theorem 5.5.6. Given that utility is de-
termined up to level and unit, we will throughout equate equivalent utility
functions and will write U1 =U2 when U1 = τ+σU2 for a real τ and a posi-
tive σ. The following corollary adapts Theorem 5.5.6 to decision under risk.
Corollary 5.5.7. Under the Structural assumption 5.4.2 (decision under
risk), the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Expected utility holds with continuous strictly increasing utility and
the (subjective) probabilities used in the EU model of Theorem 5.5.6
identical to the objective probabilites.
(ii) < satisfies:
(a) weak ordering;
(b) monotonicity;
(c) continuity;
(d) truncation continuity;
(e) tradeoff consistency.
The utility function in Statement (i) is unique up to level and unit.
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The characterization of expected utility by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944) is very appealing. We presented the above alternative charac-
terization because we need the ∼∗ relation for other purposes later, and this
way we obtain a unified analysis. Relative to Fishburn’s (1970, Theorem
10.1) version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, we have general-
ized the result to allow for unboundedness of utility.
5.5.4 Risk Aversion Analyzed using DRS
The expected value needed for the definition of risk aversion can only be
defined if probabilities over the state space S can be defined. This is the
case for decision under risk, and decision under uncertainty if EU holds.
Then a risk premium designates the difference between expected value and
the certainty equivalent of a lottery.
Quasi-concavity of preferences in terms of mixing provides an alterna-
tive characterization of risk aversion for unknown probabilities (Chateauneuf
and Tallon 2002; Debreu and Koopmans 1982). Formally, for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
and acts x, y,λx+ (1−λ)y is the act assigning outcome λx(s)+ (1−λ)y(s) to
each s. Quasi-concavity holds if λx+ (1−λ)y< x whenever x∼ y.
Theorem 5.5.8. Assume that all assumptions and results of Theorem 5.5.6
hold. Then the following four statements are equivalent.
(i) Utility is concave;
(ii) Risk aversion holds;
(iii) Quasi-concavity holds;
(iv) Diminishing rate of substitution holds.
In Theorem 5.5.8, Statement (ii) is less appealing for decision under un-
certainty than the other conditions because this statement involves expected
values and subjective probabilities, which are not directly observable. As re-
gards DRS, each triple αi−1,αi,αi+1 in Eq. (5.4) entails a test of DRS, so that
n indifferences in Eq. (5.3) give n−2 tests of the condition. This illustrates
that preference conditions in terms of ∼∗ are easily observable even if ∼∗
is a derived concept. DRS transparently corresponds with concavity of U in
Figure 5.2(b), where α j+1α j ∼∗ α jα j−1 with α j < α
j+1+α j−1
2 for all j.
Next, a comparative result is obtained using the ∼∗ relation.
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Theorem 5.5.9. Assume that for both j = 1 and j = 2: A j is a subalgebra
of A ; the outcome set is C ⊂ R; < j is a preference relation over the acts that
are measurable with respect to A j; ∼∗ j refers to the corresponding tradeoff
relation; all assumptions and results of Theorem 5.5.6 hold with algebra A j,
subjective probability P j on A j, and utility function U j. Then the following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) U1 =ϕ◦U2 for a concave transformation ϕ;
(ii) <1 exhibits stronger DRS than <2.
The special case where <1 and <2 are preferences of the same decision
maker and A 1 and A 2 are different sources, yields a within-person compar-
ison similar to the Ellsberg two-color paradox. If <1 and <2 concern differ-
ent different decision makers and A 1 =A 2, then we have a between-person
within-source comparison.
5.6 Yaari’s Comparative Risk Aversion Results
It is well known that for decision under risk, decision maker 1 has a more
concave utility function than decision maker 2, as in Statement (i) of Theo-
rem 5.5.9, if and only if decision maker 1’ s risk premium (difference between
expected value and certainty equivalent) exceeds that of decision maker 2
for every act. This condition is more difficult to handle for uncertainty for
reasons as discussed above: subjective probabilities are not easily observ-
able so that expected value and risk premium are so neither. Yaari (1969)
showed that comparisons are still possible in terms of certainty equivalents
(he used an equivalent formulation in terms of acceptance sets) under a re-
strictive condition. In other words, he showed equivalence of Statements (i)
and (ii) below.
Theorem 5.6.1. Assume that for both j = 1 and j = 2: the outcome set is
the nondegenerate interval C ⊂ R; < j is a preference relation over all acts;
all assumptions and results of Theorem 5.5.6 hold with algebra A j ⊂ A ,
subjective probability P j on A j, and utility function U j. Then the following
three statements are equivalent:
(i) U1 =ϕ◦U2 for a concave transformation ϕ and P1 = P2;
(ii) For each act, the certainty equivalent for <2 is at least as large as that
for <1;
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(iii) <1 exhibits stronger DRS than <2; further, P1 = P2.
Under EU, probabilities are commonly taken to reflect beliefs, while util-
ities reflect attitudes towards risk. This separation is maintained in Theo-
rem 5.5.9. In particular, Theorem 5.5.9 allows for comparison of risk atti-
tudes irrespective of what beliefs are, so that identification of beliefs is no
longer required. Yaari’s (1969) result did not obtain such a separation of
risk attitude and belief. As he showed, the risk attitudes of different deci-
sion makers could only be compared through his condition (ii) for the special
case of identical beliefs.
5.7 Recursive Models
This section turns to recursive multi-stage models where in the first stage
probabilitiesmay be unknown but they are known in the second stage. Thus,
all following models can be considered to be special cases of Anscombe and
Aumann’s (1963) model. L denotes the set of lotteries, where lotteries (typi-
cally denoted by ℓ) are probability distributions over C . A typical act xmaps
a state space S to L, assigning a lottery x(s) to each state s. (E1 : ℓ1, . . . ,Em :
ℓm) denotes an act with E1, . . . ,Em partitioning the state space S, and each
ℓi, i= 1, . . .,m, designating a lottery.
First-stage acts x have their outcomes depend only on first-stage events,
i.e., all lotteries x(s) are degenerate. Second-stage acts x have their outcomes
depend only on the second-stage uncertainty, i.e. there exists a lottery ℓ such
that x(s)= ℓ for all s⊂S. First-stage acts are identified with the correspond-
ing mappings from S to C , and second-stage acts are identified with the lot-
tery that they generate. The restrictions of the preference relation < to first-
and second-stage acts are denoted <1 and <2. We will impose the richness
assumptions of preceding sections on first- and second-stage acts. We do not
need further richness assumptions. In particular, we need not assume the
presence of every (measurable) allocation of lotteries to states s. This point
will be crucial in the application to the model by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukherji (2005). The following assumptions will be made sometimes, but
not always.
Assumption 5.7.1 (Within-Source EU). <1, P1, and U1 satisfy all assump-
tions and results of Theorem 5.5.6. <2, P2, and U2 satisfy all assumptions
and results of Corollary 5.5.7.
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Assumption 5.7.2 (Backward Induction). The preference value of act x is
not affected if each lottery x(s) is replaced by its <2 certainty equivalent, i.e.
an outcome αs with αs ∼2 x(s).
By backward induction, a preference between any pair of acts can be
derived from the preference between the first-stage acts that result after the
substitutions of certainty equivalents. This implies, in particular, that <
inherits weak ordering from <1. EU2 denotes expected utility with respect
to U2 and the objectively given probabilities of stage 2.
Theorem 5.7.3. Let the Structural Assumptions 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 hold for <1
and <2, respectively. Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) There exist continuous strictly increasing functions U2 and ϕ, and a
probability measure P on S, such that acts are evaluated by
x→
∫
S
ϕ
(
EU2(x(s))
)
dP(s);
(ii) Assumption 5.7.2 holds and, for each j = 1,2, < j satisfies:
(a) weak ordering;
(b) monotonicity;
(c) continuity;
(d) truncation continuity;
(e) tradeoff consistency.
Statement (i) above means that Assumptions 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 hold. Sev-
eral papers have studied conditions that imply concavity of ϕ in the above
theorem. They all need richness assumptions at least as strong as the fol-
lowing one.
Assumption 5.7.4 (Richness). Under the within-source EU Assumption 5.7.1,
there exists an event E ⊂ S with 0 < P(E) = p < 1 such that for all α and β
in the image of U2, there exists an act (E : ℓ1,not−E : ℓ2) in the preference
domain with EU2(ℓ1)=α and EU2(ℓ2)=β.
Preference for second-stage resolution (PSR) of uncertainty holds if, for
each first-stage act αEβ and second-stage act αpβ with P(E) = p, αEβ 4
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αpβ. In intertemporal contexts, preference for first-stage resolution of un-
certainty is more common, although not universal. Nevertheless, to be con-
sistent with some later results on ambiguity, where concavity rather than
convexity of ϕ is of interest, we analyze PSR and the implied concavity of ϕ
in our theorems. The analysis of preference for first-stage resolution of un-
certainty is completely analogous, with the above preference reversed and
with convexity of ϕ rather than concavity.
E
not
E
S
α
β

p
S
α
β(1− p)
Figure 5.4: P(E)= p. Preference for second-stage resolution of uncertainty (PSR).
PSR can be interpreted as an aversion to mean-preserving spreads in
terms of second-stage acts. The righthand act yields the second-stage mix
αpβ with certainty. The lefthand act is a mean-preserving spread, yielding
α at the second stage with probability p, and β with probability 1− p. Ergin
and Gul (2009) considered a stronger condition, imposing aversion to mean-
preserving spreads of second-stage acts in general. The present condition is
equivalent to
p ·ϕ(U2(α))+ (1− p) ·ϕ(U2(β))≤ϕ(p ·U2(α)+ (1− p) ·U2(β)) ,
which, given sufficient richness of U2 ’s image, is equivalent to concavity of
ϕ (see Lemma 5.A.1).
An alternative preference condition can be obtained if we use an alternative-
outcome interpretation, taking the EU values of the second-stage acts as
outcomes. For an act x we define the alternative-outcome act x′ through
x′(s) = EU2(x(s)) for all s. x′ is a first-stage act. The expected value of x
under the alternative interpretation, i.e. the expected value of x′ with re-
spect to P on S, is the preference value of the act x that would result if
ϕ were the identity function. Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukherji (2005) –
henceforth abbreviated to KMM – introduced smooth ambiguity aversion:
any lottery ℓ with EU(ℓ) = EV (EU2(x(s))) is preferred to the original act
x. This condition amounts to traditional risk aversion imposed under the
alternative-outcome interpretation. Given sufficient richness, the risk aver-
sion mentioned is equivalent to concavity of ϕ.
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The two conditions just discussed, PSR and smooth ambiguity aversion,
used the first-stage subjective probabilities as inputs, which makes their use
in preference foundations problematic, as discussed before. The following
condition does not have this problem.
For 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and lotteries ℓ, ℓ′, λℓ+ (1−λ)ℓ′ denotes a probabilistic
mixture defined in the usual way. For acts x, y, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the proba-
bilistic mixture of acts λx+ (1−λ)y is defined through statewise probabilis-
tic mixing, assigning lottery λx(s)+ (1−λ)y(s) to each s. Given EU prefer-
ences over second-stage acts, the probabilistic mixture of acts just defined,
is equivalent to outcome mixing under the alternative-outcome interpreta-
tion. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989) defined uncer-
tainty aversion: λx+(1−λ)y< x whenever x∼ y. The condition is equivalent
to quasi-concavity under the alternative-outcome interpretation. We now
summarize various ways to get concavity of ϕ.
Theorem 5.7.5. Assume the conditions and assumptions of Theorem 5.5.9
for <1 and <2. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) ϕ is concave;
(ii) <1 exhibits stronger DRS than <2.
If we further have Assumptions 5.7.2 and 5.7.4, then the following three state-
ments are also equivalent to the above two statements:
(iii) Smooth ambiguity aversion holds;
(iv) PSR (preference for second-stage resolution of uncertainty) holds;
(v) Uncertainty aversion holds.
In the above theorem, the condition in (ii) is more generally applicable
than those in (iii), (iv), and (v). It shares with condition (v) the advantage
over the conditions (iii) and (iv) that it does not need subjective first-stage
probabilities as inputs, which is important if the first-stage probabilities are
not objectively given.
5.8 Comparative Results for Recursive Models
We now turn to comparative results. KMM proposed the following condi-
tion. It is only defined for decision makers <A and <B with same first-stage
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beliefs PA = PB; then <A is more smooth-ambiguity averse than decision
maker <B if
x<A ℓ⇒ x<B ℓ (5.5)
for all acts x and second-stage acts ℓ. As pointed out by KMM, this condition
implies that <A and <B are identical on lotteries, as follows by substitut-
ing lotteries for x. Although for general preference relations the resulting
condition need not imply identical preferences1, it does so for nondegener-
ate preferences that maximize EU, such as <2A and <2B. Given the same
preferences over lotteries, we may restrict Eq. (5.5) to degenerate lotteries
ℓ, i.e. sure outcomes, these being the same for <A and <B. Thus, compar-
ative smooth ambiguity aversion amounts to the requirement of identical
preferences over lotteries plus Yaari’s certainty-equivalent condition (ii) in
Theorem 5.6.1.
Theorem 5.8.1. For both <A and <B, assume the conditions and assump-
tions of Theorem 5.7.3, with the notation <1A, <2A, <1B, and <2B as before.
The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) ϕA is a concave transformation of ϕB and U2A =U2B;
(ii) <1A exhibits stronger DRS than <1B; further ∼∗2A=∼∗2B.
If we further have Assumptions 2.5.2 and 2.5.4 for both <A and <B, and
if PA = PB, then the following statement is also equivalent to the above two
statements:
(iii) A is more smooth-ambiguity averse than B.
We are not aware of similar comparative results using uncertainty aver-
sion. The above results compared ambiguity attitudes only under the re-
strictive assumption of identical preferences over lotteries. We next show
how ambiguity attitude can be compared without this restriction.
Theorem 5.8.2. For both <A and <B, assume the conditions and assump-
tions of Theorem 5.7.3, with the notation <1A, <2A, <1B, and <2B as before.
The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) ϕA is a concave transformation of ϕB;
1Loosely speaking, <2B might have more indifferences than <2A.
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(ii) If αβ ∼∗1B βγ and αβ′ ∼∗1A β′γ, then β′ ≤ β¯ whenever β¯ ∼2A αpγ and
β∼2B αpγ for some p. 2
The condition β¯ ∼2A αpγ and β ∼2B αpγ in statement (ii) ensures that
β¯ has the same position relative to α and γ in terms of U2A as β has in
terms of U2B. In other words, Statement (ii) in Theorem 5.8.2 is Definition
5.5.2 ("Stronger DRS") reformulated for the alternative-outcome interpreta-
tion. In Theorem 5.8.2, identical preferences over lotteries can be imposed
by adding the requirement of ∼∗A=∼∗B, or by requiring that always β = β¯
in Condition (ii). Thus, the restriction of identical preferences under risk is
optional in Theorem 5.8.2.
5.9 Alternative Recursive Models
We show how the above results generalize a number of classical multi-stage
results in the literature. All of these models make the within-source EU
Assumption 5.7.1 and we will maintain this assumption in the following dis-
cussion. The first study that used a representation as in Statement (i) of
Theorem 5.7.3 was Kreps and Porteus (1978) (they only considered bounded
utility). They obtained the equivalence of Statements (i) and (iv) in Theorem
5.7.5. Their result was applied to intertemporal decision making, assuming
that the first-stage uncertainty was resolved before the second-stage uncer-
tainty. Then preference for first-stage resolution amounts to a preference
for an early resolution of uncertainty. Statement (ii) in Theorem 5.7.5 is the
equivalence resulting from our Theorem 5.5.6. Section 5.8 has provided com-
parative extensions of Kreps and Porteus’ results, where one decision maker
has a stronger preference for late (or early) resolution of uncertainty than
another decision maker. Under Assumptions 5.7.1 and 5.7.2, Statement (ii)
can be used as an alternative to the condition of Kreps and Porteus. It,
however, extends to cases where Assumptions 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 need not hold.
For nonexpected utility it is desirable that Assumption 5.7.1, necessi-
tating a violation of the reduction of compound lotteries, be relaxed. It is
well known that one of some desirable dynamic-decision principles has to
be abandoned under nonexpected utility (Hammond 1988). Machina (1989)
2There always exists a probability p with β∼2B αpγ, because, by Lemma 5.5.3,U2B(β) is
between U2B(α) and U2B(γ), and (excluding the trivial case where U2B(α) =U2B(γ), when
β = β¯ = γ, and p can be anything) p is uniquely determined by U2B(β) = p ·U2B(α)+ (1−
p) ·U2B(γ). By continuity of U2B there exists a β¯. This β¯ is unique because U2B is strictly
increasing.
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strongly argued for abandoning consequentialism rather than the reduction
of compound lotteries or dynamic consistency. Karni and Safra (1989) ar-
gued for abandoning, inmodern terminology, dynamic consistency. Our anal-
ysis in terms of ∼∗ leaves all these options open, and does not commit to the
violation of reduction of compound lotteries.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) considered multi-stage models; their results
follow from repeated application of the two-stage results. They formulated
their result for the special case of decision under risk, where the probability
measure P in the first-stage is also objective and given beforehand, so that
it can easily be used as input for obtaining testable preference conditions.
For decision under uncertainty, where P is subjective and has to be derived
from choice in the revealed preference approach, their condition of PSR is
not easy to observe. Then an equality P(E)= p can only be derived from ob-
served choice, which need not always be easy to do. For exampe, if S = {s1, s2}
and P(s1)=
p
0.5, then we are not aware of a finite number of observed pref-
erences within the model assumed that can reveal this probability3. Our
conditions are directly observable even if first-stage probabilities are subjec-
tive.
Neilson (1993) (brought to our attention by a reference in KMM) pre-
sented the equivalence of Statements (i) and (iii) in Theorem 5.7.5. To ob-
tain the representation in Theorem 5.7.3, he imposed the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms on lotteries, and Savage’s (1954) axioms on first-stage
acts, where he added a weak continuity axiom to imply continuity of util-
ity; it also implies boundedness of utility. He applied his result to ambiguity,
with the first-stage events ambiguous. Then smooth ambiguity aversion and
concavity of ϕ can be interpreted as ambiguity aversion. In this approach
the first-stage probabilities P are not objective or known but are subjective
and must be derived from choice. Then the first-stage probabilities P in
smooth ambiguity aversion are not easy to observe, which makes smooth
ambiguity aversion not so easy to observe empirically. This problem is simi-
lar to the problem of PSR. In addition, smooth ambiguity aversion uses the
utility function U2, which must similarly be derived from preference4. We
3We recall that the objective probabilities of the second stage involve different utilities so
that they cannot be used for calibration purposes.
4This problem can be mitigated. Assume that there are a maximal outcome M and a
minimal outcome m, and normalize U2(M)= 1 and U2(m)= 0. We can replace every second-
stage act by the act (p : M,1− p : m) equivalent to it, and the EU2 value of that second-
stage act then is p, which makes EU2 relatively easy to observe so that it can be used in
behavioral preference axioms. In this manner, utilities are converted into probabilities and
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have relaxed these restrictions and have added comparative results.
Theorem 5.7.3 provides a complete preference foundation for the basic
decision model of KMM5. These authors indicated that such a foundation
was possible but for brevity did not elaborate on it. We can present the
entire preference foundation and at the same time maintain brevity because
we use the same ∼∗ tool in all our results. Whereas in KMM’s model utility
must be bounded for each act, we also allow for acts with unbounded utility.
KMM obtained the equivalence of Statements (i) and (iii) in Theorem
5.7.5. A major step forward in KMM’s analysis was that through subtle in-
terpretations of the concepts involved they opened a new way to analyze
ambiguity. Their interpretations are discussed in some detail. At the outset,
the uncertainty in the second stage in their model concerns a Savagean state
space T rather than given probabilities as in our approach. The uncertainty
in the first stage concerns what is the appropriate subjective second-stage
probability measure to use for the Savage state space; this uncertainty en-
tails a psychologically realistic modeling of ambiguity. Thus, in our notation,
every state s ∈ S specifies what the subjective probability measure over T
is. First-stage acts (called second-order acts in their model) assign outcomes
contingent on what the appropriate second-stage subjective probability mea-
sure on T is. KMM assume that the two-stage decomposition is endogenous.
By nevertheless assuming preferences between first-stage acts to be avail-
able, they make it possible to have this endogenous two-stage decomposition
observable. Thus, their model becomes considerablymore broadly applicable
while at the same time coming close to our psychological perceptions of am-
biguity. By assuming the second-stage probabilities over T to be completely
specified by the first-stage states, KMM achieve that subjective probabil-
ities over the state space T can be treated as known probabilities in the
second stage (KMM, Lemma 1, Definition 2, and Assumption 3). This leads
to the paradoxical but extremely useful result that the Savagean second-
stage uncertainty can be treated as objective risk, as in the second stage of
the Anscombe-Aumann model as we do. All aspects of ambiguity are con-
troled in the first stage. The following remark prepares for explaining our
generalization of the required richness of KMM’s model.
Remark 5.9.1 (Richness in KMM). Not all mappings from S to L need to be
smooth ambiguity aversion, i.e. risk aversion with respect to second-stage EU, can be seen
to be stronger than a preference for first-stage resolution of uncertainty.
5These authors assumed countably additive probability measures. This condition can be
ensured by adding set-continuity as in Theorem 5.5.6.
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available in the preference domain of KMM. They do assume that all first-
stage acts (called second-order acts) are available. They also assume that
there is a subalgebra of events on T that have objective probabilities (being
the same under all second-stage probability measures P2 considered) and
that is rich enough to generate all probability distributions over outcomes,
so that there is also richness for the second-stage acts. They, further, as-
sume that T =Ω× (0,1] where the second component (0,1] generates these
objective probabilities, leading to an Anscombe- Aumann-like two-stage de-
composition of T. This composition only serves to calibrate risk attitude and
should not be confused with our Anscombe-Aumann decomposition. The sec-
ond stage of our decomposition concerns the whole space T.
Using Assumption 5.7.2, we can generate the preference values of all
mappings from S to L in the KMM model. KMM impose some richness
assumptions on the set of acts, i.e. two-stage acts with nondegenerate Sav-
agean acts/lotteries assigned to first-stage states of nature, with thought
experiments involving two different first-stage subjective probability mea-
sures with disjoint supports. In this manner, they derive the richness of
Assumption 5.7.4 in the proof of their Proposition 1.
The contribution of Theorem 5.5.8 (Statement (ii) in Theorem 5.7.5) to
the ambiguity-aversion characterization of KMM is that it, again, avoids
the need to use subjective probabilities or second-stage utilities as inputs
in a preference condition, and that it does not need Assumptions 5.7.1 and
5.7.2. All it needs is that all simple first-stage acts (“second-order acts”) are
available, and those second-stage acts in the model of KMM that have their
outcomes depend only on events with known probabilities (called lotteries
by KMM). In particular, we do not impose any richness on the objects of
primary interest in the KMM model, i.e. the mappings from Ω to outcomes
(i.e. Savagean acts). We do not need the richness assumptions in the second
paragraph of Remark 5.9.1. Thus, we leave complete flexibility regarding
the important Savagean acts. Also, we require no commitment to a violation
of reduction of compound lotteries, and no boundedness of the acts. We hope
that these generalizations can enhance the applicability of KMM’s approach
to ambiguity.
We also generalized KMM’s results on comparative ambiguity aversion.
We did not use the subjective first-stage probabilities as inputs and, in par-
ticular, need not assume that these are the same for different decision mak-
ers. We also did not require same preferences over lotteries. Thus, ambigu-
ity attitude can be analyzed as a component completely independent from
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beliefs and risk attitudes.
Nau (2006) assumed the two-stage decomposition of Figure 5.4 to be ex-
ogenous. He considered a state-dependent generalization of EU for first-
and second-stage acts, and then used a local version of PSR (called local un-
certainty aversion) to characterize concavity of his analog of ϕ. He also ex-
pressed this condition in terms of generalized Pratt-Arrow measures. State-
dependent versions of our results could be obtained by using event-dependent
relations ∼∗
E
in Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2), but we will not pursue this point here.
Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2001) used a two-stage model as in theorem 5.7.3
in a game-theory context.
5.10 Discussion
We consider the intuitive objection against the use of marginal utility for
analyzing risk and ambiguity, raised before, from a different perspective.
it may be argued that the DRS condition used in Theorem 5.5.8 is not as
appealing as the traditional definition of risk aversion because the former
does not speak to risk or probability in any direct manner, whereas the latter
clearly does. We agree that these two conditions are intuitively different.
This difference can be interpreted as an argument against EU. Advocates of
EU have to consider the conditions as equivalent, simply as a logical fact.
Similar observations apply to our theorems. In Theorem 5.6.1, even if
P1 = P2, then still stronger DRS (condition iii) does not speak to risk as
Yaari’s certainty-equivalent condition (in ii) does. In Theorem 5.7.5 on re-
cursive utility, stronger DRS (in ii) does not speak to ambiguity as smooth
ambiguity aversion and the other conditions do, with similar observations
for the comparative results in Theorem 5.8.2. When these results are inter-
preted in the intertemporal sense of Kreps & Porteus, stronger DRS does not
even consider the intertemporal structure (with the advantage of not having
to use acts with outcomes depending on more than one stage), much as it
does not even consider the probabilities or ambiguous events. In all these
cases, the EU assumptions as used in the models mentioned would imply
that our DRS conditions are equivalent, which turns against these EU as-
sumptions. The criticism of EU advanced here can be compared to Rabin’s
(2000) criticism of EU. He derived unacceptable implications of taking utility
as an index of risk attitude. This chapter puts forth undesirable implications
of EU when utility is used to model ambiguity.
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5.11 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented a convenient tool for analyzing marginal utility. It
entails many generalizations of classical results and alternative preference
foundations and interpretations. Readers who have doubts about the ap-
propriateness of EU to model risk and ambiguity attitudes can test their
confidence in EU by inspecting if the alternative preference conditions put
forward in this chapter can convey the same intuition as preceding prefer-
ence conditions used in the literature. If they do, then EU is appropriate. If
they do not, then EU must be questioned. For example, if the reader expects
that smooth ambiguity aversion is found empirically in the two-stage model
of section 5.7, but that the standard sequences in Eq. (5.4) will be the same
and will exhibit the same utility graphs (Fig. 5.2(b)) for stage 1 and stage 2
uncertainty, then this amounts to EU not being valid.
5.A Appendix: Proofs
We begin with two lemmas that will be useful for the elaboration of our main
results.
Lemma 5.A.1. Let f : I→R be continuous, with I ⊂R an interval. Then f is
concave if and only if, for every α,β ∈ I, there exists a pα,β with 0< pα,β < 1
and f (pα,β ·α+ (1− pα,β) ·β)≥ pα,β · f (α)+ (1− pα,β) · f (β).
Proof. This follows from Hardy, Littlewood, and Pòlya (1934, Observation
88). We will only need the case where pα,β = p is independent of α,β.
Lemma 5.A.2. Let I ⊂R be an interval. A continuous and strictly increasing
function f : I→R is concave if and only if [ f (α)− f (β)= f (β)− f (γ)⇒β≤ α+γ2 ].
Proof. The condition between brackets is equivalent to midpoint con-
cavity, which is the case of Lemma 5.A.1 with pα,β = 0.5 for all α,β, and is
equivalent to concavity of f by Lemma 5.A.1.
Proof of Lemma 5.5.3. See Wakker (2009).
Proof of Theorem 5.5.6.
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[(i)⇒ (ii)]. This follows from substitution. For simple acts and conditions
(a) – (c) and (e), it was established by Köbberling and Wakker (2003, Corol-
lary 10). For general acts and condition (e), it was established by Wakker
(1993, Lemma 1.8, Corollary 2.14, and Section 4.4).
[(ii) ⇒ (i)]. Assume (ii). We first restrict attention to simple acts, for
which we will not use truncation continuity. For finite state spaces the result
was obtained by Köbberling and Wakker (2003). The extension to all simple
acts for a general state space is routine.
The extension of the representation to general, possibly unbounded, acts
follows from Theorem 2.5 in Wakker (1993). Note here that EU is a special
case of Wakker’s CEU (Choquet expected utility), and that Wakker’s step
equivalent assumption is implied by the existence of certainty equivalence.
[Further Results]. The uniqueness results follow from Köbberling and
Wakker (2003, Corollary 10). The set-continuity, necessary and sufficient
for countable additivity, follows from substitution similar to Wakker (1993,
Section 4.1; for additive measures we only need Wakker’s (1993) Eq. 4.2,
and only for A =;.).
Proof of Theorem 5.5.8. (i)⇒ (ii) is exactly as for decision under risk.
For (ii)⇒ (i) assume (ii). By nondegeneracy, there exists an event E with
0 < P(E) = p < 1. Risk aversion implies αEβ4 (p ·α+ (1− p) ·β) (the latter
taken as degenerate) and thus, under EU, U(pα+ (1− p)β) ≥ p ·U(α)+ (1−
p) ·U(β). By Lemma 5.A.1,U is concave.
(i)⇔ (iii) is due to Debreu and Koopmans (1982).
(i)⇔ (iv) follws from Lemmas 5.5.3 and 5.A.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.5.9. Express outcomes in U1 units, and apply Theo-
rem 5.5.8 to ϕ instead of U with ϕ such thatU2 =ϕ◦U1.
Proof of Theorem 5.6.1. (i) ⇔ (ii) is by Yaari (1969). (i) ⇔ (iii) is by
Theorem 5.5.9, with equality of probabilities added.
Proof of Theorem 5.7.3. For (i) ⇒ (ii), assume (i). EU with P j and U j
represents < j for j = 1 (because ϕ is strictly increasing) and 2 (with U1 =
ϕ◦U2), which by Theorem 5.5.6 implies conditions (a) – (d) in Statement (ii).
Assumption 5.7.2 follows because all αi have the same EU2 value as the acts
they replace.
We now assume (ii) and derive (i). Theorem 5.5.6 applied to both <1
and <2 implies that there exist continuous and strictly increasing functions
130
Thesis_Driesen_v04.pdf
5.A. Appendix: Proofs
U1 and U2 and a probability measure P such that the first-stage acts (E11 :
x11, . . . ,E1m : xm1) are evaluated by
m∑
i=1
P(E i)U
1(xi1),
and the second-stage acts are evaluated by EU2, being EU with respect to
U2. Define the continuous strictly increasing ϕE =U1 ◦ (U2)inv.
Consider any act x. By continuity and strict increasingness ofU2, we can
obtain αs such that αs ∼2 x(s) (i.e., these have the same EU2 value) for all s.
By backward induction, x∼ y with y(s)=αs for all s. Thus, the evaluation of
x must equal:∫
S
U1(y(s))dP(s)=
∫
S
ϕ
(
U2(y(s))
)
dP(s)=
∫
S
ϕ
(
EU2(x(s))
)
dP(s).
Proof of Theorem 5.7.5. (i)⇔ (ii) is by Theorem 5.5.9.
(i) ⇔ (iii) is due to KMM (Proposition 1). In our setup, the derivation
is as follows. (i) ⇒ (iii) is the traditional risk aversion implication. For (iii)
⇒ (i), smooth ambiguity aversion applied to event E from Assumption 5.7.4
implies that ϕ(p ·α+ (1− p) ·β)≥ϕ(α)+ (1− p) ·ϕ(β) which, by Lemma 5.A.1,
implies (i).
For (i)⇔ (iv), make Assumption 5.7.2, and assume that 0< P(E)= p < 1
for some first-stage event E. Take some arbitrary U2(α) and U2(β). Then
αEβ4αpβ implies p·ϕ
(
U2(α)
)+(1−p)·ϕ(U2(β))≤ϕ(p ·U2(β)+ (1− p) ·U2(β)).
By Lemma 5.A.1, ϕ is concave.
(i) ⇔ (v) follows from the equivalence (i) ⇔ (iii) of Theorem 5.5.8 under
the alternative-outcome interpretation.
Proof of Theorem 5.8.1. For (i) ⇔ (ii), we note that ∼∗2A=∼∗2B is equiv-
alent to U2A and U2B having same equalities of utility differences, which,
given that they are defined on an interval and are continuous and strictly
increasing, is equivalent to them being the same in the sense of being in the
same interval class.
By Theorem 5.5.8, the first part of condition (ii) is equivalent to U1A
being more concave thanU1B. BecauseU1A =ϕA ◦U2A,U1B =ϕB ◦U2B and
U2A =U2B, it is equivalent to ϕA being more concave than ϕB.
(i)⇔ (iii) is due to KMM (Theorem 2), and follows from the equivalence of
(i) and (ii) in Theorem 5.4.1 under the alternative-outcome interpretation.
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Proof of Theorem 5.8.2. First, ϕA and ϕB being continuous and strictly in-
creasing functions, there exist a continuous and strictly increasing function
ψ such that ϕA =ψ◦ϕB. Let us fixU2A(α)=U2B(α)= a,U2A(γ)=U2B(γ)= c
andU2A(β′)= b′. Then β¯∼2A αpγ and β∼2A αpγ implyU2B(β)=U2A(β¯)= b
(where b = p · a+ (1.p) · c). Statement (ii) can be rewritten: ϕB(a)−ϕB(b) =
ϕB(b)−ϕB(c) and ψ◦ϕB(a)−ψ◦ϕB(b′)=ψ◦ϕB(b′)−ψ◦ϕB(c) imply ϕB(b′)≤
ϕB(b). By Lemma 5.A.2, ψ must be concave. The theorem follows.
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6.1 Introduction
Fictitious Play is a procedure in which at each instance, players of a game
myopically play their best replies against the opponents’ past play. The ori-
gins of Fictitious Play lie in a series of papers by Brown (1949, 1951) and
Robinson (1951). While today, the algorithm is usually interpreted as a my-
opic learning process, the initial objective of these studies was to develop
an easy method to find the value of zero-sum games. In his 1949 article,
Brown already argued heuristically that the continuous version of the pro-
cedure – Continuous Fictitious Play (CFP) – must converge at a linear speed
to the set of Nash equilibria, and thus, the value of the game. This result
is again mentioned – without proof – in Brown (1951). Brown’s to a large
extent heuristic approach towards CFP may be explained by the fact that he
was primarily interested in a discrete algorithm, and thus, only considered
convergence of CFP in zero-sum games as support for his conjecture that
Discrete Fictitious Play (DFP) in zero-sum games converges to equilibrium.
The proof of this conjecture was obtained by Robinson (1951) in the early
fifties. However, it was not until Hofbauer (1994) and Harris (1998) that the
result for CFP was rigorously proven. Today, Harris’ proof has become the
standard reference. Essentially, he shows that the sum of players’ instanta-
neous improvement steps in a zero-sum game, is a Lyapunov function. While
this argument appears to be quite simple at first glance, it requires several
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rather technical lemmas1. Moreover, it makes use of nontrivial results on
dynamical systems. Different versions of Harris’ proof – often in a simpli-
fied form – have appeared in the literature. See a.o. Krishna and Sjöström
(1997), Shamma and Arslan (2004), and Hofbauer and Sorin (2006).
In this chapter we provide a simple alternative argument. We show that
the convergence of CFP in two-player zero-sum games follows directly from
a result obtained by Monderer et al. (1997) that says that for CFP in any
game, each player’s instantaneous expected payoff will in the long run coin-
cide with the average payoff that player has realized so far. Using the same
approach, convergence of DFP is established up to the condition of infre-
quent switching (Fudenberg and Levine 1995; Monderer et al. 1997). That
is, if for DFP in a zero-sum game players play each pure strategy profile for
increasingly long periods of time, then the DFP converges to equilibrium.
Simulations lead us to conjecture that infrequent switching is the engine
behind Robinson’s result2. Whether DFP in zero-sum games satisfies the
condition of infrequent switching in general, remains an open question.
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Zero-sum Games
A zero-sum game is represented as anm×nmatrix A. There are two players
– 1 and 2. Player 1 [2] has a pure strategy set I [J] of cardinality m [n]. If
player 1 plays strategy i and 2 plays j, then player 1 receives a payoff of a i j
and 2 of −a i j. Let ∆m and∆n be the sets of probability distributions over sets
of respectively m and n alternatives; ∆m and ∆n are players’ respective sets
of mixed strategies over I and J. A pure strategy i ∈ I is also denoted as the
unit vector ei ∈∆m; we write I˜ := {ei | i ∈ I}. Analogously, we denote player
2’s j-th pure strategy also as the j-th unit vector f j ∈∆n, and J˜ := { f j | j ∈ J}.
Let β1 :∆n→∆m be player 1’s best-reply correspondence. That is,
β1(qˆ) := {p ∈∆m | pAqˆ≥ p′Aqˆ for all p′ ∈∆m}.
Player 2’s best-reply correspondence, β2 :∆m→∆n is defined as
β2(pˆ) := {q ∈∆n | pˆAq≤ pˆAq′ for all q′ ∈∆n}.
1See also Hofbauer and Sorin (2006).
2Note that convergence of CFP implies convergence of DFP for a class of games that in-
cludes zero-sum games. See Harris (1998) and Hofbauer and Sorin (2006).
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Define β : ∆m ×∆n → ∆m ×∆n as β(p, q) := (β1(q),β2(p)). The set of Nash
equilibria of a game A is defined as
NE(A) := {(p, q)∈∆m×∆n | (p, q)∈ β(p, q)}.
That is, NE(A) is the set of fixed points of the best-reply correspondence β.
Define the functionW :∆m×∆n→R as
W(pˆ, qˆ) :=H(qˆ)−L(pˆ),
where H(qˆ) :=maxp∈∆m pAqˆ and L(pˆ) :=minq∈∆n pˆAq.
Theorem 6.2.1. W(p, q)≥ 0, with equality if and only if (p, q)∈NE(A).
This is a classic result that follows from von Neumann’s (1928) maximin
theorem. For an exact proof, see a.o. Myerson (1991).
6.2.2 Continuous Fictitious Play
A Continuous Fictitious Play (CFP) in A is a pair (x(t), y(t)) of Lebesgue
measurable functions x : [0,∞)→ I˜ and y : [0,∞)→ J˜, such that for almost
all t≥1, we have
(x(t), y(t))∈β
(
1
t
∫t
0
x(τ)dτ,
1
t
∫t
0
y(τ)dτ
)
.
Players’ beliefs (p(t), q(t)) are defined as functions
p(t) := 1
t
∫t
0
x(τ)dτ, and q(t) := 1
t
∫t
0
y(τ)dτ
on the domain [1,∞). Furthermore, we define the set Ω of limit points of
(p(t), q(t)) as
Ω :=
⋂
T≥1
cl({(p(t), q(t)) | t≥T}) ,
where cl denotes the topological closure. We say (p, q) converges to Nash
equilibrium if Ω ⊆ NE(A,B). Expected and average payoffs are defined for
t ∈ [1,∞) as
E1(t) := x(t)Aq(t), and E2(t) :=−p(t)Ay(t),
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and
P1(t) :=
1
t
∫t
0
x(τ)Ay(τ)dτ, and P2(t) :=−P1(t).
Monderer et al. (1997) introduce the concept of belief affirmation; a CFP is
said to be belief affirming if
lim
t→∞
(E i(t)−Pi(t))= 0
for i = 1,2. In a belief affirming process players’ expected payoffs and aver-
age realized payoffs coincide in the long run.
6.3 CFP Convergence in Zero-Sum Games
The aim of this chapter is to prove the following.
Theorem 6.3.1. CFP in zero-sum games converges to Nash equilibrium.
The proof requires two simple lemmas. The first is due to Monderer et al.
(1997). For completeness, we include the proof.
Lemma 6.3.2 (Monderer et al. 1997). Every CFP is belief affirming.
Proof. Each function g i : [1,∞)→R, i ∈ I, defined as
g i(t) :=
∫t
0
eiAy(τ)dτ,
is continuous on [1,∞). Since tE1(t) = max{g i(t) | i ∈ I} for all t ≥ 1, also
tE1(t) is continuous on [1,∞). The function tP1(t) is also continuous on
[1,∞); it follows that tE1(t)− tP1(t) is continuous on [1,∞).
Suppose (x(·), y(·)) is continuous at t. Since x(·) and y(·) are by definition
pure strategies, there is an ε > 0 such that x(τ) and y(τ) are constant for
all τ ∈ (t− ε, t+ ε). This implies that the derivatives of tE1(t) and tP1(t) at
t are both equal to x(t)Ay(t). It follows that tE1(t)− tP1(t) is constant on
each interval on which (x(·), y(·)) is continuous. Continuity of tE1(t)− tP1(t)
on [1,∞) then implies
tE1(t)− tP1(t)=K ,
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for all t ∈ [1,∞), where K :=E1(1)−P1(1). Thus,
lim
t→∞(E1(t)−P1(t))= limt→∞
1
t
(tE1(t)− tP1(t))= lim
t→∞
K
t
= 0. (6.1)
A similar argument applies to player 2.
Lemma 6.3.3. limt→∞W(p(t), q(t))= 0.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 6.3.2 that CFP is belief affirming. This
implies
0= lim
t→∞
(E1(t)−P1(t))+ lim
t→∞
(E2(t)−P2(t))
= lim
t→∞
(E1(t)−P1(t)+E2(t)−P2(t))
= lim
t→∞
(E1(t)+E2(t))
= lim
t→∞W(p(t), q(t)),
where the third equality follows from P1(t)=−P2(t) for all t, and the fourth
fromW(p(t), q(t))=E1(t)+E2(t) for all t.
Proof of Theorem 6.3.1 Take some (p∗, q∗) ∈Ω and a sequence of times
(tk)
∞
k=1 such that limk→∞(p(tk), q(tk)) = (p∗, q∗). Note that the existence of
such a sequence is implied by (p∗, q∗) ∈Ω. SinceW is continuous in (p, q) we
have
lim
k→∞
W(p(tk), q(tk))=W(p∗, q∗).
By Lemma 6.3.3 it follows that W(p∗, q∗) = 0, which by Theorem 6.2.1 im-
plies (p∗, q∗) ∈NE(A). Hence, Ω⊆NE(A).
Remark 6.3.4. From Equation (6.1) it follows that (E1(t)−P1(t)) converges
at rate 1
t
; this also holds for player 2. It follows that (p(t), q(t)) converges to
equilibrium at a rate of 1
t
, confirming Harris’ (1998) result.
Remark 6.3.5. Our proof of Theorem 6.3.1 seems to be closer to Brown’s
heuristic argument than the one usually presented in the literature. For in-
stance, Brown (1951, pp. 375) says:3 “In the system of differential equations
the convergence rests on the fact that tV (t) and tV (t) maintain a constant
difference between them.”
3Here, V (t)≡E1(t) and V (t)≡−E2(t).
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6.4 DFP in Zero-Sum Games
A Discrete Fictitious Play (DFP) in A is a sequence (x(t), y(t)) in I˜× J˜, t ∈N,
with (x(0), y(0)) ∈ I˜× J˜ and for all t ∈N\{0},
(x(t), y(t))∈β
(
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
(x(τ), y(τ))
)
.
The sequence of beliefs (p(t), q(t)) :N\{0}→∆m×∆n, is given by
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
(x(τ), y(τ)).
Like before, we define E1(t) := x(t)Aq(t), E2(t) :=−p(t)Ay(t),
P1(t) :=
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
x(τ)Ay(τ), and P2(t) :=−P1(t).
The following result was proven by Robinson (1951).
Theorem 6.4.1 (Robinson 1951). DFP in zero-sum games converges to Nash
equilibrium.
A DFP satisfies the condition of infrequent switching4 if
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=1
Mi(τ)= 0,
for i= 1,2, where
M1(t) :=
{
1 if x(t) 6= x(t−1)
0 otherwise.
and M2(t) :=
{
1 if y(t) 6= y(t−1)
0 otherwise.
for all t ∈N\ {0}. Monderer et al. (1997), and Fudenberg and Levine (1994)
established the following result.
Lemma 6.4.2. Every DFP satisfying infrequent switching is belief affirming.
Hence, if the DFP process satisfies infrequent switching, then its con-
vergence in zero-sum games follows along the lines of the previous section.
Whether DFP in zero-sum games satisfies infrequent switching remains an
open question.
4Monderer et al. (1997) call DFP’s that satisfy infrequent switching “smooth” Fictitious
Plays.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt onderwerpen in de besliskunde, de speltheorie,
en het raakvlak tussen deze beide vakgebieden. Het onderdeel van de be-
sliskunde dat we beschouwen in deze tekst, beslissen onder onzekerheid,
onderzoekt hoe individuen beslissingen en keuzes maken in een onzekere
wereld, en hoe deze worden beïnvloed door de gedragssamenstelling van de-
gene die de beslissing neemt. Dit wordt misschien best geïllustreerd door het
klassieke voorbeeld van Bernoulli (1738), die de vraag stelde tegen welke
prijs men een lot uit de loterij dient te verkopen dat met gelijke kans e
20.000 of e 0 oplevert. Dat wil zeggen, welk zeker geldbedrag zou de bezit-
ter van een dergelijk lot als een passende vergoeding beschouwen voor de
kans e 20.000 te winnen, en het risico met niets te eindigen. Uiteraard
verandert het probleem als we niet langer met zekerheid weten met welke
kans de lotto wordt gewonnen, of wanneer men niet de verkoper is van zo’n
lot, maar de koper.
Dagelijks nemen wij ontelbare beslissingen, zowel kleine als grote. Doe
ik er goed aan mij te verzekeren tegen fietsdiefstal? Moet ik de auto nemen
naar mijn werk, in de wetenschap dat de fiets trager is, maar veiliger? Moet
ik vandaag stoppen met roken, wetende dat dit mij kan behoeden voor po-
tentiële gezondheidsproblemen in de toekomst? Door het onderzoeken van
problemen zoals dit van Bernoulli, tracht de besliskunde de systemen aan
het licht te brengen die aan onze beslissingen ten grondslag liggen. Zij bezet
dan ook een belangrijke plaats in verschillende humane wetenschappen,
zoals daar zijn psychologie, sociologie, en economie.
Beslissen onder onzekerheid beperkt zich tot het onderzoeken van keu-
zeproblemen van geïsoleerde individuen, en gaat derhalve voorbij aan de
Thesis_Driesen_v04.pdf
interactie die inherent is aan het economisch handelen. De uitkomst van de
beslissingen die een agent neemt hangt niet enkel af van welke staat van de
wereld gerealiseerd wordt, maar tevens van de beslissingen genomen door
één of meerdere andere agenten die geconfronteerd worden met exact het-
zelfde hetzelfde probleem, zijnde het maken van de optimale keuze in de
wetenschap dat de uitkomst afhangt van de combinatie van alle gespeelde
strategieën, zowel die van de anderen als die van henzelf. Dergelijke strate-
gische interacties worden bestudeerd in de speltheorie.
Hoewel speltheorie een toepassing vindt in vele wetenschappelijke dis-
ciplines, zijn er slechts weinig waarin zij een zo prominente plaats inneemt
als in economie. Op een paar losstaande uitzonderingen na, is het gebruik
van speltheorie in de economie begonnen met de publicatie van von Neu-
mann en Morgenstern’s boek Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Hier
bekomen zij een hoogst elegante integratie van de besliskundige principes
van Bernoulli met de speltheoretische concepten die op dat moment in voege
waren. De theorie van verwacht nut die zij hiervoor aanwendden, bleef even-
wel niet lang zonder kritiek. Reeds in de jaren 50 leidde Allais een experi-
ment waarmee werd aangetoond dat individuen keuzes maken die hiermee
niet verenigbaar zijn. Over de jaren heen doken er meer en meer paradoxen
en puzzels op die de theorie van verwacht nut in vraag zouden stellen; de
nood aan een alternatief beslismodel drong zich op.
Een belangrijk alternatief model – genaamd prospecttheorie – werd ont-
wikkeld door Kahneman en Tversky (1979). Zij behielden de basis van
het verwacht nutsmodel, maar verrijkten dit met een aantal gedragsken-
merken, waaronder verliesaversie. Verliesaversie is gebaseerd op het idee
dat bij het nemen van beslissingen, een mogelijk verlies in het algemeen
zwaarder doorweegt dan een potentiële winst van dezelfde grootte. Als we
weten dat Kahneman en Tversky’s beslismodel dergelijke besliskundige eige-
naardigheden in acht neemt, hoeft het niet te verbazen dat het significant
beter doet dan haar verwacht nutstegenhanger. Dit succes voor individu-
ele beslissingen voedt het vermoeden dat het invoeren van (elementen van)
prospecttheorie in de speltheorie op eenzelfde manier zal leiden tot betere
modellen voor strategische interacties. We trachten in dit proefschrift een
licht te werpen op het effect van verliesaversie op enkele bekende resultaten
uit de speltheorie.
Verliesaversie wordt gemodelleerdmet de simpele transformatie van Sha-
lev (2000). Shalev nam aan dat elke speler een bepaald nutsniveau r in
gedachten heeft – een verwachting of een vooraf gesteld doel – dat zijn hele
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spectrum van nutsuitkomsten opsplitst in winsten en verliezen. Dit nut-
sniveau wordt ook het referentiepunt van deze speler genoemd. Tversky en
Kahneman (1981) gaven al aan dat elke nutsuitkomst x kan uitgedrukt wor-
den als een afwijking van dit referentiepunt: x = r+ (x− r). Kahneman en
Tversky’s (1979) stelling dat negatieve afwijkingen (x− r < 0) belangrijker
zijn dan positieve (x−r ≥ 0), werd door Shalev gemodelleerd met de elegante
transformatie
U(x)=


r+ (x− r) if x− r ≥ 0,
r+ (1+λ) · (x− r) if x− r < 0,
waar de positieve parameter λ – de verliesaversiecoëfficiënt – een maat is
voor hoe negatief de agent precies staat tegenover verliezen. Om de ef-
fecten van verliesaversie op de uitkomst van strategische interacties vast te
stellen, hoeven we in principe slechts de mogelijke uitbetalingen van de spel-
ers te corrigerenmet Shalevs transformatie. Dit gaat echter voorbij aan het
feit dat we de referentiepunten van de spelers niet kennen. Het is duidelijk
dat deze de uitkomst van een spel beïnvloeden. Het omgekeerde is echter
eveneens waar: welke uitbetalingen een individuele speler als verlies zal
beschouwen, en welke als winst, hangt af van hoe deze speler verwacht dat
het spel gespeeld zal worden, en dus welke uitbetaling hij denkt te kunnen
realiseren. Het besluit dat wij hieruit trekken is dat een correcte integratie
van verliesaversie in speltheorie vereist dat het bepalen van spelers’ ref-
erentiepunten deel uitmaakt van het evenwichtsconcept waarmee het spel
wordt gespeeld.
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we wat dit betekent voor het onderhandel-
ingsspel van Rubinstein (1982) waarin twee spelers een akkoord moeten
bereiken over de verdeling van een perfect verdeelbaar goed. De onder-
handeling bestaat erin dat ze mekaar om de beurt een voorstel doen, tot-
dat één van de twee akkoord gaat met het aanbod van de ander. Daarop
wordt de afgesproken verdeling geïmplementeerd. Een aanbod afslaan leidt
met een kleine kans tot het doodlopen, en dus eindigen van de onderhan-
delingen; in deze situatie krijgen beide spelers niets. Rubinstein toonde
aan dat dit spel een uniek Subgame Perfect Evenwicht (SPE) heeft. In dit
proefschrift wordt de spelsituatie uitgebreid met de aanname dat beide spel-
ers verliesavers zijn, en dat ieders referentiepunt gelijk is aan het hoogste
bod van zijn tegenspeler dat hij in het verleden afgewezen heeft. In dit
uitgebreid spel construeren wij een SPE dat we bovendien karakteriseren
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door drie eigenschappen die het gemeen heeft met Rubinsteins verliesneu-
trale evenwicht. Hoewel een dergelijke karakterisering niet uitsluit dat het
spel met verliesaverse spelers nog andere evenwichten heeft, kunnen we wel
besluiten dat ons evenwicht het enige is dat gelijkaardig is aan dat van Ru-
binstein. Het is welbekend dat Rubinsteins evenwicht in de Nash onderhan-
delingsoplossingsuikomst resulteert, als we de kans op het doodlopen van de
onderhandelingen na het afwijzen van een voorstel, naar nul laten converg-
eren. Wij tonen aan dat het SPE in het spel met verliesaverse spelers op een
gelijkaardige manier leidt tot een asymmetrische Nash onderhandelingso-
plossingsuitkomst, waarin de sterkte van een spelers onderhandelingsposi-
tie invers gerelateerd is aan zijn eigen verliesaversiecoëfficiënt, en positief
aan die van zijn tegenstander.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de effecten van verliesaversie in axiomatische
onderhandelingstheorie. Centraal in deze theorie staat Nash’ (1950a) on-
derhandelingsprobleem. Onderhandelaars dienen samen een akkoord te
bereiken over één welbepaald element uit een verzameling van mogelijke
uitkomsten, in de wetenschap dat het niet eens raken een uitkomst oplev-
ert die slecht is voor hen allemaal. We nemen aan dat spelers verliesavers
zijn, en passen Shalevs (2002) methode van zelfonderhoud toe. Als alle ver-
liesaverse spelers, gegeven een bepaalde onderhandelingsoplossing, vooraf
een bepaalde uitbetaling verwachten, en de uitkomst die ze uiteindelijk re-
aliseren gegeven die verwachting is exact gelijk aan die verwachting, dan
zeggen we dat deze uitkomst zichzelf onderhoudt voor die welbepaalde on-
derhandelingsoplossing. Wij tonen aan dat een onderhandelingsprobleem
juist één uitkomst heeft die zichzelf onderhoudt onder de Kalai-Smorodinsky
onderhandelingsoplossing. Verder definiëren we een klasse van onderhan-
delingsoplossingen die deze unieke uitkomst implementeert. Deze oploss-
ingsklasse wordt gekarakteriseerd door een drietal standaardaxioma’s uit
de onderhandelingsliteratuur, en een nieuw axioma dat in dit proefschrift
wordt gedefinieerd.
In hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we drie verschillende verliesaversie evenwich-
ten in bimatrixspelen. Een verliesaversie evenwicht is een Nash evenwicht
van een spel waarin beide spelers verliesavers zijn, en waarin hun referen-
tiepunten endogeen zijn aan de evenwichtsberekening. Het eerste evenwicht
dat we beschouwen is Shalevs (2000) ‘fixed point’ verliesaversie evenwicht,
waarin het referentiepunt van elke speler exact afhangt van het strate-
gieprofiel dat hij gelooft dat zijn tegenstander zal spelen. Bij het tweede
type evenwicht dat we beschouwen, hetmaximin evenwicht, hangt het refer-
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entiepunt slechts af van de dragers van de evenwichtsstrategie van de tegen-
stander, en niet langer van de precieze kansen. In het derde evenwichtscon-
cept, veiligheidswaarde-evenwichten, wordt de waarde van de eigen uitbe-
talingsmatrix als referentiepunt genomen. Shalev toonde reeds aan dat er
steeds een fixed-point verliesaversie-evenwicht bestaat. Wij tonen het al-
gemene bestaan van maximin-evenwichten aan in m× 2- en 2× n-spelen;
met een voorbeeld laten we zien dat dit niet voor algemenere bimatrixspe-
len geldt. We bewijzen tevens het algemene bestaan van veiligheidswaarde-
evenwichten. Het hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met een comparative statics
analyse. We leiden een conditie af onder de welke verliesaversie van de
tegenstander een goede zaak is.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over aversie voor risico en ambiguïteit. Het is wel-
bekend dat het model van verwacht nut de mate van risico-aversie van
een agent gelijk stelt aan de concaviteit van zijn nutsfunctie. Hier intro-
duceren we een nieuwe techniek die toelaat de concaviteit van verschil-
lende nutsfuncties – en dus risico-attitudes – met elkaar te vergelijken met
slechts een beperkte kennis van kansen of staten van de wereld. Deze
techniek, de preferentiemiddelpuntstechniek, is gebaseerd op een discrete
versie van marginal rates of substitution, een welbekend concept uit de
consumententheorie. Hoewel de preferentiemiddelpuntstechniek wiskundig
gezien vrij elementair is, veralgemeent zij niettemin een aantal klassieke
resultaten over beslissen onder onzekerheid. Daar het misschien niet hele-
maal geloofwaardig is dat we risico-attitudes kunnen bestuderen met een
slechts zeer beperkte aandacht voor kansen of staten van de wereld, werpt
deze techniek tevens een nieuw licht op de descriptieve waarde van nut voor
het modelleren van risico- en ambiguïteitsattitudes.
Het proefschrift besluit met een zuiver speltheoretisch resultaat dat in
principe los staat van risico- en verliesaversie. Om precies te zijn, we lev-
eren een alternatief bewijs voor het welgekende resultaat dat tweepersoons
nulsomspelen gekenmerkt worden door de Fictitious Play-eigenschap. Ficti-
tious Play is een leerproces dat behoort tot de literatuur die het Nash even-
wichtsconcept tracht te rechtvaardigen middels het argument dat begrensd
rationele spelers evenwichtsstrategieën kunnen leren spelen. Spelers spelen
op ieder moment hun optimale strategieën, gegeven de empirische strategie
van de tegenstanders. Als met deze procedure het empirisch strategieprofiel
voor een bepaald spel naar een Nash evenwicht convergeert, ongeacht de
startcondities, dan zeggen we dat dit spel de Fictitious Play eigenschap
heeft. Robinson (1951) toonde reeds aan dat het discrete Fictitious Play
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proces in nulsomspelen naar een Nash evenwicht convergeert. Dat dit ook
geldt voor het continue Fictitious Play proces is reeds geweten sinds het
werk van Brown (1949). Op een rigoureus bewijs was het echter wachten tot
eind jaren negentig (Harris 1998). Wij leveren een alternatief bewijs voor
dit resultaat, dat zowel korter als gemakkelijker is dan dit van Harris.
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